Throughout the Arab world, Islamist political movements are joining the electoral process. This change alarms some observers and excites other. In recent years, electoral opportunities have opened, and Islamist movements have seized them. But those opportunities, while real, have also been sharply circumscribed. Elections may be freer, but they are not fair. The opposition can run but it generally cannot win. Semiauthoritarian conditions prevail in much of the Arab world, even in the wake of the Arab Spring. How do Islamist movements change when they plunge into freer but unfair elections? How do their organizations (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) and structures evolve? What happens to their core ideological principles? And how might their increased involvement affect the political system?
In When Victory Is Not an Option, Nathan J. Brown addresses these questions by focusing on Islamist movements in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Palestine. He shows that uncertain benefits lead to uncertain changes. Islamists do adapt their organizations and their ideologies do bend--some. But leaders almost always preserve a line of retreat in case the political opening fizzles or fails to deliver what they wish. The result is a cat-and-mouse game between dominant regimes and wily movements. There are possibilities for more significant changes, but to date they remain only possibilities.
كتاب أكثر من رائع ، وأعمق من كتاب سابق للمؤلف مع عمرو حمزاوي عن الإسلاميون في البرلمانات العربية، ورغم أن المادة الأساسية للكتاب وضعت وكتبت قبل الربيع العربي، إلا أن المؤلف، أرفق بالترجمة العربية مقدمة رائعة تتصدى للكثير من الإشكاليات التي أثارها الربيع العربي وصعود الإسلاميين للسلطة.
هذا الكتاب، في فض الاشتباك في القراءة التي تحاول أحيانًا فهم الإسلامي السياسي في الشرق الأوسط على ضوء الحراك السياسي المسيحي اليميني في أوروبا من ناحية، وعلى نمط الفاشية السياسية من ناحية أخرى، في هذا الكتاب يقدم الكاتب حركات الإسلام السياسي في الشرق الأوسط كنموذج أصيل ابنًا للتربية السياسية العربية\الإسلامية. من خلال قراءة هذا الكتاب الذي كُتب في عام 2012، يمكن أن تفهم جيدًا لماذا اختار الإخوان المسلمين بكل حُمق الترشح لانتخابات الرئاسة رغم الانقسام الداخلي حول ذلك القرار، ولماذا بشكل أكثر حمُقًا سقط حكمهم خلال سنة واحدة من الغباء السياسي وخبط العشواء والاستعلاء على الواقع وأطياف مجتمعنا، ويشرح كذلك لماذا نموذجهم في المعارضة حاليًا لا مناص عنه، حيث المسارات الحتمية اللانهائية من الحمق وتكراره.. الخبر السيء، الجيد بالنسبة للإسلام السياسي، أن مجتمعاتنا الحمقاء ما زالت على استعداد لتكرار التجربة بكل سهولة في حال سقطت الأنظمة السلطوية التي تحكمها.. تلك منطقة مُبتلاة بين إسلام سياسي وإسلام على طريقة العسكر، وعلمانية على طريقة الأنظمة الدكتاتورية.. أيضًا الكتاب في شق آخر مهم جدًا في شرح قرار حماس في السابع من أكتوبر، فمهما حاول الشخص التحرر من الأحكام الجوهرانية، سيدفعه الإسلاميون دائمًا أن يؤمن بجوهرانية الحُمق والسذاجة كبوصلة توجيههم في عجلة التاريخ
A review of how Islamist movements in four states (Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Palestine) adapted organizationally and ideologically to the openings provided as authoritarian regimes softened into "semiauthoritarian" states, defined as states in which, despite all trappings and electoral flourishes, the opposition is foreordained to lose.
In sum, Brown argues, "over time, given a political process that offers substantial rewards for participation and substantial risks for other strategies, movements on the edge of a system will indeed become politicized..."
Brown kept his argument fairly modest and there was a faint 'captain of the obvious' feel about some of his observations. That said, there was much to appreciate here:
Brown avoids the use of the word "moderation," which has a strong normative bent that basically ends up meaning "agrees with us" with us defined as whomever is using the word that day. Instead he substitutes the word "politicization" which indicates a commitment to achieve goals through existing democratic structures, to play within the commonly accepted rules of the game. This leads to an interesting observation, that the more politicized elements of a given Islamist movement (for example, doves in Jordan) are more likely to take a strident, oppositional tone than those elements that are less convinced of the utility of playing politics. Thus ideology and tone of discourse are separated from the commitment to engage positively within democratic structures.
Brown captures what he refers to as the "cat and mouse" game played between semiauthoritarian regimes (who change the rules of the game willy nilly) and Brotherhood-style/affiliate movements (who respond to the varying openings and freezes like "toothpaste" in the tube, flowing from newly constricted areas to places with more social 'space.') His larger and unstated point is that it is unfair, or at least imprecise, to judge movements in semiauthoritarian countries by the standards generated by the study of movements in more open democracies. He notes, "semiauthoritarian regimes generate semiresponsive movements" and grey-zone regimes produce grey-zone movements. He also argues that Islamist movements are most in danger/scariest to the regime when they play by the rules of an open democracy (ie they commit to the political process and try to win).
While the example of Hamas was interesting, mostly because it broke all the rules while still following the trendline, it did not gel as well as the other three case studies. I also found Chapter 8 to be surprisingly lukewarm. When Brown gave himself the space to speculate wildly he did very little with it. Some of his observations were OBE given the speed at which Egypt has plowed forward into the unknown. But I also thought he was pretty light on the implications of the Egyptian Brotherhood's (and other similar movements) hierarchical and highly disciplined nature given that he was musing on the potential for these movements to make the society around them more open to open discussion.
Worth the read and ridiculously timely for Brown, given that his footnotes are littered with MB luminaries: once obscure, now headlines in international media.