Red Sabbath: The Battle of Little Bighorn

by Robert Kershaw

There are few battles in the sometimes bloody history of the expansion of the United States in North American during the Indian Wars that are more famous than Little Bighorn. The romantic view of Custer's last stand against marauding hordes of Indians has achieved iconic status but the reality was somewhat different, as recent research has shown. The Battle of Little Bighorn was the culmination of a process of attrition between the Native Americans and European settlers. On 25 June 1876 this clash of cultures was settled by force of arms as the 7th Cavalry under Custer came upon a huge Indian camp by the Little Bighorn River. The resulting battle was the stuff of legends, but legends based on misconception and hearsay - no members of the 7th Cavalry survived to tell their tale and the Indians recorded their triumph in pictographs and oral memory, long undeciphered by historians.

In Red Sabbath, military historian Robert Kershaw analyses the causes of Custer's defeat from the standpoint of a professional soldier, and examines the multitude of factors that lay behind this setback of a modern US Army's campaign against an unsophisticated foe. Bringing a forensic examination to the subject, this new view of the battle will be required reading for all those with an interest in the military history of the USA and of the career of that most famous of historical figures, General Custer.

Drawing evidence from a wide range of sources, including contemporary reports of the battle, personal analysis of the battlefield and the most recent archaeological investigations, Kershaw explores the background to the battle and its results. His analysis debunks many of the myths about Custer's abilities as a military commander and previous generalizations of this savage encounter, providing a unique insight into the Battle of Little Bighorn.

Genres: Military History

223 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 2005

About the author

Born in 1950 and a graduate of Reading University, Robert Kershaw joined the Parachute Regiment in 1973.

He served numerous regimental appointments until selected to command the 10th Battalion The Parachute Regiment (10 PARA). He attended the German Staff College (Fuhrungsakademie) spending a further two years with the Bundeswehr as an infantry, airborne and arctic warfare instructor. He speaks fluent German and has extensive experience with NATO, multinational operations and all aspects of operations and training.

His active service includes several tours in Northern Ireland, the First Gulf War and Bosnia. He has exercised in many parts of the world and served in the Middle East and Africa. His final army appointment was with the Intelligence Division at HQ NATO in Brussels Belgium.

On leaving the Army in 2006 he became a full-time author of military history as well as a consultant military analyst. He has written a paper on the military impact of HIV AIDS for Cranfield University and more recently was the historical editor for ParaData, an on-line archive for the Parachute Regiment and Airborne Forces.

Reviews

[Roger · Rating 3 out of 5]

With some reservations (which I'll get into later), I can recommend Red Sabbath as the one book to read if you want to know what happened at the Battle of Little Bighorn - "Custer's Last Stand". Robert Kershaw has given us an up-to-date and accurate description of what was the US Army's greatest disaster in its wars against the Plains Indians.

Something has always fascinated me about Custer's last battle: given the amount of paper and ink given over to it, it seems that I'm not the only one. The tragedy of his demise along with most of the 7th Cavalry attains Greek proportions - hubris, courage, disaster - they are all here. I've had the fortune to visit the battlefield, and it's a very moving place, with grave markers scattered around the field indicating where the men actually fell (there are not many Indian markers on the battlefield, partly owing to lack of intelligence about where they fell, but also - as Kershaw points out - while over 260 US servicemen, civilians and scouts lost their lives at Little Bighorn, the Indian deaths probably numbered just over 40).

Red Sabbath is a book that is oriented more at the military side of affairs, with a detailed look at the command and control aspects of the battle, and more focused on the Government rather than the Indian side. The first chapters set the scene, with a detailed account of the Fetterman Massacre 11 years before Little Bighorn, and briefly taking us through the Laramie Treaty, and the underhanded way the US Government broke that treaty, which led to the three columns under Generals Terry, Crook and Gibbon entering the Powder River Country during May 1876.

By taking us through the details of the Fetterman engagement, and the "Wagon box fight" of 1867, Kershaw points out that the way for the Army to defeat Indians was to combine, stand, and fight: not disperse, scatter and run. In retrospect, that seems obvious, but in the ten years between those events and Little Bighorn, most Indian engagements involved the Army making contact and the Indians fleeing, so the strategy had developed of splitting Army forces - one force to engage, and the others to attack the fleeing enemy. Engagements since 1867 had been with small forces of Indians - usually less than 100.

The summer of 1876 was different. The Indians - usually moving in small tribal bands - had decided to take a stand. They called as many groups as possible together, both to provide safety in numbers, and to attack the Army en masse if they could. Another key development on the Indian side was their ability to gather together a large number of modern rifles, including many repeating rifles such as Henrys and Winchesters. These key facts had eluded the intelligence gatherers for the Army.

The vaunted 7th Cavalry was not what some of the old movies would have us believe. The Army was a last choice occupation in the 19th Century, and many of the regular soldiers were recent migrants, wastrels, or joined up only to desert when they had made it out West. Many of them were not great horsemen, and while their Springfield rifles were mostly reliable, accurate and had a long range, they were single shot (breech-loaded), and most of the soldiers were very poor marksmen, with only 15 practice rounds per year allocated to each soldier.

The Army had other problems that summer as well: while we all know Custer as a General, that was a brevet rank given during the Civil War, and he had reverted to his substantive rank of Captain on the cessation of hostilities (he again held a brevet rank of Major General at the time of his death, but was a substantive Lieutenant Colonel). He was not the only officer in that situation, and with the size of the army greatly reduced after the Civil War, promotion was difficult to obtain. For a man with Custer's personality, that was hard to take, and he leaped at the chance to battle the Indians with the hope of a jump in his substantive rank. The officer over him, Terry, was aware of his chafing, and gave him a pretty free reign in carrying out his orders, which was not a good idea. In fact communication was a problem for this whole campaign, with Crook's forces severely tested at the Battle of the Rosebud some days before Custer's battle - if Crook had passed on some crucial facts such as the number of enemy gathered in the area, and their firepower, Custer may not have made some fateful decisions on the day of his battle.

And so we come to the 25th of June 1876. Custer and his troops were weary before the day began, desperate for a victory to end their constant marching. With no serious reconnaissance, Custer divided his command before heading out to do battle. The first surprise for Custer was the size of the Indian encampment. The second surprise was that they were standing and fighting rather than fleeing. The third surprise was that Custer's plan to circle around and support Reno was denied him by topography which had not been fully scouted before the plan was formulated. Custer then further divided his forces, refusing it seems to believe that the Indians could and would stand and fight against Army troops. To be fair to Custer he did think support was on its way. But that support was halted before it could get to Custer, with its inexperienced men, and officers not used to what was happening in front of them, both unwilling and unable to bridge the - what now seems almost unbearably short - gap between themselves and Custer's dwindling force.

The end came very quickly for Custer, as the Indians spared no-one, and made sure their bodies were useless in the spirit world by mutilation. This cultural practice made the discovery of the disaster the next day all the more horrific for Terry's men, and for the public as news of the disaster spread. What was to have been a great centennial victory over the savages had turned into a horror story.

Kershaw's description of the Battle is first rate: he has used some up-to-date research and Indian testimony to refute some of the earlier theories on how the battle progressed. His general style is easy to read and informative, and rarely slips into hyperbole. He does however sometimes slip into jargon, most noticeable when he is comparing the Plains Wars to modern warfare, and in particular modern peace-keeping missions. Why he felt he had to do this is a mystery, as in my view it adds nothing to the book, either in helping the reader understand Custer or modern peace-keeping.

This problem is an indicator, yet again, that books published under the Ian Allen umbrella lack a serious editorial presence. Kershaw would have benifitted greatly from that, as his repetitions of key themes can verge on the tedious (how many times do we have to have explained in detail that the Indians tactics resembled that of a buffalo hunt?). Another criticism that I'd make is that the Bibliography seems a little odd - I'm not sure that it's a full one.

However those criticisms are minor in the wider scheme of this book - if you are interested in Custer and his final days, this book is well worth finding and reading. Recommended.

Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/

[Susan · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read "Red Sabbath" as "homework" ahead of our long postponed visit to the Bighorn site later this year. It set the scene well and gave a different perspective to the battle and the lead up to it than has come down through film and popular culture. Given the lack of survivors on the soldiers' side, written evidence is scarce. However, there is archaeological evidence and Indian pictographs to help piece together what really happened. This was great preparation for our visit.

[Chris Jones · Rating 4 out of 5]

Having seen accounts in my youth on the silver screen about the exploits of Custer and the 7th cavalry and having visited the site of the Little Big Horn last stand, I found this book most interesting
What was particularly engrossing was the discovery that the legend of Custer had been so whitewashed and gilded.
In this account he appears to have been a n arrogant and reckless glory hunter.
Due to his bravery and successes in the American Civil War he seems to have been caught up in the aura of invincibility which had sprung up around him which led to his leading his troops in what was essentially a suicide mission
Engrossing

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very interesting story of the lead up to the battle and the battle itself, drawing upon a wide variety of sources. One of the most written about battles, so I guess not everyone will agree with the author’s conclusions, but they made sense to me.

[Snakeman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Indepth study of the Little Big Horn Campaign

[Ó Ruairc · Rating 1 out of 5]

Throughout "Red Sabbath," the author, Robert Kershaw, criticizes Custer's movements and decisions at the Little Bighorn. Not only does he denigrate Custer, he also troubleshoots General Crook's and Sheridan's actions during that campaign. Now, this is perfectly fine; after all, the summer campaign of 1876 against the Sioux was a failure, and Kershaw seeks to explain why things happened the way they did. The problems I have with Kershaw's "armchair general" criticisms, however, are this:

When writing about Custer's subordinate, that poltroon, Major Marcus Reno, the author says,

"Reno had pulled himself together sufficiently to play a role in what became a joint command of the battle around the hilltop. His frightening setback in the valley bottom, criticized subsequently by armchair commentators, would have taxed any leader of men and overwhelmed a lesser."

The main issue here is that Reno WAS overwhelmed. He was, by all accounts, a mediocre officer, and his actions during the battle were shockingly abhorrent. For all of that, the author of the book seemingly defends Reno while condemning the man who's name is practically synonymous with raw courage. Other problems I had with this book - in the Introduction, Kershaw writes,

"... that Plains Indians, unlike any other on the American continent, could mass in sufficient numbers to overwhelm a number of companies of organised troops in open battle."

"... unlike any other on the American continent??" I guess Kershaw never heard of St. Clair's Defeat where a coalition of eastern tribes routed General Arthur St. Clair's army late in the 18th century. The vast horde of Indians under Chief Little Turtle killed around 700 of St. Clair's troops. Too, I suppose this authour never heard of the Battle of Adobe Walls where Kit Carson and about 400 troops battled it out with 3,000 Comanches. But there are other bits and pieces of history that the writer of this book somehow misconstrues. On page 36, Kershaw writes,

"Militarism was not a dominant national characteristic following a bloody Civil War, and was conspicuously lacking as a motive for joining for a three-to five-year term that paid only $13 per day."

OK, anyone who has read anything about the history of the western frontier knows that enlisted soldiers, post-Civil War troops, were paid $13 per MONTH. If we are to believe Kershaw, a cavalryman on the Plains would have been living high on the hog; after all, $13 per day was a prosperous income back then. Another error, though subtle, occurs on P.137. Kershaw writes about Custer,

"That was why he was spearheading the strike force. Opportunities for promotion were rare and, at 36 years, he was the oldest soldier in the column."

Well, Custer was not the oldest soldier in the column. There were many who were Custer's age or older. Captain Benteen and Major Reno, for instance, were five years Custer's senior; and Lt. DeRudio was 44 years of age. Wait, there is more... at one point, when describing Custer's thought processes, Kershaw states,

"Custer was taking a number of seemingly illogical and uncharacteristic decisions. Clarity of thought may have been clouded by tiredness."

This is interesting. Giving his situation at the Little Bighorn, most scholars give Custer credit for doing all that he could have done. The fact is, he was outnumbered and outgunned. Too, the Indians use of the terrain was a huge factor. But "tiredness?" Custer tired? Those two words don't go together. Every description given in bios about George Armstrong Custer speak of his boundless, superhuman energy.

By and large, it seems that the author of this book, in an effort to be unique, tries hard to come up with new and singular perspectives relating to Custer's defeat at the Little Bighorn. It doesn't work. The ideas that he seems to be reaching for seem forced and they come across as weak and paltry concepts. Suffice it to say, while trying to breech new material about a battle that has been written about a thousand times over, this author falls flat on his face.

At any rate, the above are just a few questionable lines I came across while reading this book. Unfortunately, where there are a few debatable and irregular statements, one will generally find more. Personally, I just don't have the time or desire to further prove Kershaw wrong. This book does have its good points. The author reveals a lot of new information regarding military tactics. Too, I like the way he parallels the Sioux campaign of 1876 with modern conflicts. Overall, however, it is not a good book about the Battle of Little Bighorn. I may have given it a better rating if the author didn't make so many blaring and glaring historical gaffes.

[Donnacha · Rating 4 out of 5]

Of all the books I have read about The Battle of the Little Bighorn I enjoyed this the most. It's easily read and very atmospheric. I would definitely recommend it to anyone who has an interest in the American West. Excellent read.

[Kevin · Rating 3 out of 5]

A few interesting perspectives. Typos and misspellings got annoying after a while.