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Logical Positivism. Edited by A.J. Ayer, includes articles by Russell, Schlick, Carnap, Hempel, Hahn, Neurath, Ramsey, Ryle, & Waismann. [With bibliography of Logical Positivism]. Free Press. 1959.
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October 9, 2024
AN EXCELLENT COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND ARTICLES REPRESENTING THE MOVEMENT
Editor Alfred Jules Ayer (1910-1989) was a British philosopher who was a founder of Logical Positivism, who was a professor of logic at the University of Oxford.
General Editor Paul Edwards wrote in the Preface to this 1959 collection of essays, "This volume presents, for the first time in English, many of the most influential papers by leading members of the Vienna Circle. These and other articles contain authoritative expositions of the doctrines most commonly associated with logical positivism." Essays are included from Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Carl Hempel, Otto Neurath, Frank Ramsey, Gilbert Ryle, and others, as well as Ayer himself.
Ayer wrote in his Introduction, "The term `Logical Positivism' was coined some thirty years ago to characterize the standpoint of a group of philosophers, scientists and mathematicians who gave themselves the name of the Vienna Circle. Since that time its reference has been extended to cover other forms of analytic philosophy; so that disciples of Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore or Ludwig Wittgenstein... or members of the contemporary Oxford movement of linguistic analysis may also find themselves described as logical positivists. This wider usage is especially favored by those who are hostile to the whole modern development of philosophy as an analytical rather than a speculative enquiry." (Pg. 3)
After citing Hume's famous "Commit it them to the flames" comment about books of speculative metaphysics, Ayer observes, "It is an excellent statement of the positivist's position... Metaphysical utterances were condemned ... for pretending to be cognitive, for masquerading as something that they were not... The originality of the logical positivists lay in their making the impossibility of metaphysics depend not upon the nature of what could be known but upon the nature of what could be said." (Pg. 10-11) He notes that the positivists modified their "demands that a statement be conclusively verifiable" to one "by which it was required only that a statement be capable of being in some degree confirmed or disconfirmed by observation." (Pg. 14)
He admits, "An obvious objection to the verification principle, which the positivists' opponents were quick to seize upon, it that it is not itself verifiable... But then what status did they think it had? Might it not itself be metaphysical?... The Vienna Circle tended to ignore this difficulty: but it seems to me fairly clear that what they were in fact doing was to adopt the verification principle as a convention. They were propounding a definition of meaning which accorded with common usage in the sense that it set out the conditions that are in fact satisfied by statements which are regarded as empirically informative." (Pg. 15)
Moritz Schlick says in one of his included essays, "Philosophy is not a system of statements; it is not a science. But what is it then?... nevertheless something so significant and important that it may henceforth as before, be honored as the Queen of the Sciences. For it is nowhere written that the Queen of the Sciences must itself be a science... we see in philosophy not a system of cognitions, but a system of ACTS; philosophy is that activity through which the meaning of statements is revealed or determined. By means of philosophy statements are explained, by means of science they are verified." (Pg. 56) Schlick later asserts, "The empiricist does not say to the metaphysician `what you say is false,' but `what you say asserts nothing at all!' He does not contradict him, but says, `I don't understand you.'" (Pg. 107)
An essay by Hans Hahn says, "Our thesis... asserts: logic does not by any means treat of the totality of things, it does not treat of objects at all but only of our way of speaking about objects; logic is first generated by language. The certainty and universal validity, or better, the irrefutability of a proposition of logic derives just from the fact that it says nothing about objects of any kind." (Pg. 152)
This book should be considered "must reading" by anyone wanting to know more about this philosophical school.
Editor Alfred Jules Ayer (1910-1989) was a British philosopher who was a founder of Logical Positivism, who was a professor of logic at the University of Oxford.
General Editor Paul Edwards wrote in the Preface to this 1959 collection of essays, "This volume presents, for the first time in English, many of the most influential papers by leading members of the Vienna Circle. These and other articles contain authoritative expositions of the doctrines most commonly associated with logical positivism." Essays are included from Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Carl Hempel, Otto Neurath, Frank Ramsey, Gilbert Ryle, and others, as well as Ayer himself.
Ayer wrote in his Introduction, "The term `Logical Positivism' was coined some thirty years ago to characterize the standpoint of a group of philosophers, scientists and mathematicians who gave themselves the name of the Vienna Circle. Since that time its reference has been extended to cover other forms of analytic philosophy; so that disciples of Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore or Ludwig Wittgenstein... or members of the contemporary Oxford movement of linguistic analysis may also find themselves described as logical positivists. This wider usage is especially favored by those who are hostile to the whole modern development of philosophy as an analytical rather than a speculative enquiry." (Pg. 3)
After citing Hume's famous "Commit it them to the flames" comment about books of speculative metaphysics, Ayer observes, "It is an excellent statement of the positivist's position... Metaphysical utterances were condemned ... for pretending to be cognitive, for masquerading as something that they were not... The originality of the logical positivists lay in their making the impossibility of metaphysics depend not upon the nature of what could be known but upon the nature of what could be said." (Pg. 10-11) He notes that the positivists modified their "demands that a statement be conclusively verifiable" to one "by which it was required only that a statement be capable of being in some degree confirmed or disconfirmed by observation." (Pg. 14)
He admits, "An obvious objection to the verification principle, which the positivists' opponents were quick to seize upon, it that it is not itself verifiable... But then what status did they think it had? Might it not itself be metaphysical?... The Vienna Circle tended to ignore this difficulty: but it seems to me fairly clear that what they were in fact doing was to adopt the verification principle as a convention. They were propounding a definition of meaning which accorded with common usage in the sense that it set out the conditions that are in fact satisfied by statements which are regarded as empirically informative." (Pg. 15)
Moritz Schlick says in one of his included essays, "Philosophy is not a system of statements; it is not a science. But what is it then?... nevertheless something so significant and important that it may henceforth as before, be honored as the Queen of the Sciences. For it is nowhere written that the Queen of the Sciences must itself be a science... we see in philosophy not a system of cognitions, but a system of ACTS; philosophy is that activity through which the meaning of statements is revealed or determined. By means of philosophy statements are explained, by means of science they are verified." (Pg. 56) Schlick later asserts, "The empiricist does not say to the metaphysician `what you say is false,' but `what you say asserts nothing at all!' He does not contradict him, but says, `I don't understand you.'" (Pg. 107)
An essay by Hans Hahn says, "Our thesis... asserts: logic does not by any means treat of the totality of things, it does not treat of objects at all but only of our way of speaking about objects; logic is first generated by language. The certainty and universal validity, or better, the irrefutability of a proposition of logic derives just from the fact that it says nothing about objects of any kind." (Pg. 152)
This book should be considered "must reading" by anyone wanting to know more about this philosophical school.
Displaying 1 of 1 review