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The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic
Offering a full-scale study of the theory of reality hidden beneath modern logic, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, a lecture course given in 1928, illuminates the transitional phase in Heidegger's thought from the existential analysis of Being and Time to the overcoming of metaphysics in his later philosophy. In a searching exposition of the metaphysical problems underpinning Leibniz's theory of logical judgment, Heidegger establishes that a given theory of logic is rooted in a certain conception of Being. He explores the significance of Western logic as a system-building technical tool and as a cultural phenomenon that is centuries old.
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First published January 1, 1978
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About the author
Martin Heidegger
524 books3,296 followersMartin Heidegger (1889-1976) was a German philosopher whose work is perhaps most readily associated with phenomenology and existentialism, although his thinking should be identified as part of such philosophical movements only with extreme care and qualification. His ideas have exerted a seminal influence on the development of contemporary European philosophy. They have also had an impact far beyond philosophy, for example in architectural theory (see e.g., Sharr 2007), literary criticism (see e.g., Ziarek 1989), theology (see e.g., Caputo 1993), psychotherapy (see e.g., Binswanger 1943/1964, Guignon 1993) and cognitive science (see e.g., Dreyfus 1992, 2008; Wheeler 2005; Kiverstein and Wheeler forthcoming).
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
December 7, 2016
Probably the quickest Heidegger read I've ever done. Heidegger continues his project of deconstructing the history of the Western philosophical tradition. In this piece, namely the first part, Heidegger provides an analysis of Leibniz. This text really picks up when he is discussing Leibniz concept of the monad. This really clarified my understanding of Leibniz...as I always considered the monadology to be an extremely obscure metaphysics. He's basic insight is that the monad is fundamentally drive and orientation.
This is another great lecture by Heidegger in, what I take to be, his peak period. Great stuff if you are interested in Heidegger's project around this period.
This is another great lecture by Heidegger in, what I take to be, his peak period. Great stuff if you are interested in Heidegger's project around this period.
April 6, 2023
A great introduction to Being and Time
October 15, 2024
A 1928 COURSE OF LECTURES
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was an influential and controversial German philosopher, primarily concerned with Being, and phenomenology---who was widely (perhaps incorrectly) also perceived as an Existentialist. His relationship with the Nazi party in Germany has been the subject of widespread controversy and debate [e.g., 'Heidegger and Nazism,' 'Heidegger and the Nazis,' 'Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany,' 'Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism,' etc.] .
He states in the first section, “There is need for another logic, but not for the sake of providing more entertaining and appealing classroom material. We need another logic solely because what is called logic is not a logic at all and had nothing in common anymore with philosophy.” (Pg. 5)
He states, “We do not philosophize in order to become philosophers, no more than to fashion for ourselves and others a salutary world-view that could be procured like a coat and hat… Only he can philosophize who is already resolved to grant free dignity to Dasein in its radical and universal-essential possibilities, which alone makes it suitable for withstanding the remaining uncertainty and gaping discord, while at the same time remaining untouched by all the idle talk of the day. There is, in fact, a philosophical world-view, but it is not a result of philosophy and not affixed to it as a practical recipe for life. It resides rather in the philosophizing itself.” (Pg. 17-18)
He summarizes, “In the introduction we showed how the main phenomena of what is discussed in logic refer back to metaphysics. Truth refers to transcendence, ground to freedom, concept to schema, the copula to being. Because this connection is essential, it had to reassert itself repeatedly in previous philosophy, though there was a trend, which arises today more than ever, to isolate logic and base logic upon itself alone.” (Pg. 56-57)
He acknowledges, “There is of course an argument frequently enlisted by those who believe the primacy of logic over metaphysics can be conclusively proved. This argument has the additional advantage of being capable of deciding the problem of their relationship on the basis of quite general notions of logic and metaphysics… While our thesis is that, a) logic is grounded in metaphysics, and b) logic is nothing other than the metaphysics of truth; the other argument is based on, 1) the assumption that logic is free-floating, something ultimate, ‘thinking’ as it were, and 2) the general argument that logic has primacy over all the sciences, an argument rooted in the first assumption.” (Pg. 103)
He says, “The understanding-of-being forms the basic problem of metaphysics as such. What does ‘being’ mean? This is quite simply the fundamental question of philosophy. We are not able here to present the formulation of the problem and its ‘retrieval’ in Being and Time. We wish instead to make an external presentation of its guiding principles and thereby pin down the ‘problem of transcendence.’” (Pg. 136)
He argues, “It is not intrinsic to the essence of Dasein as such that it factually exist; it is, however, precisely its essence that in each case this being can also not be extant. The cosmos can be without humans inhabiting the earth, and the cosmos was long before humans ever existed. But then how can we maintain that being-in-the-world belong to the essence of Dasein?... then being-in-the-world must mean something else. And what it does mean is asserted when we emphasize: being-in-the-world is the basic constitution of Dasein. For the crucial aspect lies in the negative: If I say of Dasein that its basic constitution is being-in-the-world, I am then first of all asserting something that belongs to its essence, and I therefore disregard whether the being of such a nature exists or not.” (Pg. 169)
Later, he summarizes, “The world does not mean beings, neither individual objects nor the totality of objects standing opposite a subject. Whenever one wishes to express transcendence as a subject-object relation, especially as in the movement of philosophical realism, the claim is frequently made that the subject always presupposes the ‘world’ and, by this, one means objects that are. We maintain that this claim is far from even seeing the real phenomenon of transcendence and ever further from saying anything about it.” (Pg. 193)
He concludes, “We want to set forth, in a positive way, the main features of the metaphysical essence of time in five points… 1. The essence of time has an ecstatic character. 2. Together with this ecstatic structure there is a horizontal character which belongs to time. 3. Time neither passes nor remains but it temporalizes itself. Temporalization is the primal phenomenon of ‘motion.’ 4. Time is not relative to sensibility but is more primordial than sensibility and than mind and reason as well… 5. Methodologically we should note that, only because it constitutes the metaphysical continuity of Dasein, time is not intelligible if Dasein is construed in some sort of theoretical scheme, whether it be as a psychical whole, as cognitive-volitional subject, as self-awareness, or as the unity of body, soul, and mind.” (Pg. 198)
He adds, “In its metaphysical essence, Dasein is the inquirer into the why. The human being is not primarily the nay-sayer… but just as little is the human being a yes-sayer. The human is rather the why-questioner. But only because man is in this way, can he and must he, in each case, say, not only yes or no, but essentially yes or no.” (Pg. 216)
These lectures provide a little-known side of Heidegger’s thought, and will be of interest to anyone seriously studying his philosophy.
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was an influential and controversial German philosopher, primarily concerned with Being, and phenomenology---who was widely (perhaps incorrectly) also perceived as an Existentialist. His relationship with the Nazi party in Germany has been the subject of widespread controversy and debate [e.g., 'Heidegger and Nazism,' 'Heidegger and the Nazis,' 'Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany,' 'Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism,' etc.] .
He states in the first section, “There is need for another logic, but not for the sake of providing more entertaining and appealing classroom material. We need another logic solely because what is called logic is not a logic at all and had nothing in common anymore with philosophy.” (Pg. 5)
He states, “We do not philosophize in order to become philosophers, no more than to fashion for ourselves and others a salutary world-view that could be procured like a coat and hat… Only he can philosophize who is already resolved to grant free dignity to Dasein in its radical and universal-essential possibilities, which alone makes it suitable for withstanding the remaining uncertainty and gaping discord, while at the same time remaining untouched by all the idle talk of the day. There is, in fact, a philosophical world-view, but it is not a result of philosophy and not affixed to it as a practical recipe for life. It resides rather in the philosophizing itself.” (Pg. 17-18)
He summarizes, “In the introduction we showed how the main phenomena of what is discussed in logic refer back to metaphysics. Truth refers to transcendence, ground to freedom, concept to schema, the copula to being. Because this connection is essential, it had to reassert itself repeatedly in previous philosophy, though there was a trend, which arises today more than ever, to isolate logic and base logic upon itself alone.” (Pg. 56-57)
He acknowledges, “There is of course an argument frequently enlisted by those who believe the primacy of logic over metaphysics can be conclusively proved. This argument has the additional advantage of being capable of deciding the problem of their relationship on the basis of quite general notions of logic and metaphysics… While our thesis is that, a) logic is grounded in metaphysics, and b) logic is nothing other than the metaphysics of truth; the other argument is based on, 1) the assumption that logic is free-floating, something ultimate, ‘thinking’ as it were, and 2) the general argument that logic has primacy over all the sciences, an argument rooted in the first assumption.” (Pg. 103)
He says, “The understanding-of-being forms the basic problem of metaphysics as such. What does ‘being’ mean? This is quite simply the fundamental question of philosophy. We are not able here to present the formulation of the problem and its ‘retrieval’ in Being and Time. We wish instead to make an external presentation of its guiding principles and thereby pin down the ‘problem of transcendence.’” (Pg. 136)
He argues, “It is not intrinsic to the essence of Dasein as such that it factually exist; it is, however, precisely its essence that in each case this being can also not be extant. The cosmos can be without humans inhabiting the earth, and the cosmos was long before humans ever existed. But then how can we maintain that being-in-the-world belong to the essence of Dasein?... then being-in-the-world must mean something else. And what it does mean is asserted when we emphasize: being-in-the-world is the basic constitution of Dasein. For the crucial aspect lies in the negative: If I say of Dasein that its basic constitution is being-in-the-world, I am then first of all asserting something that belongs to its essence, and I therefore disregard whether the being of such a nature exists or not.” (Pg. 169)
Later, he summarizes, “The world does not mean beings, neither individual objects nor the totality of objects standing opposite a subject. Whenever one wishes to express transcendence as a subject-object relation, especially as in the movement of philosophical realism, the claim is frequently made that the subject always presupposes the ‘world’ and, by this, one means objects that are. We maintain that this claim is far from even seeing the real phenomenon of transcendence and ever further from saying anything about it.” (Pg. 193)
He concludes, “We want to set forth, in a positive way, the main features of the metaphysical essence of time in five points… 1. The essence of time has an ecstatic character. 2. Together with this ecstatic structure there is a horizontal character which belongs to time. 3. Time neither passes nor remains but it temporalizes itself. Temporalization is the primal phenomenon of ‘motion.’ 4. Time is not relative to sensibility but is more primordial than sensibility and than mind and reason as well… 5. Methodologically we should note that, only because it constitutes the metaphysical continuity of Dasein, time is not intelligible if Dasein is construed in some sort of theoretical scheme, whether it be as a psychical whole, as cognitive-volitional subject, as self-awareness, or as the unity of body, soul, and mind.” (Pg. 198)
He adds, “In its metaphysical essence, Dasein is the inquirer into the why. The human being is not primarily the nay-sayer… but just as little is the human being a yes-sayer. The human is rather the why-questioner. But only because man is in this way, can he and must he, in each case, say, not only yes or no, but essentially yes or no.” (Pg. 216)
These lectures provide a little-known side of Heidegger’s thought, and will be of interest to anyone seriously studying his philosophy.
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December 22, 2012Page 18 provides an insightful exposition of thinking as comportment, or rather as an activity that has levels or detail and one is aware of these to different degrees. The arguments about the closeness between being and thought seem logical. However, there is still some lack of clarity. Heidegger screwed up a little bit in terms of providing examples and stuff.
October 6, 2022
According to Heidegger - classical and modern logic have their grounds in metaphysics and not the other way around. And not just that, but this insight is deeply concealed and not at all obvious to our current understanding of logic as free-floating and self-sufficient. There was a moment in the history of philosophy when Kant with his “transcendental imagination” (imagination understood by Heidegger as time/world) was about to unveil and show the metaphysical foundations of logic; but eventually Kant bowed before logic and started to use logic in grounding any future metaphysics instead. Kant's original insight was lost; while logic and logical positivism started their absolute domination.
The first half of this book is about Leibniz's metaphysics and how modern logic emerged from it. The second half is about explaining fundamental concepts from “Being and Time” that are relevant for the topic at hand: transcendence, intentionality, for-the-sake-of, being-in-the-world, world, time, Being, and their relationship to the ground/reason. Among the basic principles of logic, the principle of reason/ground is the most important one according to Heidegger -- as this principle points to the dependence of logic on something more fundamental than itself. Being and the understanding-of-being provide this ground/reason; while Being in turn is accessible only through radical philosophizing, existing as Dasein, asking questions, and by acknowledging the ontological difference.
The first half of this book is about Leibniz's metaphysics and how modern logic emerged from it. The second half is about explaining fundamental concepts from “Being and Time” that are relevant for the topic at hand: transcendence, intentionality, for-the-sake-of, being-in-the-world, world, time, Being, and their relationship to the ground/reason. Among the basic principles of logic, the principle of reason/ground is the most important one according to Heidegger -- as this principle points to the dependence of logic on something more fundamental than itself. Being and the understanding-of-being provide this ground/reason; while Being in turn is accessible only through radical philosophizing, existing as Dasein, asking questions, and by acknowledging the ontological difference.
September 21, 2023
First part was a painstaking analysis of logic and its development in Leibniz, most of which went over my head. Second part was a fascinating restatement, and expansion, of Being and Time to which I'll probably end up returning.
September 20, 2014
Since this book is not an easy read for a few relaxed afternoons,I continue to read it again and again. It has a great level of conversations, sources and letters going back in the search of many philosophers throughout history on the subject and lends itself for much closer examination, again and again.
Thou Mr. Heidegger himself, and his affiliation with fascism, is a huge caveat and must be taken into close consideration while reading.
Thou Mr. Heidegger himself, and his affiliation with fascism, is a huge caveat and must be taken into close consideration while reading.
June 17, 2015
Fast read for the philosophically inclined. More regarding the foundations of metaphysics itself.... being-as-such, existence-as-such, etc. A good book on metaphysics in general, covers a lot of other philosophers. Doesnt do so much in regards to an exposition of the fundamental constructs that create and shape logic, and logical structures, such as syntax, perception, meaning, patterns, infinity.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews