Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy

by Richard Bellamy

Judicial review by constitutional courts is often presented as a necessary supplement to democracy. This book questions its effectiveness and legitimacy. Drawing on the republican tradition, Richard Bellamy argues that the democratic mechanisms of open elections between competing parties and decision-making by majority rule offer superior and sufficient methods for upholding rights and the rule of law. The absence of popular accountability renders judicial review a form of arbitrary rule which lacks the incentive structure democracy provides to ensure rulers treat the ruled with equal concern and respect. Rights based judicial review undermines the constitutionality of democracy. Its counter-majoritarian bias promotes privileged against unprivileged minorities, while its legalism and focus on individual cases distort public debate. Rather than constraining democracy with written constitutions and greater judicial oversight, attention should be paid to improving democratic processes through such measures as reformed electoral systems and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny.

Paperback

First published January 1, 2007

About the author

Richard Bellamy was born in Glasgow, though he is not of Scottish descent - both his parents came from Liverpool. The family moved to near London when he was 2, by way of a 6 month period on the beach near Pisa, where his father was working at the Institute of Physics. Though he did return to Glasgow 16 years later to work as a community service volunteer (CSV) prior to University, those few idyllic months in Italy left a profound impression and many of his writings engage with the Italian tradition of political thought. The family also spent periods in California (while his father was at Stanford) and Geneva (where his father worked at CERN).

Richard studied history at Cambridge and did his PhD there and at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. He was a post doctoral research fellow at Nuffield College Oxford, a temporary lecturer in history at Cambridge and then moved to a lectureship in politics at Edinburgh. He has held Chairs at UEA, Reading, Essex and University College, London (UCL), where he was founding head of the Political Science Department and also set up the European Institute. From 2014-2019 he was Director of the Max Weber Post-doctoral programme at the EUI, on extended leave from his position at UCL to which he has now returned. He has been a Visiting Professor at the University of Exeter and at the Hertie School in Berlin, where he was Professor of Ethics and Public Policy and is now a Senior Fellow.

The author of 11 monographs and the editor of a further 30 books, most of his work combines history, politics, law and philosophy to different degrees. He has written extensively on the development of, and challenges to, democracy, citizenship and constitutionalism in modern societies, particularly in Europe and most recently in relation to the European Union. He is presently working on books on constitutional theory and on democratic ethics.

He lives and works between London, Exeter, Berlin and Livorno. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS) and of the British Academy (FBA). Further information about Richard can be found on his website (see link above).

Reviews

[Sarah · Rating 4 out of 5]

Pretty persuasive in his discussion of judges rulings being somewhat arbitrary and that more participatory democracy would be helpful, especially in today's climate.

Overall enjoyed it, just unsure how a world without judges would really function. Going to use a lot of him for my political framework so all in all a goodread!

[Gordon D · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ultimately unpersuasive. Moral reasoning is sometimes arbitrary: Bellamy accepts some moral assumptions as unassailable but the rest of his critique is based on the contestable nature of most other moral arguments made by other philosophers. He doesn’t refute these arguments successfully (his critiques of Rawls and dworkin miss the mark), but relies only on the idea that reasonable people can disagree, so moral assumptions or arguments that undergird democratic theory have to be removed. Unless, like republican liberty or political equality, they are useful for his argument—in which case they are accepted as moral assumptions which somehow escape the same objection as all the other moral assumptions or arguments in this critique. Contestability means that a polity has to be free to revise or abandon any contestable commitments—except for the aforementioned few which arbitrarily escape that standard.