The Reliability of Sense Perception

by William P. Alston

Why suppose that sense perception is an accurate source of information about the physical environment? More generally, is it possible to demonstrate that our basic ways of forming beliefs are reliable? In this book, a leading analytic philosopher confronts this classic problem through detailed investigation of sense perception, the source of beliefs in which we place the most confidence. Carefully assessing the available arguments, William P. Alston concludes that it is not possible to show in any noncircular way that sense perception is a reliable source of beliefs. Alston thoroughly examines the main arguments that have been advanced for the reliability of sense perception, including arguments from the various kinds of success we achieve by relying on the sense perception, arguments that some features of our sense experience are best explained by supposing that it is an accurate guide, and arguments that there is something conceptually incoherent about the idea that sense perception is not reliable. He concludes that all of these arguments that are not disqualified in other ways are epistemically circular, for they use premises based upon the very source in question. Alston then suggest that the most appropriate response to the impossibility of showing that our basic sources of beliefs are reliable is an appeal to the practical rationality of engaging in certain socially established belief-forming practices. The Reliability of Sense Perception will be welcome by epistemologists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers of science.

Genres: Philosophy

168 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1993

About the author

William Payne Alston (November 29, 1921 – September 13, 2009) was an American philosopher. He made influential contributions to the philosophy of language, epistemology, and Christian philosophy. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and taught at the University of Michigan, Rutgers University, University of Illinois, and Syracuse University.

Reviews

[Carlie Gavin · Rating 3 out of 5]

In summary, there is no non-circular defence for our doxastic practice in trusting our sense perception to be reliable.

A bit dense, but not unmanageable (although arguably I’m becoming practiced in reading dense texts.)

Overall worth a read if you’re interested in the sceptic argument of knowledge, although this book doesn’t take a sceptic approach, and rather actively tries to prove the reliability of sense perception, settles that this is not possible without epistemic circularity.

[Edmundo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Convincingly shows that we cannot give a non-circular argument for the reliability of our senses. Incredibly important work. Should discourage people from attempting the same thing. An important aspect to work out, however, is a diagnosis of exactly why we fail to give a non-circular account of the reliability of our senses. Perhaps this can be done.

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 3 out of 5]

This work is a continuation of Alston’s earlier project in Perceiving God. Earlier he claimed that critics of religious epistemology could not give a non-circular account of basic doxastic practices like trusting in sense perception. This work expands upon those claims.

Alston makes important contributions to epistemology, but the work itself, which will be reviewed below, suffers from several drawbacks. It’s not always clear what Alston’s larger point is. And the structure of the book isn’t always clear, either. He does spend several LONG chapters rebutting different defenses of sense perception (which seems to vitiate his larger point), only to propose a non-circular defense of sense perception at the end. And some chapters just seemed to end abruptly.

Alston presupposes some form of reliabilist epistemology: to know that p is to have a reliably generated belief that p is” (Alston 3). In line with later epistemologies of proper function, we form beliefs when our given psyches at a given time have a relatively fixed number of dispositions to go from a certain belief input to a certain belief output.

Along the way he rebuts Wittgensteinian and Kantian defenses of belief and sense perception. Some of these are quite interesting but can be passed over for the moment.

Several points are worth noting if Alston’s thesis holds

a) The reliability of sense perceptual practices (SP) is not the same as an argument for the existence of the external world.
b) Wittgenstein’s “Language Games” are similar to Thomas Reid’s “doxastic practices” (to borrow a later phrase that Reid wouldn’t have used).

Alston’s specific argument (99ff):

We should adopt a specific world-scheme that trades on an ability to anticipate reliable SP. This is not circular reasoning, however, since we use SP involving the world-scheme, rather than SP working from within a specific doxastic practice. So what does this mean? As I understand it, a circular account of SP says “SP is warranted because our doxastic practice justifies SP” (understanding, of course, pace Hume and Russell, that we need SP to begin the doxastic practice). Alston argues, by contrast, that our world-scheme/human constitution (Reid) allows for the existence of SP. I agree with him. I’m just not sure how different his proposal is.

Conclusion:

The book makes a number of important contributions, if densely and indirectly. His final proposal, that we should rely on Thomas Reid and his modern followers, is one I agree with wholeheartedly: doxastic practices are innocent until proven guilty. That sounded familiar when I read it. The reason it was familiar is because several pages seemed to be lifted straight from Perceiving God (an admittedly fine work, but see: PG, p. 151 = RSP, p. 126-127). I don’t fault him for repeating Reid. That is something we all should do. But to be honest: it seemed tacked-on to the whole work.

[P. Es · Rating 5 out of 5]

Proffers the claim that there is no non-circular, non-self-referencial defense for the reliability of our sense perception - we merely accept that it is acceptable - and we must.

Something from Plantinga that reflects the implications of the issue; "Take other sources of knowledge: rational intuition, memory, and perception, for example. Can we show by the first two that the third is in fact reliable--that is, without relying in anyway on the deliverances of the third? No, we can't; nor can we show by the first and third that memory is reliable, nor (of course) by perception and memory that rational intuition is. Nor can we give a decent, non-question-begging rational argument that reason itself is indeed reliable. Does it follow that there is something irrational in trusting these alleged sources, in accepting their deliverances? Certainly not. So why insist that it is irrational to accept, say, the Internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit [or Altered/Alternate States of Consciousness, or Entheogens, or Human-Animal communications, or Sinai, etc, etc] unless we can give a rationally conclusive argument for the conclusion that there is indeed such a thing, and that what it delivers is the truth? Why treat these alleged sources differently? Is there anything but arbitrariness in insisting that any alleged source of truth must justify itself at the bar of rational intuition, perception and memory [considering the 'strength' of the 'arguements' for their reliability]? Perhaps God has given us several different sources of knowledge about the world, and none of them can be shown to be reliable using only the resources of the others [also to Clouser/Dooyeweerd's critique/s of reductionism]. "Darwin, Mind and Meaning".