What do you think?
Rate this book
Painism: A Modern Morality
Dr Richard Ryder has played a creative role in developing new ethical ideas for over 30 years and was part of a small group of Oxford writers in the early 1970s who revived interest in the ethical treatment of animals. Including animals within the moral circle was itself a revolutionary step and one that has begun to bear fruit in the new body of legislation protecting animals internationally. These ideas helped pioneer the modern interest in applied ethics generally. Ryder's concept of speciesism is now widely debated in philosophical circles, and indeed has had an entry in the Oxford Dictionary since 1985. Ryder. Painism, a term Ryder coined in 1990, is the word he employs to describe his unique ethical position. Painism goes far wider than the treatment of animals, and also covers human situations, many of which are examined in this book - often with provocative and controversial results. Painism's implications for human society are quite considerable, not least because of its insistence that the quantity of sufferers affected by any event is irrelevant; instead, all is judged by the pain of the individual who suffers most. Thus painism stands between, and to an extent forms a bridge between, the two great rival theories in modern Utilitarianism and Rights Theory.
- GenresPhilosophy
144 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 2002
2 people are currently reading
40 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
July 8, 2020
To say that I have deep sympathy for Ryder's views on ethics would be a criminal understatement. Unfortunately, this book mostly just presents these views as opposed to arguing for them. And of the arguments that are presented, many are not particularly satisfying — even when I agree with the basic arguments, they are not developed sufficiently. A clear sense of the structure of the view being defended is largely missing.
I also feel the book fails to engage with some of the most basic objections one could raise to the views presented.
As just one example of something I feel is left not only undefended but also unexplained is that Ryder claims that we cannot aggregate pains and pleasures across different individuals, whereas "it can be quite proper to do so within the same individual" (p. 36). Ryder does not explain why this distinction is sensible. In particular, Ryder gives no explanation to the empty individualist who thinks each consciousness-moment should, also for ethical purposes, be considered a different person.
The lack of rigor meant that reading this book was at times frustrating. For example, when discussing rights theory (pp. 39-40), Ryder criticizes pluralist rights theories for being arbitrary, without acknowledging that his own theory is also much less than perfectly parsimonious, as he introduces many rules above and beyond just "minimize the pain of the greatest sufferer".
As a case in point, he says it is always wrong to deliberately cause pain that is severe or prolonged (though he also suggests this is a mere rule of thumb, which renders the "always" in this moral rule rather confusing), implying that his view is not a pure consequentialist view focused on reducing the pain of the greatest sufferer, whatever the means. In other words, his distinction between acts of commission and acts of omission, along with the impermissibility of certain means ("my theory would never permit causing pain to others in order to reduce the pain of maximum sufferers to absolute zero" p. 43), can also be deemed arbitrary (though he distances himself from the act-omission distinction in other places, cf. p. 42, which is a good example of the lack of clarity in Ryder's exposition).
Similar charges of arbitrariness can be leveled at the significance ascribed to individual preferences (p. 31) in determining the badness and moral importance of pain. For example, if one individual says it is maximally important to reduce their pain, and another individual says the same about their pain, how can we adjudicate these claims, even in principle? This does not seem perfectly "unarbitrary" either.
Beyond that, the book contains a lot of loose speculation, and frequently mentions quantum mechanics, which not only feels unnecessary but also distracting.
All in all, Ryder's view is extremely important, and in my opinion comes closer to capturing the heart of ethics than do the most popular alternatives. But Ryder leaves much to be wanted in terms of the exact structure of his view and the justification for it.
I also feel the book fails to engage with some of the most basic objections one could raise to the views presented.
As just one example of something I feel is left not only undefended but also unexplained is that Ryder claims that we cannot aggregate pains and pleasures across different individuals, whereas "it can be quite proper to do so within the same individual" (p. 36). Ryder does not explain why this distinction is sensible. In particular, Ryder gives no explanation to the empty individualist who thinks each consciousness-moment should, also for ethical purposes, be considered a different person.
The lack of rigor meant that reading this book was at times frustrating. For example, when discussing rights theory (pp. 39-40), Ryder criticizes pluralist rights theories for being arbitrary, without acknowledging that his own theory is also much less than perfectly parsimonious, as he introduces many rules above and beyond just "minimize the pain of the greatest sufferer".
As a case in point, he says it is always wrong to deliberately cause pain that is severe or prolonged (though he also suggests this is a mere rule of thumb, which renders the "always" in this moral rule rather confusing), implying that his view is not a pure consequentialist view focused on reducing the pain of the greatest sufferer, whatever the means. In other words, his distinction between acts of commission and acts of omission, along with the impermissibility of certain means ("my theory would never permit causing pain to others in order to reduce the pain of maximum sufferers to absolute zero" p. 43), can also be deemed arbitrary (though he distances himself from the act-omission distinction in other places, cf. p. 42, which is a good example of the lack of clarity in Ryder's exposition).
Similar charges of arbitrariness can be leveled at the significance ascribed to individual preferences (p. 31) in determining the badness and moral importance of pain. For example, if one individual says it is maximally important to reduce their pain, and another individual says the same about their pain, how can we adjudicate these claims, even in principle? This does not seem perfectly "unarbitrary" either.
Beyond that, the book contains a lot of loose speculation, and frequently mentions quantum mechanics, which not only feels unnecessary but also distracting.
All in all, Ryder's view is extremely important, and in my opinion comes closer to capturing the heart of ethics than do the most popular alternatives. But Ryder leaves much to be wanted in terms of the exact structure of his view and the justification for it.
Displaying 1 of 1 review