Methodological Variance: Essays in Epistemological Ontology and the Methodology of Science

by G.L. Pandit

For a philosopher with an abiding interest in the nature of objective knowledge systems in science, what could be more important than trying to think in terms of those very subjects of such knowledge to which men like Galileo, Newton, Max Planck, Einstein and others devoted their entire lifetimes? In certain respects, these systems and their structures may not be beyond the grasp of a linguistic conception of science, and scientific change, which men of science and philosophy have advocated in various forms in recent times. But certainly it is wrong-headed to think that one's conception of science can be based on an identification of its theories with languages in which they may be, my own alternatively, framed. There may be more than one place in book (1983: 87) where they may seem to get confused with each other, quite against my original intentiens. The distinction between the objec­ tive knowledge systems in science and the dynamic frameworks of the languages of the special individual sciences, in which their growth can be embedded in significant ways, assumes here, therefore, much impor­ tance. It must be recognized that the problems concerning scientific change, which these systems undergo, are not just problems concerning language change.

455 pages, Paperback

First published October 31, 1991

Reviews

[Matthew Osborn · Rating 5 out of 5]

I enjoyed it very much, even though it was difficult reading for me. I had to read quite a bit of other sources in order to understand some of the terms and concepts discussed in the book. It was rather mind-expanding on subjects of what is knowledge, how do we know what we know, what is the difference in science and non-science, whether it is possible ever to absolutely translate anything from one language to another, are there essential properties and characteristics of science as opposed to nominalism or conventionism and saying things are whatever we say they are?

I was interested in the book because of my interest in the general concept of epistemological ontology, and so I found it to be quite rewarding for me on that subject, even though the main thesis of the book is more specifically the philosophy of science.

The author is very thorough and detailed, walking through his arguments from fundamental concepts, through differing thinkers' opinions, to his own assertions. There are many references for further exploration, and there's a huge bibliography.

I think this book helped me not only to understand more about epistemological ontology (with much reference to K. Popper's Three Worlds ideas, for instance), but also I think it helped me to understand something about personal knowledge states as orientating variables important in relating to the outside world and other people.