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Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature
Shows how Darwinian biology supports an Aristotelian view of ethics as rooted in human nature.
This book shows how Darwinian biology supports an Aristotelian view of ethics as rooted in human nature. Defending a conception of "Darwinian natural right" based on the claim that the good is the desirable, the author argues that there are at least twenty natural desires that are universal to all human societies because they are based in human biology. The satisfaction of these natural desires constitutes a universal standard for judging social practice as either fulfilling or frustrating human nature, although prudence is required in judging what is best for particular circumstances.
The author studies the familial bonding of parents and children and the conjugal bonding of men and women as illustrating social behavior that conforms to Darwinian natural right. He also studies slavery and psychopathy as illustrating social behavior that contradicts Darwinian natural right. He argues as well that the natural moral sense does not require religious belief, although such belief can sometimes reinforce the dictates of nature.
"This is one of the best works of its kind that I have read in many years. It is extremely well-written and reads beautifully. Arnhart argues for a Darwinian perspective on morality and human nature generally, combined with an Aristotelian perspective. His argument will be extremely controversial." -- Michael Ruse, Editor, Philosophy and Biology
"This work is an astounding accomplishment. No one else could have done it. The range and depth of the understanding of Aristotle and Darwin are unusual; the capacity to link them to a thorough and accurate treatment of contemporary biology is even more so. And on other thinkers or historical issues, the erudition and clarity are equally precise and illuminating. For decades, we have been told that political philosophy in general and ancients like Aristotle in particular have been rendered obsolete by contemporary science. Social scientists and humanists in general--and political theorists more specifically--will simply have to reconsider their assumptions in the light of this work." -- Roger Masters, Dartmouth College
"This is a very intelligent discussion of matters that in the past have invited ideologues as participants and critics. My sense is that this is a book a publisher should be happy to have on its list." -- Timothy Goldsmith, Yale University
"Larry Arnhart is at the cutting edge of the frontiers of political philosophy today. His book on Aristotle and Darwin crowns more than a decade of research on the biological foundations of human nature. He has shown that it is no longer possible to assume that our biological nature is unrelated to our moral nature. He has therefore gone a long way to restoring the credibility of 'the laws of nature and of nature's God,' and of the political science upon which this nature was founded." -- Harry V. Jaffa, Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate School
This book shows how Darwinian biology supports an Aristotelian view of ethics as rooted in human nature. Defending a conception of "Darwinian natural right" based on the claim that the good is the desirable, the author argues that there are at least twenty natural desires that are universal to all human societies because they are based in human biology. The satisfaction of these natural desires constitutes a universal standard for judging social practice as either fulfilling or frustrating human nature, although prudence is required in judging what is best for particular circumstances.
The author studies the familial bonding of parents and children and the conjugal bonding of men and women as illustrating social behavior that conforms to Darwinian natural right. He also studies slavery and psychopathy as illustrating social behavior that contradicts Darwinian natural right. He argues as well that the natural moral sense does not require religious belief, although such belief can sometimes reinforce the dictates of nature.
"This is one of the best works of its kind that I have read in many years. It is extremely well-written and reads beautifully. Arnhart argues for a Darwinian perspective on morality and human nature generally, combined with an Aristotelian perspective. His argument will be extremely controversial." -- Michael Ruse, Editor, Philosophy and Biology
"This work is an astounding accomplishment. No one else could have done it. The range and depth of the understanding of Aristotle and Darwin are unusual; the capacity to link them to a thorough and accurate treatment of contemporary biology is even more so. And on other thinkers or historical issues, the erudition and clarity are equally precise and illuminating. For decades, we have been told that political philosophy in general and ancients like Aristotle in particular have been rendered obsolete by contemporary science. Social scientists and humanists in general--and political theorists more specifically--will simply have to reconsider their assumptions in the light of this work." -- Roger Masters, Dartmouth College
"This is a very intelligent discussion of matters that in the past have invited ideologues as participants and critics. My sense is that this is a book a publisher should be happy to have on its list." -- Timothy Goldsmith, Yale University
"Larry Arnhart is at the cutting edge of the frontiers of political philosophy today. His book on Aristotle and Darwin crowns more than a decade of research on the biological foundations of human nature. He has shown that it is no longer possible to assume that our biological nature is unrelated to our moral nature. He has therefore gone a long way to restoring the credibility of 'the laws of nature and of nature's God,' and of the political science upon which this nature was founded." -- Harry V. Jaffa, Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate School
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First published April 1, 1998
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January 23, 2015
Arnhart draws primarily from Aristotle (and supplements Aristotle with Hume and Darwin) to argue for ethical naturalism. In contrast to inanimate nature, humans are goal seeking, teleological beings. We act with ends in mind and we make choices. Arnhart lists twenty universal desires (collectively, “Darwinian natural right"), based on his survey of the literature, with desire being defined as a “propensity toward” or an “aversion against” an object. Knowledge and belief systems are secondary; they provide “information relevant to the goals set by desire.” This, Arnhart believes, reiterates Hume's belief that "reason can direct action but not motivate it."
In making his argument, Arnhart has to dispose of several theoretical objections, the most prominent of which is the reputed* Hume assertion that we cannot draw an “ought” from an “is.” Arnhart states that this distinction comes first from Kant, not Hume, whose “phenomenal” comes from the realm of nature and what “is,” and his ought belongs to the “‘noumenal’ realm of freedom.” While Kant’s “radical” dualist approach separates ought from is in this way, it’s not so clear how this disposes of the commonly understood logical objection to deriving an “ought” from “is,” and we are left only with Arnhart’s argument that, since we have twenty universal desires, we “ought” to desire their goals/objects.
Arnhart might be better off to reformulate the problem on the basis of sound evolutionary principles. If we desire to survive, this brings with it certain rights (freedom to seek, the needs for nurture and security, and to defend against threats) that can be legitimately argued as “natural” as they are central to our survival. If such rights and assertions only promote self-interest, this becomes a problem for the rights of those who restrict self-seeking in deference to the whole. Fortunately, as Darwin observed, we also have a full suite of social values that move us to merge with the group and to restrain ourselves as a result. Yet, given Darwinian variability, many are at the opposite end of the continuum and seek to advance their interest at the expense of others and the group if they can get away with it.
Despite Arnhart’s listing of human universals, it is doubtful that we have a “common human nature” as he argues in this book. This, and his preoccupation with Aristotle, lead him to make statements such as, “All human beings, or at least all those not suffering from some abnormal deformity in their emotional and rational capacities, are naturally inclined to assert their independence as human beings with a moral sense governed by sympathy and reciprocity.” This does not match up with the historical evidence about who we are or I believe with our evolutionary design. Both other-regarding behavior and purely self-seeking behavior (combined with power and deception) are valid survival strategies.
*Arnhart writes: "The common interpretation of Hume as having separated is from ought depends on only one paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature. Some Hume scholars have shown that if one considers carefully both the textual and historical contexts of this paragraph, one sees that the common interpretation is wrong."
In making his argument, Arnhart has to dispose of several theoretical objections, the most prominent of which is the reputed* Hume assertion that we cannot draw an “ought” from an “is.” Arnhart states that this distinction comes first from Kant, not Hume, whose “phenomenal” comes from the realm of nature and what “is,” and his ought belongs to the “‘noumenal’ realm of freedom.” While Kant’s “radical” dualist approach separates ought from is in this way, it’s not so clear how this disposes of the commonly understood logical objection to deriving an “ought” from “is,” and we are left only with Arnhart’s argument that, since we have twenty universal desires, we “ought” to desire their goals/objects.
Arnhart might be better off to reformulate the problem on the basis of sound evolutionary principles. If we desire to survive, this brings with it certain rights (freedom to seek, the needs for nurture and security, and to defend against threats) that can be legitimately argued as “natural” as they are central to our survival. If such rights and assertions only promote self-interest, this becomes a problem for the rights of those who restrict self-seeking in deference to the whole. Fortunately, as Darwin observed, we also have a full suite of social values that move us to merge with the group and to restrain ourselves as a result. Yet, given Darwinian variability, many are at the opposite end of the continuum and seek to advance their interest at the expense of others and the group if they can get away with it.
Despite Arnhart’s listing of human universals, it is doubtful that we have a “common human nature” as he argues in this book. This, and his preoccupation with Aristotle, lead him to make statements such as, “All human beings, or at least all those not suffering from some abnormal deformity in their emotional and rational capacities, are naturally inclined to assert their independence as human beings with a moral sense governed by sympathy and reciprocity.” This does not match up with the historical evidence about who we are or I believe with our evolutionary design. Both other-regarding behavior and purely self-seeking behavior (combined with power and deception) are valid survival strategies.
*Arnhart writes: "The common interpretation of Hume as having separated is from ought depends on only one paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature. Some Hume scholars have shown that if one considers carefully both the textual and historical contexts of this paragraph, one sees that the common interpretation is wrong."
August 19, 2014
This is another attempt to provide a basis for morality on human nature. The author points out several (twenty)features of our human nature, such as our desire to be good parents and raise children, our sexual desires, our desire for social status. His arguments are very persuasive in proving our social nature. They are less persuasive in proving our moral nature.
He appeals to the authority of Aristotle, Hume, and Darwin as early proponents of a humanist ethics grounded on human nature. James Wilson's book, The Moral Sense, is frequently cited.
It is well-written and cites references clearly. I respect the thought. But I feel like such arguments will only ground humanist ethics upon our social nature in a general way. It does not help much when attempting to deal with many of the moral issues of the day.
He appeals to the authority of Aristotle, Hume, and Darwin as early proponents of a humanist ethics grounded on human nature. James Wilson's book, The Moral Sense, is frequently cited.
It is well-written and cites references clearly. I respect the thought. But I feel like such arguments will only ground humanist ethics upon our social nature in a general way. It does not help much when attempting to deal with many of the moral issues of the day.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews