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The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God
Creative and original, here is D.Z. Phillips's most systematic attempt to address the problem of evil. He argues that the problem is inextricably linked to our conception of God and that the concept of God in recent philosophy of religion is problematic, even harmful. That intellectual inheritance, he claims, attempts to distinguish between logical and existential problems of evil and offers us distorted accounts of God's omnipotence and will. As a result, God is ridiculed out of existence or found unfit before the bar of decency. Yet Phillips elucidates in a second part a neglected tradition in which we reach a different understanding of God's presence amid suffering and which addresses the ultimate question of how God can be said to be with those who are crushed by life's afflictions. This new work is an ideal text for students of philosophy, religion, or theology, but it also speaks clearly to anyone who reflects seriously on the danger of adding to human evil by the way in which we write and think about it.
- GenresPhilosophyTheology
Paperback
First published January 1, 2004
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About the author
D.Z. Phillips
54 books8 followersDewi Zephaniah Phillips, usually cited as D.Z. Phillips, is recognized for his work in the philosophy of religion and other philosophical disciplines. He was also a proponent of preserving the Welsh language.
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December 17, 2012
God as Agent among Agents and Humanity’s Contingency
The first significant contribution Phillips made to my understanding of religious language is his discussion on God as an agent among other agents. If we conceive of God as a person without a body (this, presumably being what it means to think of God as an agent—the implication being that God is part of our community of persons), then we begin to think that God makes plans or has feelings like human beings do. It is clear that this is not the case, however, when one looks at the grammar of religious language about God. A few examples come to mind. Although it is imaginable for a person to say to another person, “You have fulfilled your duty. You can’t do anything else. A person must move on.” it is not imaginable for a religious person to say, “You have fulfilled your duty to God. A person must move on.” It is also imaginable to say, “My friend forgives me but I cannot forgive myself,” it would be hard to imagine what a religious person means if he or she were to say, “God forgives me but I cannot forgive myself.” This is because far from being a call to explanation when a person questions God’s will, it is not the same as questioning the intentions of another person. For the latter an explanation might alleviate and comfort the questioner; for the former no explanations will do. To question God’s will is to have, in one sense, an existential crisis. This question is the questioner’s disposition towards any explanation. This is because ‘God’ is always something we react against with our entire existence—either in anger, thankfulness, etc. This is what constitutes God’s independence, the separation between God and humanity—as opposed to anything metaphysical. To recognize God as creator in this instance will be to recognize one’s existence as contingent and based on grace and be thankful for existence as such. But this is only one reaction. At any rate, this reaction will not be the same reaction one might have to any person in one’s community. Life may go on if such questions were posed to a person, but these questions, when posed to God, is life itself.
Eternal Covenant
This discussion leads to the concept of eternal covenant, Phillips’s second significant contribution to my understanding of religious language. One important point about Phillips’s distinction between a temporal contract and eternal covenant is that the concept of desert is not entailed in the latter concept. Because God is creator, and therefore all things are possible with God (this is the expression that nothing is necessary and anything can be another way), everything is an act of grace. Grace is the overcoming of desert, in this sense, because the acceptance of God’s grace is precisely in light of the recognition that the sum of one’s moral endeavors does not constitute one’s identity or value. It is this recognition that one exists which constitutes one’s worth.
Another important point about the eternal covenant is that the distance between God and humanity is not physical but is spiritual. Although it does not make sense that God would break this covenant, it does make sense to say that one is either in it or not in it. This is Phillips’s denial of universalism: when one prays for forgiveness of one’s pride because one is in danger of Hell, the meaning of Hell is one’s pride. This pride is, in this instance, what constitutes separation from God. One is not in God’s eternal covenant because one is in Hell—one thinks that the universe owes one something. Simone Weil says, “Men owe us what we imagine they will give us. We must forgive them this debt … I also am other than what I imagine myself to be. To know this is forgiveness.” To receive forgiveness, when one prays for forgiveness in light of the dangers of Hell, is to be freed from one’s pride. This establishes one as a member of the eternal covenant—in technical theological language, as justified and declared righteous in the eyes of God. This is the meaning of eternal covenant: that one is forgiven and lives in the grace of God. This establishes the point that the eternal covenant is a disposition towards life as a whole and anything that happens is an instance for such an understanding, not the criteria for it.
The Predicates of God
My discussion so far has been about my understanding of Phillips’s objections to talking about God as an agent among agents and his discussion of the eternal covenant. My discussion has been based on Phillips’s points about God’s predicates. The concept of ‘God’ does not mean anything in and of itself but it has instances of meaning. These instances of meaning are its predicates. That “God is love” shows us what the reality of God is when the believer loves her neighbor. That “God forgives my sins” shows itself in the believer’s disposition towards life in general—in the believer’s reception of grace at the acknowledgement of her contingency. That “God is wrathful” shows itself in the life of the believer who has recognized her contingency but has yet to receive the grace of God. Although these conceptions of the reality of God are distinct, they have, what Wittgenstein would call, a family resemblance, and the meaning of ‘God’ shows itself in the sense that these predicates ascribe to God. The concept of God, then, has instances of meaning. And such meaning is in the roles that the concept has in the believer’s life.
The first significant contribution Phillips made to my understanding of religious language is his discussion on God as an agent among other agents. If we conceive of God as a person without a body (this, presumably being what it means to think of God as an agent—the implication being that God is part of our community of persons), then we begin to think that God makes plans or has feelings like human beings do. It is clear that this is not the case, however, when one looks at the grammar of religious language about God. A few examples come to mind. Although it is imaginable for a person to say to another person, “You have fulfilled your duty. You can’t do anything else. A person must move on.” it is not imaginable for a religious person to say, “You have fulfilled your duty to God. A person must move on.” It is also imaginable to say, “My friend forgives me but I cannot forgive myself,” it would be hard to imagine what a religious person means if he or she were to say, “God forgives me but I cannot forgive myself.” This is because far from being a call to explanation when a person questions God’s will, it is not the same as questioning the intentions of another person. For the latter an explanation might alleviate and comfort the questioner; for the former no explanations will do. To question God’s will is to have, in one sense, an existential crisis. This question is the questioner’s disposition towards any explanation. This is because ‘God’ is always something we react against with our entire existence—either in anger, thankfulness, etc. This is what constitutes God’s independence, the separation between God and humanity—as opposed to anything metaphysical. To recognize God as creator in this instance will be to recognize one’s existence as contingent and based on grace and be thankful for existence as such. But this is only one reaction. At any rate, this reaction will not be the same reaction one might have to any person in one’s community. Life may go on if such questions were posed to a person, but these questions, when posed to God, is life itself.
Eternal Covenant
This discussion leads to the concept of eternal covenant, Phillips’s second significant contribution to my understanding of religious language. One important point about Phillips’s distinction between a temporal contract and eternal covenant is that the concept of desert is not entailed in the latter concept. Because God is creator, and therefore all things are possible with God (this is the expression that nothing is necessary and anything can be another way), everything is an act of grace. Grace is the overcoming of desert, in this sense, because the acceptance of God’s grace is precisely in light of the recognition that the sum of one’s moral endeavors does not constitute one’s identity or value. It is this recognition that one exists which constitutes one’s worth.
Another important point about the eternal covenant is that the distance between God and humanity is not physical but is spiritual. Although it does not make sense that God would break this covenant, it does make sense to say that one is either in it or not in it. This is Phillips’s denial of universalism: when one prays for forgiveness of one’s pride because one is in danger of Hell, the meaning of Hell is one’s pride. This pride is, in this instance, what constitutes separation from God. One is not in God’s eternal covenant because one is in Hell—one thinks that the universe owes one something. Simone Weil says, “Men owe us what we imagine they will give us. We must forgive them this debt … I also am other than what I imagine myself to be. To know this is forgiveness.” To receive forgiveness, when one prays for forgiveness in light of the dangers of Hell, is to be freed from one’s pride. This establishes one as a member of the eternal covenant—in technical theological language, as justified and declared righteous in the eyes of God. This is the meaning of eternal covenant: that one is forgiven and lives in the grace of God. This establishes the point that the eternal covenant is a disposition towards life as a whole and anything that happens is an instance for such an understanding, not the criteria for it.
The Predicates of God
My discussion so far has been about my understanding of Phillips’s objections to talking about God as an agent among agents and his discussion of the eternal covenant. My discussion has been based on Phillips’s points about God’s predicates. The concept of ‘God’ does not mean anything in and of itself but it has instances of meaning. These instances of meaning are its predicates. That “God is love” shows us what the reality of God is when the believer loves her neighbor. That “God forgives my sins” shows itself in the believer’s disposition towards life in general—in the believer’s reception of grace at the acknowledgement of her contingency. That “God is wrathful” shows itself in the life of the believer who has recognized her contingency but has yet to receive the grace of God. Although these conceptions of the reality of God are distinct, they have, what Wittgenstein would call, a family resemblance, and the meaning of ‘God’ shows itself in the sense that these predicates ascribe to God. The concept of God, then, has instances of meaning. And such meaning is in the roles that the concept has in the believer’s life.
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