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British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918: Defeat Into Victory
This book explores how British Army learnt from the pyrrhic victories of 1915-17 and developed the new tactics, leadership and doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate hitherto bedevilling Allied offensives to defeat the
- GenresMilitary History
Paperback
First published December 17, 2004
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April 21, 2021
An accessible academic study of British generalship on the western front during the First World War, based on the author’s PhD thesis.
Challengers the accepted, popular, view that the generals were incompetent, callous men, sat far behind the front lines unworried about the casualties. Robbins sets out a compelling argument that British generals were in a steep learning curve enforced by their intrinsic culture and the fact that the army had been designed for imperial policing rather than continental conflict. By the end of the war British generals arguably have no rival, out-planning and out-fighting the Germans and performing more effectively than their allies.
Robbins is not afraid to level criticism where he sees it due, Haig’s adherence to total victory in a single battle through 1916-17, when only able to deliver a strategy of attrition for example.
Though an academic study, British generalship is a relatively easy read, heavily referenced for those who want to explore specific points in more detail, significant use has been made of primary source material. My only criticism, perhaps more from an academic standpoint is the lack of engagement with the wider historical debate and work of other historians. This does not, however, detract from an otherwise excellent book. Recommended to serious students, but also those who want to understand the command challenges of the western front to contextualise more popular history and even mythology.
Challengers the accepted, popular, view that the generals were incompetent, callous men, sat far behind the front lines unworried about the casualties. Robbins sets out a compelling argument that British generals were in a steep learning curve enforced by their intrinsic culture and the fact that the army had been designed for imperial policing rather than continental conflict. By the end of the war British generals arguably have no rival, out-planning and out-fighting the Germans and performing more effectively than their allies.
Robbins is not afraid to level criticism where he sees it due, Haig’s adherence to total victory in a single battle through 1916-17, when only able to deliver a strategy of attrition for example.
Though an academic study, British generalship is a relatively easy read, heavily referenced for those who want to explore specific points in more detail, significant use has been made of primary source material. My only criticism, perhaps more from an academic standpoint is the lack of engagement with the wider historical debate and work of other historians. This does not, however, detract from an otherwise excellent book. Recommended to serious students, but also those who want to understand the command challenges of the western front to contextualise more popular history and even mythology.
Displaying 1 of 1 review