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Zero!
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
February 23, 2021
I found ZERO! by Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi with
MARTIN CAIDIN
fascinating in that it questioned how so much could be allowed to go wrong. This is a question posed by MARTIN CAIDIN in his introduction (the only part of the book he actually wrote), and is one that was constantly in the back of my mind as I read about the ridiculous loss of lives on both sides throughout this book.
I now find myself curious about the diplomatic failures on both sides that led up to the war. Okumiya dedicates a chapter to the build-up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, but says the Japanese public and those lower in the military hierarchy were caught by surprise by Japan's declaration of hostilities on the U.S. and Great Britain. In the final chapter Horikoshi suggests Japan's population strain on its natural resources forced it to look abroad for raw materials, which put it on a course for conflict. I think there is some truth to that, but it doesn't explain the cynicism of Japan's wartime leaders, both governmental and military, or why the Japanese chose to prolong the war well beyond the point everyone recognized the effort was lost, once the logic of the war--that Japan would break America's back with a rapid succession of decisive victories--was lost at Midway. With each battle lost, the Japanese lost leverage they had at the negotiating table, which is why they had to accept unconditional defeat in the end. What explains Tokyo's position that they would fight to the last man in a war they admitted was a lost cause only to inflict as much pain on the Americans as possible before defeat? If you knew you were eventually going to have to put yourself at the mercy of your enemies, why adopt such a stance? I have some theories, but would like to learn the Japanese point-of-view.
Some may find the technical details and lists of every unit and piece of equipment used in every battle to make for dry reading, the overall effect of the book, though, is one of an authentic view of the war from one who participated in it and was an eye-witness to key events, and gives a candid account of Japan's failures. I found myself moved to tears at times, reading of the avoidable bloodbaths endured by both sides. The tragedy is so much human potential was squandered for no good reason, and no one can really answer the question of how it happened.
I now find myself curious about the diplomatic failures on both sides that led up to the war. Okumiya dedicates a chapter to the build-up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, but says the Japanese public and those lower in the military hierarchy were caught by surprise by Japan's declaration of hostilities on the U.S. and Great Britain. In the final chapter Horikoshi suggests Japan's population strain on its natural resources forced it to look abroad for raw materials, which put it on a course for conflict. I think there is some truth to that, but it doesn't explain the cynicism of Japan's wartime leaders, both governmental and military, or why the Japanese chose to prolong the war well beyond the point everyone recognized the effort was lost, once the logic of the war--that Japan would break America's back with a rapid succession of decisive victories--was lost at Midway. With each battle lost, the Japanese lost leverage they had at the negotiating table, which is why they had to accept unconditional defeat in the end. What explains Tokyo's position that they would fight to the last man in a war they admitted was a lost cause only to inflict as much pain on the Americans as possible before defeat? If you knew you were eventually going to have to put yourself at the mercy of your enemies, why adopt such a stance? I have some theories, but would like to learn the Japanese point-of-view.
Some may find the technical details and lists of every unit and piece of equipment used in every battle to make for dry reading, the overall effect of the book, though, is one of an authentic view of the war from one who participated in it and was an eye-witness to key events, and gives a candid account of Japan's failures. I found myself moved to tears at times, reading of the avoidable bloodbaths endured by both sides. The tragedy is so much human potential was squandered for no good reason, and no one can really answer the question of how it happened.
June 23, 2022
I really enjoyed this book in that I learnt many things that I was unaware of. Of course war is not right, but this is history.
August 24, 2017
In the book Zero by Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi with Martin Cadin, you get a real perspective from legendary aces, people surviving the war, and the designer of the Zero. It introduces and tells each battle with detail and the book tells the role of the Zero including lists of each aircraft carrier division, the losses of aircraft of the enemy's side and the Japanese. It also tells what the pilots thought of the Zero at the beginning and the end. I really enjoyed reading and learning the perspectives of how the Japanese thought of the Zero in battle. I enjoyed learning things I didn't know of and learning about the success of battles and losses for three reasons.
The first reason: There is so few books that have the actual thought and telling of a Japanese ace or a person who survived the war, like Saburo Sakai who is one of the most skilled fighters, Jiro Horikoshi who is the designer of the Zero fighter. Usually, you will have the perspective of American aces who won the war. Both sides, in books exaggerate on how many ships or planes they sunk or shot down. However, in this book it actually says the estimated amount instead of an exaggerated or way off amount. Also, the book describes what the pilots destroyed in a fast way so there is a lot of paragraphs for how they did when attacking the enemy. Pg.45 and more it says. "In May of 1941 several units of Type 96 and Type 1 twin-engined bombers returned to China to resume heavy bombing operations, which augmented the marauding raids of the Zero fighters. On May 20, unable to ferret out Chinese fighters over Chengtu, the Zeros strafed and set afire fuel storage installations and destroyed two planes on the Taipingssu and Shuanglin airfields. This strafing raid, however, marked the end of the incredible good fortune of the Zeros against enemy opposition. Antiaircraft fire riddled Chief Flight Petty Officer Kimura's airplane, which subsequently crashed; this was the first Zero lost in combat. Three other fighters sustained damage from enemy ground fire that day." This reporting keeps going on to help tell you about the success and the failures of the attacks.
The second reason: I learned that a lot of the time before the Zero fighter even existed, a lot of bombers were lost because the escorts weren't so good back then. PG.38. "The limited range of the Claude fighters prevented them from escorting the bombers to their objectives, where waiting Chinese fighters pounced upon the raiders. We suffered heavy losses; nine planes were destroyed or missing, and a total of 297 bombers were damaged. During some raids the percentage of lost or damaged bombers rose beyond the "prohibitive" figure of 10 per cent. The Chinese fighters inflicted at least half the damage sustained by our bombers, while antiaircraft fire was responsible for the remainder. We could alleviate this unsatisfactory situation only by securing command of the air over the targets." The answer is the Zero because it was superior to the Russian N-15 and N-16 fighters and could go for a long distance to maintain the protection of the bombers.
The third and last reason: I liked the way the book had so much detail that you could actually picture the battle in your head like you were in the cockpit of the plane. One example is on page 108. "We began the attack at an altitude of 1,000 feet and about a mile and a half from the enemy. No sooner had we emerged from the clouds than the enemy gunners sighted our planes. The fleet opened up with a tremendous barrage of shells, trying to disrupt our attack before we could release our torpedoes. The sky was filled with bursting shells which made my plane reel and shake. "The second battleship had already started evasive action and was making a hard turn to the right. The target angle was becoming smaller and smaller as the bow of the vessel swung gradually in my direction, making it difficult for me to release a torpedo against the ship. It was expected that the lead torpedo bomber would be compelled to attack from the most unfavorable position. This was anticipated, and it enabled the other planes following me to torpedo the target under the best of conditions" This quote was one of the many parts of the book that really had me picturing the attack they were making on the British fleet. You could feel the nervousness of the pilots as the target battleship was making an evasive move to make it harder to attack. However, at the end of the attack the Japanese torpedo bombers successfully sink the two battleships Repulse and the Prince of Wales.
All in all, I really enjoyed picturing the battles and attacks, learning about how the Japanese drastically changed after the Zero fighter became the top of the line fighter plane and finally getting a real perspective of some Japanese aces and the maker of the Zero fighter.
I hope you enjoyed.
By: Kenichi
The first reason: There is so few books that have the actual thought and telling of a Japanese ace or a person who survived the war, like Saburo Sakai who is one of the most skilled fighters, Jiro Horikoshi who is the designer of the Zero fighter. Usually, you will have the perspective of American aces who won the war. Both sides, in books exaggerate on how many ships or planes they sunk or shot down. However, in this book it actually says the estimated amount instead of an exaggerated or way off amount. Also, the book describes what the pilots destroyed in a fast way so there is a lot of paragraphs for how they did when attacking the enemy. Pg.45 and more it says. "In May of 1941 several units of Type 96 and Type 1 twin-engined bombers returned to China to resume heavy bombing operations, which augmented the marauding raids of the Zero fighters. On May 20, unable to ferret out Chinese fighters over Chengtu, the Zeros strafed and set afire fuel storage installations and destroyed two planes on the Taipingssu and Shuanglin airfields. This strafing raid, however, marked the end of the incredible good fortune of the Zeros against enemy opposition. Antiaircraft fire riddled Chief Flight Petty Officer Kimura's airplane, which subsequently crashed; this was the first Zero lost in combat. Three other fighters sustained damage from enemy ground fire that day." This reporting keeps going on to help tell you about the success and the failures of the attacks.
The second reason: I learned that a lot of the time before the Zero fighter even existed, a lot of bombers were lost because the escorts weren't so good back then. PG.38. "The limited range of the Claude fighters prevented them from escorting the bombers to their objectives, where waiting Chinese fighters pounced upon the raiders. We suffered heavy losses; nine planes were destroyed or missing, and a total of 297 bombers were damaged. During some raids the percentage of lost or damaged bombers rose beyond the "prohibitive" figure of 10 per cent. The Chinese fighters inflicted at least half the damage sustained by our bombers, while antiaircraft fire was responsible for the remainder. We could alleviate this unsatisfactory situation only by securing command of the air over the targets." The answer is the Zero because it was superior to the Russian N-15 and N-16 fighters and could go for a long distance to maintain the protection of the bombers.
The third and last reason: I liked the way the book had so much detail that you could actually picture the battle in your head like you were in the cockpit of the plane. One example is on page 108. "We began the attack at an altitude of 1,000 feet and about a mile and a half from the enemy. No sooner had we emerged from the clouds than the enemy gunners sighted our planes. The fleet opened up with a tremendous barrage of shells, trying to disrupt our attack before we could release our torpedoes. The sky was filled with bursting shells which made my plane reel and shake. "The second battleship had already started evasive action and was making a hard turn to the right. The target angle was becoming smaller and smaller as the bow of the vessel swung gradually in my direction, making it difficult for me to release a torpedo against the ship. It was expected that the lead torpedo bomber would be compelled to attack from the most unfavorable position. This was anticipated, and it enabled the other planes following me to torpedo the target under the best of conditions" This quote was one of the many parts of the book that really had me picturing the attack they were making on the British fleet. You could feel the nervousness of the pilots as the target battleship was making an evasive move to make it harder to attack. However, at the end of the attack the Japanese torpedo bombers successfully sink the two battleships Repulse and the Prince of Wales.
All in all, I really enjoyed picturing the battles and attacks, learning about how the Japanese drastically changed after the Zero fighter became the top of the line fighter plane and finally getting a real perspective of some Japanese aces and the maker of the Zero fighter.
I hope you enjoyed.
By: Kenichi
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 27, 2015
A very interesting book, told from the perspective of two Japanese men who were very closely involved with Japanese naval aviation. Not so much about the Zero fighter as about the whole Japanese WW2 war effort, specifically the war in the air waged over top of the huge naval battle groups amassed by both the Japanese and the Allies. After reading this book, one thing is abundantly clear and that is that the Japanese totally underestimated and were woefully unprepared for war against the USA and Britain and their allies. What we see is that they were so wrapped up in their own perceived superiority in morality, intelligence, discipline, training and technology to really notice how much of a chunk they'd bitten off. A few smart ones knew this, but the Japanese leaders persisted for years with their doomed agenda, bolstered by a few victories along the way. Ultimately, their backsides (and this unfortunately included the civilian population, not only the military) were well and truly kicked. The perfect example of this is the Zero, which was considered more than adequate for the job even as far better American designs began appearing. I guess I found myself becoming very frustrated with the overall Japanese attitude as I read this book, and as much as I feel ashamed to say it, they got what was coming to them, so to speak. To open hostilities with the USA by simultaneously bombing three military installations was to invite a huge backlash. It's a terrible, terrible shame that Japanese civilian collateral damage was so devastatingly high, but after reading this book I have to admit, once again, that we reap what we sow. The nation of Japan is one example. Overall, this book is a very good read, and a definite must-read for military history buffs. A very educational and sobering story with a solid lesson that came at a massive cost to all sides.
June 20, 2016
This account of the air war in the Pacific from the Japanese point of view must have been fascinating in 1957 when it was first published, and is still of great interest. To a modern reader, used to very accessible non-fiction, it does read as slightly dry, coming into its own where there are first person accounts of the conflict.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews