Air Power as a Coercive Instrument

by Daniel L. Byman

Coercion―the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior―is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic

192 pages, Paperback

First published August 20, 1999

Reviews

[Rich · Rating 4 out of 5]

Byman, Waxman, and Larson's Air Power as a Coercive Instrument is a compact review of coercion and how airpower can and cannot contribute to it. Although it is clearly derivative of the work provided by Schelling's Arms and Influence , Pape's Bombing to Win , and Bueno de Mesquita's War and Reason , its still quite good on its own.

Air Power as a Coercive Instrument emphasizes that there are three important implications for assessing and designing coercive strategies. First, coercion is a the result of an interaction (a non-cooperative game?). Second, the interaction of coercion is anticipatory. And, third, coercion is best described and measured in relative terms rather than absolute terms. For this last implication the authors state: "The true question is not whether air power 'worked,' but rather whether it helped or hindered coercion." The implication is clear: the relative change in behavior should be applied to any strategic effect; did ______ power projection increase the relative level of force from the recipient's point of view? This theoretical starting point sets the stage for the discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of coercive airpower.

Air Power as a Coercive Instrument's analytical approach to coercion is based upon three factors: escalation dominance, denial of an adversary's military strategy, and the magnification of third-party threats. The authors admit that there are challenges in applying airpower to each factor. The challenge is particularly acute in application of coercive denial strategies where intelligence gaps are highlighted as the most significant limitation in operations. In this theme, behavioral and cultural intelligence are the most crucial limitations. That aside, a coercer can stress the adversary's functional capabilities, particularly through escalation dominance, where the coercer has the ability to increase the adversary's costs while also denying them the opportunity to neutralize those costs or counter escalate. However, the "know thy enemy" (behavioral, cultural, etc intelligence) as the key to denial strategies is always the most difficult aspect of coercion, where the commander's desired end-state is a change in behavior. Historically, any strategic implication of behavior change, via effects based operations or otherwise, has only produced mixed results.

Air power, like other military instruments, offers little help to or may even hinder coercion under certain circumstances.... Policymakers must recognize when air power is not the appropriate tool for the job. When the only targets available to strike (whether constrained by operational, political, or diplomatic pressures) are of limited value to the adversary, air strikes will do little to coerce. Because such strikes will have little impact, they may reduce the credibility of U.S. threats in both the short and long term.... For air power to retain its credibility, and hence its ability to coerce, it must be used with restraint.... By recognizing when air power is likely to fail and avoiding its use in such circumstances, the USAF will better preserve the credibility of air power for instances when it can coerce successfully.

The authors do well with their balanced approach to the limits of the effects of airpower. For this reason, I give this book equally a strong recommendation for both airpower advocates and antagonists alike.