China's Battle for Korea: The 1951 Spring Offensive

Twentieth-Century Battles

by Xiaobing Li

Between November 1950 and the end of fighting in June 1953, China launched six major offensives against UN forces in Korea. The most important of these began on April 22, 1951, and was the largest Communist military operation of the war. The UN forces put up a strong defense, prevented the capture of the South Korean capital of Seoul, and finally pushed the Chinese back above the 38th parallel. After China's defeat in this epic five-week battle, Mao Zedong and the Chinese leadership became willing to conclude the war short of total victory. China's Battle for Korea offers new perspectives on Chinese decision making, planning, and execution; the roles of command, political control, and technology; and the interaction between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow, while providing valuable insight into Chinese military doctrine and the reasons for the UN's military success.

344 pages, Hardcover

First published February 5, 2014

About the author

Xiaobing Li is Professor of History and director of the Western Pacific Institute at the University of Central Oklahoma.

Reviews

[Fer Prz · Rating 4 out of 5]

After reading Why they collaborated by Eugene Kinkead 1959, I had a yearning to learn about the Korean War from the communist states perspective. Specially around POW.

As part of the research for this book, Xiaobing Li interviewed survivors and POWs. Turns out that China has no tolerance for surviving POW since it is looked as a shameful act. You die in battle, being captured is not an option.

Since this was a subset of cold era conflicts, it was USA led coalition supporting South Korea and Sino-Russian supporting North Korea.

“WRUSAK war to resist the U.S. and aid Korea”

This book is extremely detailed, Li does an incredible job of obtaining information from Chinese and North Korean sources which were/are hard to obtain. A play by play of the events in the war along with the discussions and decisions being made. Mistakes from both sides but the intervention and decisions being made by Mao Zedong did not align with the realities of the conflicts. The generals were forced into positions that were not favorable and exposed the Chinese troops to many casualties at every conflict. The worst detractor however was logistics. Soldiers were not supplied with enough armament, food, and attire for the cold weather.

One aspect I liked about the book was the correlation between Sun Tzu’s art of war and China’s approach to the war. Due to their success in the Revolution and war with the Japanese, the People’s Liberation Army used tried and true tactics such as encircle and annihilate using their overwhelming number of soldiers. This approach contrasted with the US lead coalition which was more adept with technology and face to face confrontation with rapid resolution of military conflicts by main force. Sandler mentions the captured Chinese soldiers who "began to deprecate their army doctrine of 'man over weapons’ conceding that such theories worked only when their enemy's technological superiority was not too great.

As part of the realization that the only outcome would be truce instead of victory, the Chinese decided to setup defensive strategies at the 38th parallel. They dug 780 miles of underground tunnels and entrenchments of approximately 3,900 miles comparable to length of the Great Wall. The strategic timing and negotiations towards armistice were used heavily for propaganda by the Chinese. Such as the arrival of the US led coalition to combat zones with white flags. Even when China was losing ground at every conflict. Based on the book the main factor in allowing peace negotiations was the death of Stalin.

The Korean War began to transformation of the Chinese military into a modern force and ambitious rising superpower.

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

This remains a very good examination of why Mao Tsetung felt obligated to involve his new regime in the Korean War, the qualities that made the Chinese "Volunteers" immediately successful, and why those qualities were insufficient to carry the day in what was supposed to be the decisive offensive of 1951. You will learn a great deal about how the Chinese political and military leadership saw themselves, and how they adapted in the face of near failure. Where this book might have become just a bit lacking is while we know that the current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, takes the history of this conflict very seriously, the question is just what lessons he thinks he's learned; at the very least they seem to include making sure China has answers to American military doctrine and technology when planning a war of choice.

Originally written: April 17, 2020.

[Eric J. Hartsfield · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great history of China's 5th offensive in Korea.

One of the best books I have read about the Spring Offensive of 1951. Provides a good background from China's intervention to its efforts to win the war by driving UN forces off the Korea peninsula.
Good maps and analysis of what errors were made. Great use of sources and materials from all sides.

[Yong Lee · Rating 3 out of 5]

A nice introduction to China's entry into the Korean War. At this point there are multiple volumes published in the last 20 years offering China's view of the war. The author in that regard does not offer anything new, but his deep dive into the spring 1951 offensive is insightful and offers new food for thought.