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Science and philosophy in the Soviet Union by Loren R Graham
Science and philosophy in the Soviet Union [Jan 01, 1972] Graham, Loren R
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First published January 1, 1972
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About the author
Loren R. Graham
21 books17 followersLoren R. Graham was an American historian of science, particularly science in Russia.
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September 6, 2007
Note: This book is an expanded and updated edition of Graham's Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union
The main focus of this book is dialectical materialism, the official philosophy of science in the Soviet Union, and its impact on the practice of science in the USSR (mostly after WWII). After a detailed account of the ins-and-outs of dialectical materialism – its connection to other brands of materialism and its uniquely Soviet characteristics (Chapters 1 and 2) – Graham then moves onto disciplinary case studies that demonstrate the varied ways in which dialectical materialism affected scientists working in the various disciplines. Chapter 3 discusses origin of life research, 4 genetics, 5 physiology and psychology, 6 the nature-nurture debate, 7 biology and human beings, 8 cybernetics and computers, 9 chemistry, 10 quantum mechanics, 11 relativity physics, and 12 cosmology and cosmogony.
Graham skillfully (and appropriately) separates Soviet philosophy from Soviet politics. Thus the famous case of T.D. Lysenko and genetics, often referred to as the paradigmatic example of how dialectical materialism was detrimental to science, is shown to be more a case of political meddling than one of philosophical dogmatism. Many of the cases Graham details in fact seem to be ones in which dialectical materialism benefited scientists. In the case of origin of life researcher A.I. Oparin, for example, it seems to have provided him the benefit of a useful materialist understanding of the world that did not support reductionist interpretations of phenomena, while at the same time providing a check against vitalism and idealism. Oparin also benefited from the creation of a cultural atmosphere in the 1920s in which “a materialistic answer to the question ‘What is life?’ seemed natural” (p. 73). By Graham’s account, Oparin was influenced by dialectical materialism from the 1930s onward, and faced few cultural obstacles thanks to it. It is worth noting that much of Oparin’s work became foundational for NASA’s work in origin and extent of life research.
This goes against the grain of the prevailing Western wisdom that successful science in the USSR was done by scientists who only paid lip service to dialectical materialism. Graham seeks to replace this interpretation with the observation that Soviet science and its relationship to philosophy is not so different from the historical relationship between science and philosophy in general. Graham writes, “The fact that emerges … is that science and philosophy have interacted at all times and places, not merely in the ancient past or in the contemporary Soviet Union. Soviet science is a part of world science, and the type of interaction of philosophy and science that can be found in Soviet scholarly writings (those of intellectuals, not of Party activists) is not essentially different from the interaction of science and philosophy elsewhere” (p. 66). While the party did attempt to control this relationship, the story Graham tells is, for the most part, that of their failure to do so.
As robust a form of materialism as dialectical materialism may be, Graham does lament the fact that it was not allowed to developed in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom: “While dialectical materialism remains an intellectually interesting doctrine, on a political level it has been damaged – probably beyond the point of salvage – by the fact that it is the doctrine of an oppressive, nondemocratic state” (p. 434). His work also seems to imply that, had dialectical materialism been allowed to evolve in a more “natural” manner, it might be even more useful today.
The main focus of this book is dialectical materialism, the official philosophy of science in the Soviet Union, and its impact on the practice of science in the USSR (mostly after WWII). After a detailed account of the ins-and-outs of dialectical materialism – its connection to other brands of materialism and its uniquely Soviet characteristics (Chapters 1 and 2) – Graham then moves onto disciplinary case studies that demonstrate the varied ways in which dialectical materialism affected scientists working in the various disciplines. Chapter 3 discusses origin of life research, 4 genetics, 5 physiology and psychology, 6 the nature-nurture debate, 7 biology and human beings, 8 cybernetics and computers, 9 chemistry, 10 quantum mechanics, 11 relativity physics, and 12 cosmology and cosmogony.
Graham skillfully (and appropriately) separates Soviet philosophy from Soviet politics. Thus the famous case of T.D. Lysenko and genetics, often referred to as the paradigmatic example of how dialectical materialism was detrimental to science, is shown to be more a case of political meddling than one of philosophical dogmatism. Many of the cases Graham details in fact seem to be ones in which dialectical materialism benefited scientists. In the case of origin of life researcher A.I. Oparin, for example, it seems to have provided him the benefit of a useful materialist understanding of the world that did not support reductionist interpretations of phenomena, while at the same time providing a check against vitalism and idealism. Oparin also benefited from the creation of a cultural atmosphere in the 1920s in which “a materialistic answer to the question ‘What is life?’ seemed natural” (p. 73). By Graham’s account, Oparin was influenced by dialectical materialism from the 1930s onward, and faced few cultural obstacles thanks to it. It is worth noting that much of Oparin’s work became foundational for NASA’s work in origin and extent of life research.
This goes against the grain of the prevailing Western wisdom that successful science in the USSR was done by scientists who only paid lip service to dialectical materialism. Graham seeks to replace this interpretation with the observation that Soviet science and its relationship to philosophy is not so different from the historical relationship between science and philosophy in general. Graham writes, “The fact that emerges … is that science and philosophy have interacted at all times and places, not merely in the ancient past or in the contemporary Soviet Union. Soviet science is a part of world science, and the type of interaction of philosophy and science that can be found in Soviet scholarly writings (those of intellectuals, not of Party activists) is not essentially different from the interaction of science and philosophy elsewhere” (p. 66). While the party did attempt to control this relationship, the story Graham tells is, for the most part, that of their failure to do so.
As robust a form of materialism as dialectical materialism may be, Graham does lament the fact that it was not allowed to developed in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom: “While dialectical materialism remains an intellectually interesting doctrine, on a political level it has been damaged – probably beyond the point of salvage – by the fact that it is the doctrine of an oppressive, nondemocratic state” (p. 434). His work also seems to imply that, had dialectical materialism been allowed to evolve in a more “natural” manner, it might be even more useful today.
Displaying 1 of 1 review