A specialist in the history of East Africa and Sudan, Robert O. Collins was Professor of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara, where he taught from 1965 to 1994.
This is a fascinating account of a little known episode in diplomatic history.
Everyone knows of the Marchand Expedition that led to Fashoda, but other powers were interested in attempting to fill the vacuum temporarily created in the Sudan after the death of Gordon and the establishment of the Mahdist regime.
The Italians in East Africa were interested, but were checked in their ambitions by defeat at Adowa.
France tried and failed at Fashoda. But this is the story of Belgium's attempt. Or, to put it more accurately, the attempt of King Leopold II as head of state of the Congo Free State.
It is centred around the southern Sudan and especially the marshy pestilential morass of the Bahr al-Ghazal. This area feeds the Nile, but not to any serious degree as the British learned later, and is characterised by sluggish impenetrable swamps filled with sudd, thick barrier reeds.
This is a strange place for diplomatic game of imperialism to be played, since it is in itself of so little value.
But Leopold was determined to connect the Congo with the Nile, and he is frequently referred to as megalomaniac in his ambitions because they made little economic sense and the Congo had much better outlets to the east.
Leopold played a seriously clever and ridiculously drawn out game of cat and mouse, and it is interesting here to note how strong the Congo Free State was on the ground.
Barbara Emerson wrote that Leopold exploited the image of little Belgium being bullied by France in determining the borders between the CFS and the French Congo, when in fact the Belgians were stronger on the African rivers.
In the same way the British worried that Leopold would present the image of England bullying Belgium on the Nile, when the Sudanese forces were very small, and greatly outnumbered by the Belgians.
Fortunately no clashes occurred, but it interesting to note how thin the British Empire was on the ground here, and that for all of its supposed majesty the British Empire was defied by an arguably mentally unstable Belgian King and twenty-five hundred Congolese.
This book encompasses all of the intrigues, moves and counter moves, and has a rich cast of historical figures including an appearance by Churchill. Lord Cromer appears to me the hero of the story, and Leopold most obviously the villain.
Interspersed in the text are several sections dealing with the Congo Reform Movement, and the impact this had on Leopold's position. Ultimately it proved to be his undoing, since for all his diplomatic acumen he could only get England to grant the Lado Enclave for his own lifetime.
This strange ambiguous territory was left in limbo when the King ceded the Congo to the Belgian Government, and the latter was only too happy to evacuate it after Leopold's death.
Collins thesis is that Leopold proved a much more serious adversary in frustrating British attempts to secure the Sudan and the Upper Nile than either France or Italy, despite being great states.
I feel that the book proves this case very convincingly, and though Leopold was an unsavoury character he was an extraordinary person. One is left in no doubt that England never intended to let him have the Nile, but had Leopold retained control of the Congo and had lived a few more years, one wonders what arbitration might have achieved.
Leopold's grandiose visions for a Nilotic empire never materialised, because after all the British were a mighty power and Leopold was just one man. But it was a hell of a run. I greatly enjoyed this book.