Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq

by Richard T. Reynolds

Colonel Reynolds presents a firsthand account of the struggle to design and implement the air campaign that proved instrumental in defeating Iraq in the Gulf War. Through documentary research and dialogue derived from interviews with key players such as Generals Dugan, Russ, Loh, and Horner, he traces the evolution of the air campaign plan known as Instant Thunder from its origins in the mind of Col John A. Warden III to the decision by General Schwarzkopf to employ airpower as his weapon of choice against Saddam Hussein. Heart of the Storm provides behind-the-scenes insights into how future decisions to use airpower will likely be made.

176 pages, Paperback

First published January 28, 1995

Reviews

[Brian Page · Rating 1 out of 5]

Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq, by Richard T. Reynolds, Col, USAF, is a remarkable book – for all the wrong reasons. First, if it accurately depicts the initial planning process for the First Gulf War air campaign, then I would say that it smacks of an all-male middle school project, except that would be a disservice to middle schoolers. Second, the writing is horrible, both in content and style. For crying out loud, the United States Air Force employs professional PhD historians; why on earth couldn’t they have assigned one to produce this volume? The actual text is preceded by two damn-with-faint-praise commentaries, the first by J. W. Kelley, Lt. General, Commander Air University; and the second by C. G. Boyd, General, Deputy Commander U.S. European Command. Kelly records that participants in the planning process complained of “inaccuracies, words and events taken out of context, a definite bias in favor of Col John Warden and his team, and undocumented flourishing/spicing up in the style of John Clancy.” (p. iii) Here’s a single sample amongst numerous examples of the latter: “Burt Moore moved the phone away from his left ear and stared at it for a moment before switching the receiver to his other ear. ‘Bob,’ he said slowly, almost soothingly, ‘we can do that, but what we’ve got is going to be in pencil.” (p. 5) Boyd commissioned this book and notes in his Forward that it “will certainly produce hot – perhaps even bitter – debate….” (p. xiiii) My guess is that Reynolds wrote this tripe hoping some Hollywood producer would option film rights. As history, it’s worthless. The gist of the air operations planning is that some in the USAF conceived of their role tactically, close integration & support of ground troops. Another faction advocated for strategic objectives in a campaign that could be essentially won by air power alone. The strategic faction prevailed. There. I’ve saved you the bother of reading this book.

[Don · Rating 5 out of 5]

Awesome! A must read!