Seapower As Strategy: Navies and National Interests

by Norman Friedman

A noted defense analyst and naval weapons expert lays out the roles of navies and naval strategy in the twenty-first century. Drawing upon historical examples, Norman Friedman first explains how and why naval strategy differs from other kinds of military strategy and then provides a sense of the special flavor of a maritime or naval approach to national security problems. The various uses of navies are described and illustrated by extended case studies covering the last quarter-millennium. Friedman presents these observations in the context of U.S. post-Cold War security concerns and concepts. He explains how and why the United States currently espouses a maritime strategy and argues that navies are likely to regain a dominant position due to changes both in their own technology and in air and ground forces. He urges countries with the appropriate geographical and economic advantages, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia, to use their inherent maritime leverage. Rare among books on naval strategy, this work combines an examination of the vital role of coalition partners, especially those with significant ground forces, with a comprehensive survey of relevant technology and the way that strategy can be reflected in the design of an evolving fleet. The author is known for his ability to explain modern technology to lay audiences, and his book is suitable for all those interested in public policy questions as well as national security professionals and students of strategy. The book's publication at a time of potential change in U.S. national strategy only reinforces its value as a document worthy of study.

Hardcover

Published January 1, 2001

About the author

Norman Friedman is a prominent naval analyst and the author of more than thirty books covering a range of naval subjects, from warship histories to contemporary defense issues.

Reviews

[Evan Þ. · Rating 4 out of 5]

This's mostly a history of the role seapower has played in wars throughout modern history. I was fascinated by all the angles I hadn't thought of, such as the French schemes to bombard or land on the Prussian coast during the Franco-Prussian War - which came to naught, but were a live possibility for a while and might have happened had the French fleet been more capable. The British possession of so many of the "great capes" and narrows of the world was also a point of global grand strategy I hadn't considered.

What I'm left pondering is what this means for countries. Friedman suggests seapower is a more in-tune choice for republics, since it's a capital investment rather than a manpower investment. But the capital investment is expensive, and can be quickly outmoded by advances in technology or changes in global strategy - as Friedman points out. But perhaps this's just the Red Queen's Race inevitable in arms races?

[Urey Patrick]

Very interesting and well documented exposition on the strategic importance of sea power, filled with historical examples and insights. Dr. Friedman makes a strong case that the United States remains a maritime power and that sea power is essential to US goals, interests and well being -- an argument with which I agree. Dr. Friedman is gifted with an exhaustive knowledge of his subject, and a talent for easy reading prose.