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Who Wins?: Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict
Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins?
Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives.
The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.
Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives.
The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.
192 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2012
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November 10, 2013
The problem with this book is it needs a lot of editing to make it readable. I was quite interested in the subject, and by sheer force of will managed to get to page 84. I decided I wouldn't gain anything by reading the remaining 50 pages, because the author seems to be going in circles around the main thesis and repeating it over and over: war outcomes depend on how much achieving the objective relies on target's compliance and the cost-tolerance of the two belligerents. That sentence is repeated so many times in the book, I feel ill just restating it here. I felt the book is not about "predicting strategic success," but about the author desperately trying to convince the reader that she might actually have a sound theory.
There's a whole chapter on how she gathered data for testing her theory, accompanied by such mundane details as the precise number of students she used to codify various aspects of it. That information would be useful only in "postdicting" instead predicting war outcomes. In summation, I feel Patricia L. Sullivan wrote a 2–4 page paper describing her successful theory in prediction of war outcomes and then simply padded that paper with heaps of useless and repeating information to make a 134-page book out of it. I would not recommend this book to a friend.
There's a whole chapter on how she gathered data for testing her theory, accompanied by such mundane details as the precise number of students she used to codify various aspects of it. That information would be useful only in "postdicting" instead predicting war outcomes. In summation, I feel Patricia L. Sullivan wrote a 2–4 page paper describing her successful theory in prediction of war outcomes and then simply padded that paper with heaps of useless and repeating information to make a 134-page book out of it. I would not recommend this book to a friend.
Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review