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How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War
In this book the author focuses on the 11 months following the Munich conference in September 1938, and chronicles the events that led to world war. His approach is through the eyes of the leaders of all the powers involved, drawing on official records, private papers, reminiscences and biographies of the politicians, soldiers, diplomatists and others who took part in the processes which led to war.
736 pages, Hardcover
First published September 4, 1989
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About the author
Donald Cameron Watt
26 books5 followersDonald Cameron Watt was Professor of International History at the London School of Economics, where he served as the Head of the Department and Stevenson Chair of International History from 1981 to 1993.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
March 1, 2021
This a very serious account of the year preceding the outbreak of World War II. It has been immaculately researched and leaves no detail unexamined regarding the inter-relationships between the states that allowed, encouraged or turned their backs on the rise of the Third Reich. I learnt so much about the countless number of Treaties that were at that time, the standard way that nations reached agreement. My journey of education was fascinating, but I admit to having to re-read a number of chapters to ensure that I fully comprehended what DCW was narrating.
It is an astonishing tale and readers may wish to keep a notebook to hand as there are literally hundreds of protagonists. It is not a book to be 'enjoyed' in the normal sense, but it is a remarkable piece of historic journalism and one can only admire the painstaking work that Cameron Watt (and his many researchers in the UK and throughout Europe and America) had to undertake to piece it all together in a coherent tome.
I would imagine that DCW's work will remain the signal historical reference of the period immediately prior to the dark days of September 1939 and I can but admire this wonderful achievement.
It is an astonishing tale and readers may wish to keep a notebook to hand as there are literally hundreds of protagonists. It is not a book to be 'enjoyed' in the normal sense, but it is a remarkable piece of historic journalism and one can only admire the painstaking work that Cameron Watt (and his many researchers in the UK and throughout Europe and America) had to undertake to piece it all together in a coherent tome.
I would imagine that DCW's work will remain the signal historical reference of the period immediately prior to the dark days of September 1939 and I can but admire this wonderful achievement.
April 11, 2015
This magisterial account of imperial Europe's mutual suicide pact was allegedly 40 years in the making, and I can well believe it. The command of the minutiae of pre-war politics shown is truly profound. Eminently readable, if never really gripping, it is a sure antidote for the simplistic cries of "appeasement" with which this complex piece of historic insanity is so often trivialised.
If you visit rural France, you will quickly notice the memorials in every churchyard. Typically, the list of names is larger than today's section of the telephone book for the village. Watt places this in a context that makes some sense of interwar Europe and how it blundered into the most devastating and global war of the modern age. "Too much history and not enough geography" is a popular way of putting it. In more specific terms, as Watt makes clear, Britain, France, Russia and the rest had suffered so badly in one war that they failed to thwart another out of a desire to see peace. Ridden by rivalries and obsolete in military thinking, by the time they resolved to stand up against Hitler, Hitler had deluded himself that they would not.
The one thing that comes across most strongly is the inadequacy of so many of the key players. Chamberlain has been condemned by history as the arch-appeaser, but the fact is that his intentions were good and his urge to soothe injured German pride merely misguided. Stalin's pathological suspicion, Roosevelt's cynicism, Bonnet's intrigues and Mussolini's fragile ego compare less well, while some of the supporting actors, such as Ribbentrop and Molotov, seem so devoid of moral fibre or character that it beggars the imagination that they stood to at the helm of great nations.
Coming from London I have the Blitz in my blood, although I arrived on the scene rather later. I can say with some relief that Britain comes out of this story better than only Chamberlain. We acted late, but we acted, and Parliament and the Cabinet finally dragged Chamberlain to the war to which our guarantee to Poland committed us. The story of the final near-rebellion is extraordinary, and Watt leaves no doubt that Britain and thereby the Commonwealth really had decided, no matter what the rest of the world chose, to stand. There is comfort in this thought. More than a year after the outbreak US businesses' investment in the Nazi state continued to increase. Russia stood on the other side of the line, France and Poland were overrun, and the Commonwealth was suddenly a long way away across U-boat infested waters. Dark days were to come.
So how did war come? It came while we bickered. It is not true that no-one saw the danger. No-one saw it with the clarity of Churchill, it is true, but the French sought to re-arm and were thwarted, persuaded to keep to treaty limitations by the Americans and British. The Poles sought alliance but wanted no Soviet troops on their territory. Britain saw but thought that peace was possible. American isolationists saw Nazism and British Imperialism as relative evils, none of their business. And no-one trusted those who would soon fall alongside them. Too much history. In the end, though even his own military feared that war with Britain meant certain defeat, Hitler believed that we would not act.
If you visit rural France, you will quickly notice the memorials in every churchyard. Typically, the list of names is larger than today's section of the telephone book for the village. Watt places this in a context that makes some sense of interwar Europe and how it blundered into the most devastating and global war of the modern age. "Too much history and not enough geography" is a popular way of putting it. In more specific terms, as Watt makes clear, Britain, France, Russia and the rest had suffered so badly in one war that they failed to thwart another out of a desire to see peace. Ridden by rivalries and obsolete in military thinking, by the time they resolved to stand up against Hitler, Hitler had deluded himself that they would not.
The one thing that comes across most strongly is the inadequacy of so many of the key players. Chamberlain has been condemned by history as the arch-appeaser, but the fact is that his intentions were good and his urge to soothe injured German pride merely misguided. Stalin's pathological suspicion, Roosevelt's cynicism, Bonnet's intrigues and Mussolini's fragile ego compare less well, while some of the supporting actors, such as Ribbentrop and Molotov, seem so devoid of moral fibre or character that it beggars the imagination that they stood to at the helm of great nations.
Coming from London I have the Blitz in my blood, although I arrived on the scene rather later. I can say with some relief that Britain comes out of this story better than only Chamberlain. We acted late, but we acted, and Parliament and the Cabinet finally dragged Chamberlain to the war to which our guarantee to Poland committed us. The story of the final near-rebellion is extraordinary, and Watt leaves no doubt that Britain and thereby the Commonwealth really had decided, no matter what the rest of the world chose, to stand. There is comfort in this thought. More than a year after the outbreak US businesses' investment in the Nazi state continued to increase. Russia stood on the other side of the line, France and Poland were overrun, and the Commonwealth was suddenly a long way away across U-boat infested waters. Dark days were to come.
So how did war come? It came while we bickered. It is not true that no-one saw the danger. No-one saw it with the clarity of Churchill, it is true, but the French sought to re-arm and were thwarted, persuaded to keep to treaty limitations by the Americans and British. The Poles sought alliance but wanted no Soviet troops on their territory. Britain saw but thought that peace was possible. American isolationists saw Nazism and British Imperialism as relative evils, none of their business. And no-one trusted those who would soon fall alongside them. Too much history. In the end, though even his own military feared that war with Britain meant certain defeat, Hitler believed that we would not act.
January 6, 2016
Covers the year between Munich and the British declaration of war in extraordinary detail. When Watt stops to summarize, he is absolutely brilliant.
October 24, 2023
This definitely is a long, very detailed read of the 11 months that lead up to the start of WW II. If you are wanting to read such details then this is the book for you. It can and does get dry and boring, but push through and it will be worth it.
July 8, 2011
Comprehensive look at the eleven months between the Munich debacle of September 1938 and the beginning of the European phase of World War II in September 1939. I would recommend this to any serious student of the Second World War.
October 3, 2012
An sweeping account of European diplomacy in the years leading up to WWII. Once one gets past the punctuation and slightly difficult style Watt's account is witty, insightful, original, and gripping in its scholarship and analysis.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews