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The Aquinas Lecture in Philosophy #7

The Problem of the Criterion (The Aquinas Lecture, 1973) by Roderick M. Chisholm

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Book by Chisholm, Roderick M.

Paperback

First published January 1, 1973

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About the author

Roderick M. Chisholm

43 books12 followers
Roderick Milton Chisholm was an American philosopher known for his work on epistemology, metaphysics, free will, value theory, and the philosophy of perception. He was often called "the philosopher's philosopher.

Chisholm graduated from Brown University in 1938 and received his Ph.D. at Harvard University in 1942 under Clarence Irving Lewis and Donald C. Williams. He was drafted into the United States Army in July 1942 and did basic training at Fort McClellan in Alabama. Chisholm administered psychological tests in Boston and New Haven. In 1943 he married Eleanor Parker, whom he had met as an undergraduate at Brown. He spent his academic career at Brown University and served as president of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1973.

Chisholm trained many distinguished philosophers, including Selmer Bringsjord, Fred Feldman, Keith Lehrer, James Francis Ross, Richard Taylor, and Dean Zimmerman. He also had a significant influence on many colleagues, including Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa.

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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
Profile Image for Josh.
168 reviews100 followers
October 3, 2018
Chisholm attempts here to demonstrate the problem of the criterion (to know things are as they seem, we must have a method to evaluate them. But how can we know that our method is successful when we don't in the first place know without a method). After outlining this, he formulates it in the following way:

Type A "what do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge"
Type B "How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge"

The epistemological sceptic believes we cannot answer one without presupposing an answer for the other, and thus, cannot know anything.

The "Methodist" (here Chrisholm uses Locke as an example) believe they know B in order to know A

The "particularist" (the example of Reid is given) answers A to answer B

Chisholm believes there are 2 problems with the Methodist approach:

1. The criterion is very broad and far reaching yet at the same time arbitrary. How can one begin with a broad generalisation?

2. Specifically empiricist methodism leads to idealism, what we can actually know through the empiricist criterion (that which is actual is that which bears certain relations to sense perceptions) is only about sense perceptions, as Hume conceded.

Chisholm believes to solve the problem of the criterion, we must take a common sense (à la Reid) particularist approach whereby we simply intuitively trust our sense experience, examine an individual object and then extrapolate from that a criterion for the method of evaluation.

My issue however is with the way in which Chisholm objects to the Methodist approach. I agree with his 2nd point against empiricism specifically, but his first point against all of methodism doesn't seem to hold water imo. I think an easily imaginable methodist case which isn't "arbitrary" is to realise the relation of knowledge with practice. We gain and test knowledge with interaction with the world. We can experiment and test theories. If the knowledge we have corresponds to the material world and is validated by that practice, it can be said to be true knowledge. The separation of knowledge from how we are to decide the criteria of our knowledge seems unnecessary for the answer to both is the same: practice. Practice produces, tests and validates knowledge.
Profile Image for Chad Gibbons.
200 reviews13 followers
October 21, 2023
Excellent.

Chisholm tackles one of the fundamental problems in epistemology: The criterion. He does this by giving three different options of how philosophers in the past have dealt with it and why two of these don't work.

First, there are the skeptics, who don't know anything (and don't even know they don't know anything). This is somewhat self-refuting, and doesn't answer for the basic facts that everyone seems to experience either. In fact, it usually takes someone acquiring a great deal of knowledge before they end up declaring a wholesale skepticism.

Second, there are what he calls 'methodists' (not the followers of Wesley, he uses the term entirely differently). The methodists claim to possess a criterion for knowing, without first explaining HOW they know the criterion itself. Empiricists like Locke and Hume are bunched into this category. By claiming to know a criterion for knowing, before actually knowing, Chisholm says, is to ignore the problem entirely. How can you KNOW if your criterion for evaluating good knowledge is itself a good criterion?

Thirdly, there are what Chisholm labels as 'particularists'. Particularism states that we START as knowers with particular examples of things that we know WITHOUT NEEDING TO KNOW HOW WE KNOW THEM. The intricacies of this are interesting, but as Chisholm shows, this appears to be the only way to actually solve the problem of the criterion.

A quick and altogether worthwhile read.
398 reviews1 follower
September 10, 2012
So good. The conclusion is fascinating: only by begging the question can we answer the question. While totally unrelated to Chisholm's focus, this plays nicely into presuppositionalism.
Profile Image for Ethan.
Author 2 books73 followers
April 6, 2016
A nice, short talk on a fundamental issue in epistemology, along with an answer that's interesting even if you don't find it persuasive (in fact, I wonder if Chisholm is unwittingly endorsing a higher-order skepticism about epistemology). While Chisholm draws connections to historical figures, he doesn't touch on the ancient Hellenistic skeptics or non-Western discussions of similar issues (in Indian philosophy, for example, this issue arises in debates between the Madhyamaka and Nyāya schools). I suppose such connections were less popular in American philosophy at the time. I guess that gives the rest of us something to look into!
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