Moral theory should be the moral theorist attends to ordinary human action to explain what makes some acts right and others wrong, and we need no microscope to observe a human act. Yet no moral theory that is simple captures all of the morally relevant facts.
In a set of vivid examples, stories, and cases Judith Thomson shows just how wide an array of moral considerations bears on all but the simplest of problems. She is a philosophical analyst of the highest caliber who can tease a multitude of implications out of the story of a mere bit of eavesdropping. She is also a master teller of tales which have a philosophical bite. Beyond these pleasures, however, she brings new depth of understanding to some of the most pressing moral issues of the moment, notably abortion. Thomson’s essays determinedly confront the most difficult What is it to have a moral right to life, or any other right? What is the relation between the infringement of such rights and restitution? How is rights theory to deal with the imposition of risk?
I bought this because I wanted to read more by the author of the famous Violinist Argument, not realizing it also contains some of the earliest writings on the Trolley Problem. I was impressed by Thomson’s commitment to finding a moral theory, however complex, that would give the intuitive answer in every case, never considering whether intuitions could be confused, mistaken, or even contradictory. I was also struck by how impossible the task seemed, especially given how often my intuitions disagreed with hers, including on cases she found clear or obvious. It was a very interesting read, but did not clear up my thinking on any moral problems. If anything, I am more confused than ever.
Recommended for law students or those interested in famous moral problems like the trolly problem.
Some essays were more convincing than others—I really liked reading Thomson’s thoughts on abortion and the trolley problem, but the essays about governmental regulation of behavior and preferential hiring seemed less rigorous and more adrift than those previously mentioned.
Overall, I liked reading this, which was surprising considering I’ll always had more of a bent toward continental rather than analytic philosophy. However, I might be somewhat of an analytic convert now—although now I’ll need to brush up on my sentential logic.