WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT IRAQ? Scott Ritter spent seven years in Iraq as an arms inspector for the United Nations. His 1998 resignation as the U.N.'s chief weapons inspector there made front-page headlines around the world. In Endgame, Ritter draws on his experiences to take us inside Saddam Hussein's Iraq and to explain where U.S. policy in Iraq went wrong. Ritter describes in detail the ways that Saddam tried to foil inspectors by concealing his weapons programs. He brings readers with him inside some of Iraq's most carefully guarded sites and shows us dramatic face-offs between U.N. inspectors and hostile Iraqi guards and officials. But Ritter criticizes the U.S. for squandering an international consensus on Iraq and trying to use the inspections process for uniquely American goals. He argues strongly against the proposed American military strike against Iraq, suggesting instead a bold and innovative solution to the long-standing crisis.
Picked up on a whim from the Peace Corps library. Entertaining non-fiction about something I didn’t know a lot about. While the book focuses on the UN Security Council disarmament and investigation process post Kuwait invasion by Iraq, it also spends a lot of time explaining the rise to power of Sadam Hussein; the way he ran his government through a blend of tribalism, Ba’athist political ideals, and nepotism; the methods of “no-knock” weapons inspections; the intelligence work involved from both sides of the issue; etc. Cool to hear about how a country can break things down (missile launchers, biological weapon grow labs, wmd research facilities, chemical agent filled missile heads) and hide them in sedans, under orchards, in scrap piles, and as melted ingots.
Interesting account of one of the top UN weapons inspectors in the 1990's. Gives some excellent insights into how the inspections worked and why they fell apart. Ritter comes across as an odd character: very exacting and intense, an ex-Marine who took his job as an inspector extremely seriously. Maybe even a little too seriously: he would accept any political influence in the inspections, even if the Clinton administration really needed some slight tactical adjustments. Ritter ends this book with a compelling argument that the US strategy lacked an endgame. In other words, the US had committed itself to containing Saddam indefinitely, but the international coalition was collapsing and the US had no plan for diplomacy or an invasion. Ritter makes an solid case for an alternative strategy based on deterrence and diplomatic engagement with Saddam, although he overlooks the survival guarantee that would have been needed to get SH to trust the US even a little bit. This diplomatic approach would not have worked, but the fact that it was never tried shows how narrow a spectrum the American policy debate on Iraq took place within. Recommended for people interested in the Iraq War, but not really for anyone else.
When the ink was still wet on this work, I just followed the reviews, critiques, and Sunday morning Television reviews. It has always been on my list of 'to read'. I should have not postponed reading of the behind the scenes politics, personalities, and on-the-ground workings and events. Ritter's criticisms of the US's handling I found historically solid. Not current, but a worthwhile investment of my time.