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How Haig saved Lenin
Based on sources in Russian, German and English, both published and unpublished, How Haig Saved Lenin challenges what the author considers the uncritical acceptance in the West of some Soviet myths.
Hardcover
Published January 1, 1987
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About the author
Brian Pearce
68 books2 followers
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
Brian Leonard Pearce was a British Marxist political activist, historian, and translator. Adept and prolific in Russian-to-English translation, Pearce was regarded at the time of his death as "one of the most acute scholars of Russian history and British communism never to have held an academic post."
https://www.marxists.org/archive/pear...
Brian Leonard Pearce was a British Marxist political activist, historian, and translator. Adept and prolific in Russian-to-English translation, Pearce was regarded at the time of his death as "one of the most acute scholars of Russian history and British communism never to have held an academic post."
https://www.marxists.org/archive/pear...
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
March 2, 2025
The title of this book caught my eye because it made me recall Shaw-Lefebvre's argument about Poland saving the French Revolution by drawing the attention of Russia and Prussia eastwards at a critical moment.
This is a solid analogy, and another one might be apt for admirers of Pilsudski. Just as the Polish leader realised that for Poland to emerge a very specific chain of events had to happen, namely that Russia had to collapse under German attack, and then Germany had to lose in the west, so was this contingency necessary for Bolshevik success.
This book is a massive tour-de-force. It is actually very short, only about a hundred pages of core text. But I found myself jotting down notes the entire time, because every point the author made seemed like a revelation.
The author's main concern is to dispel the myth that Bolshevik propaganda distributed to the German soldiers during and after the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk resulted in the collapse of the German Army. He is at pains to prove that the primary reason was the victories of the Allies in France.
And here he means especially the British victories during the Hundred Days.
I still feel that the psychological impact of the Russian Revolution was considerable, not least because Pearce makes the point that the severity of Brest-Litovsk convinced the Allies to fight on, for fear of a similar draconian diktat from Berlin.
In the preface Evan Mawdsley states that Pearce deals with many myths and dispels them, which is no exaggeration, but one of them is of Lenin's genius.
I don't think this is a myth. The text in my opinion even reinforces it, because Lenin's policies are displayed in all of their Machiavellian glory. Lenin had no scruples in receiving assistance from anyone, or in disarming his various opponents with sops and concessions that he repudiated later.
It is, perhaps, a myth that Lenin's genius caused the collapse of Germany. But this book does not, in my view, refute the idea that the survival of the early revolution was due largely to Lenin's political dexterity.
Above all my favourite thing about this incredible book is that it shows how precarious and contingent the Russian Revolution was, and how history is in general. There were many junctures where the Bolsheviks might have been snuffed out.
Pearce is emphatic that in 1918 the Bolsheviks were practically defenceless. The old Russian Imperial Army was gone, and the new Red Army was not yet created (though its beginnings were to be laid in January and February, 1918).
The episode of Mirbach and the Left SRs attempt to overthrow Lenin and restart the war with Germany only solidify Lenin's sagacity in opposing such a nonsensical idea, one that others like Zinoviev among the Bolsheviks had. As Pearce points out, there was nothing with which to fight it.
In a very convoluted way Brest-Litovsk allowed Germany to save Bolshevism, and allowed Lenin to save German militarism, for a time, but the core point is that Bolshevism was ultimately saved from both Brest-Litovsk and any further subservience to Germany by Germany's defeat in France.
This is most fascinating to me because this exceedingly improbable chain of events gave both Lenin and Pilsudski their chance to reorder Eastern Europe, a tale that is told elsewhere.
If you want to get a very unique glimpse into the situation of 1918, grab this book with a pen and paper because you'll be writing down something of interest in almost every paragraph.
I have rarely been more pleased with a book.
This is a solid analogy, and another one might be apt for admirers of Pilsudski. Just as the Polish leader realised that for Poland to emerge a very specific chain of events had to happen, namely that Russia had to collapse under German attack, and then Germany had to lose in the west, so was this contingency necessary for Bolshevik success.
This book is a massive tour-de-force. It is actually very short, only about a hundred pages of core text. But I found myself jotting down notes the entire time, because every point the author made seemed like a revelation.
The author's main concern is to dispel the myth that Bolshevik propaganda distributed to the German soldiers during and after the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk resulted in the collapse of the German Army. He is at pains to prove that the primary reason was the victories of the Allies in France.
And here he means especially the British victories during the Hundred Days.
I still feel that the psychological impact of the Russian Revolution was considerable, not least because Pearce makes the point that the severity of Brest-Litovsk convinced the Allies to fight on, for fear of a similar draconian diktat from Berlin.
In the preface Evan Mawdsley states that Pearce deals with many myths and dispels them, which is no exaggeration, but one of them is of Lenin's genius.
I don't think this is a myth. The text in my opinion even reinforces it, because Lenin's policies are displayed in all of their Machiavellian glory. Lenin had no scruples in receiving assistance from anyone, or in disarming his various opponents with sops and concessions that he repudiated later.
It is, perhaps, a myth that Lenin's genius caused the collapse of Germany. But this book does not, in my view, refute the idea that the survival of the early revolution was due largely to Lenin's political dexterity.
Above all my favourite thing about this incredible book is that it shows how precarious and contingent the Russian Revolution was, and how history is in general. There were many junctures where the Bolsheviks might have been snuffed out.
Pearce is emphatic that in 1918 the Bolsheviks were practically defenceless. The old Russian Imperial Army was gone, and the new Red Army was not yet created (though its beginnings were to be laid in January and February, 1918).
The episode of Mirbach and the Left SRs attempt to overthrow Lenin and restart the war with Germany only solidify Lenin's sagacity in opposing such a nonsensical idea, one that others like Zinoviev among the Bolsheviks had. As Pearce points out, there was nothing with which to fight it.
In a very convoluted way Brest-Litovsk allowed Germany to save Bolshevism, and allowed Lenin to save German militarism, for a time, but the core point is that Bolshevism was ultimately saved from both Brest-Litovsk and any further subservience to Germany by Germany's defeat in France.
This is most fascinating to me because this exceedingly improbable chain of events gave both Lenin and Pilsudski their chance to reorder Eastern Europe, a tale that is told elsewhere.
If you want to get a very unique glimpse into the situation of 1918, grab this book with a pen and paper because you'll be writing down something of interest in almost every paragraph.
I have rarely been more pleased with a book.
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