Two Logics: The Conflict between Classical and Neo-Analytic Philosophy

by Henry Babcock Veatch

CONTENTS
- Introduction: the battle of the books renewed
- A logic that can't say what anything is
- Alternative logics: a what-logic and a relating-logic
- The what-statements of a what-logic: why they are not analytic truths
- The what-statements of a what-logic: why they are not synthetic truths
- The disabilities of a relating-logic: the fallacy of inverted intentionality
- The world as seen through a relating-logic
- A what-logic and its supposed commitment to essences and substantial forms
- Induction as conceived by a relating-logic and a what-logic
- The picture of the world derived from the inductions in a relating-logic
- Deductive explanation: a likely case study in surrealism?
- From deductive explanation in general to historical explanation in particular
- A short digression from history into ethics
- Conclusion: epilogue or epitaph?

Genres: Philosophy, Logic

280 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1969

About the author

Veatch was born in Evansville, Indiana. He obtained his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1937 and spent his career at Indiana University (1937–1965), Northwestern University (1965–1973), and Georgetown University (1973–1983) where he was Philosophy Department Chair from 1973 to 1976. He also had visiting professorships at Colby College, Haverford College and St. Thomas University.

Veatch was active in the Episcopal Church and served as president of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. He served as president of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1961. In 1970–71 he served as president of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association. He was a member of the Guild of Scholars of The Episcopal Church.

Henry Veatch died in Bloomington, Indiana. Indiana University maintains the archive of his collected papers (1941–1997).

Reviews

[Dan Snyder · Rating 4 out of 5]

I will have to write a longer review of this book upon consideration. This is a work that does at least three things:
1. It furthers the ramification of the 'Battle of the Books' and elucidates what that battle is about.
2. It manages to give a clearer picture of the concerns, validity(or lack thereof), and project of Analytic Philosophy.
3. It explains much of the history of educational and scholarly approach of the last century.

Even off the top of my head, it has given me new ways to consider my favorite subjects as a teacher - namely the applications of logic (of which there are two!) and the pursuit of history.

Veatch is meticulous in setting up his case, and finishes abruptly with a conclusion that feels conclusive. This is not five stars because it is not for the casual reader, but is a logical (obviously) and philosophical book.

[Ian · Rating 5 out of 5]

Probably the most important work of contemporary philosophy I have read since Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, although it seems this work is much less known. Briefly, it is a consideration of the differences between Aristotelian and symbolic logic (and the metaphysical assumptions they come packaged with) and the consequences these have for how we view the world.

[John Reis · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was published in 1969, but it takes on a current subject: whether there is any knowledge other than scientific knowledge. I am not sure if this book influenced anything I have already read. But it does go over some ground I am familiar with. The Introduction discusses Snow’s “The Two Cultures” and Swift’s bee logic versus spider logic as described in his Battle of the Books. He also discusses Popper’s admonition to do only science.

Chapter One is very difficult going at first. He makes the claim that predicate logic does not allow of saying what anything is. He calls this PM logic, after Russell’s Principia Mathematica. He discusses C.I. Lewis’ claim that logic is only about relations. He takes up the challenge and says there are two logics: relating logic and what logic.

In Chapter Two, he compares the difference between Lord Clarendon’s description of Earl Stafford versus what a personality survey like the CPI would say about Earl Stafford. He says that Kepler is not interested in what planets are or why they behave in elliptical patterns.

He comments that perhaps a ‘what-system’ would not be very useful. Perhaps we need only a ‘relating-system’ that gives us great predictive powers.