What do you think?
Rate this book
Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games [An article from: Journal of Mathematical Economics]
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Mathematical Economics, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny's [Perry, M., Reny, P., 1994. A non-cooperative view of coalition formation and the core. Econometrica 62, 795-817] non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.
In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny's [Perry, M., Reny, P., 1994. A non-cooperative view of coalition formation and the core. Econometrica 62, 795-817] non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.
22 pages, ebook
Published September 1, 2006
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
No one has reviewed this book yet.