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Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays
John R. Searle has made profoundly influential contributions to three areas of philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of society. This volume gathers together in accessible form a selection of his essays in these areas. They range widely across social ontology, where Searle presents concise and informative statements of positions developed in more detail elsewhere; artificial intelligence and cognitive science, where Searle assesses the current state of the debate and develops his most recent thoughts; and philosophy of language, where Searle connects ideas from various strands of his work in order to develop original answers to fundamental questions. There are also explorations of the limitations of phenomenological inquiry, the mind-body problem, and the nature and future of philosophy. This rich collection from one of America's leading contemporary philosophers will be valuable for all who are interested in these central philosophical questions.
- GenresPhilosophy
210 pages, Hardcover
First published January 31, 2008
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About the author
John Rogers Searle
97 books376 followersJohn Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado) is an American philosopher and was the Slusser Professor of Philosophy and Mills Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley). Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy, he was the first tenured professor to join the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley. He received the Jean Nicod Prize in 2000, and the National Humanities Medal in 2004.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 29, 2024
A fairly recent collection of short and accessible essays by Searle on the various issues in philosophy that he has worked on over the years. This is probably the best way to begin to understand John Searle’s work.
December 23, 2025
Searle passed away in September 2025. This is a collection of essays, mostof which were published between 1990 and 2008. There is a retrospective on the Turing test and Searle’s own Chinese room argument. Both are quite interesting. Though written in a clear style, there are several interpretations of Turing’s article. Searle points out that the test is clearly focused on syntax and cannot assess semantic content. As he says, “… A system can behave as if it were intelligent without having any internal mental processes whatever.”
He was often accused of being a property dualist when it came to philosophy of mind. He argues against that in his article ‘Why I am not a property dualist.” He argues that conscious is a physical process like photosynthesis or solidity or wetness or digestion.
In one article, he takes on the is/ought problem first proposed by David Hume. He focuses his argument on reasons for action and rationality, rather than on metaphysics.
The Phenomenological Illusion” Draws on his work on philosophy of mind and especially intentionality. He says, “On my view, phenomenology is a good beginning on the analysis of intentionality, but it cannot go all the way because there are all sorts of conditions which simply have no immediate phenomenological reality.” “Properly understood, there is no conflict between analytic philosophy and phenomenology.”
Serial takes on Heidegger’s notion of ready to handedness and compares it to his own treatment of the observer independent versus the observer relative. Mountains, rocks and rivers and the like are observer independent. They exist regardless of our observing them. Money, hammers, governments and marriage are creations of humans and depend on our intentions for their existence. Heidegger has that exactly backwards.
All in all, a good collection of essays.
He was often accused of being a property dualist when it came to philosophy of mind. He argues against that in his article ‘Why I am not a property dualist.” He argues that conscious is a physical process like photosynthesis or solidity or wetness or digestion.
In one article, he takes on the is/ought problem first proposed by David Hume. He focuses his argument on reasons for action and rationality, rather than on metaphysics.
The Phenomenological Illusion” Draws on his work on philosophy of mind and especially intentionality. He says, “On my view, phenomenology is a good beginning on the analysis of intentionality, but it cannot go all the way because there are all sorts of conditions which simply have no immediate phenomenological reality.” “Properly understood, there is no conflict between analytic philosophy and phenomenology.”
Serial takes on Heidegger’s notion of ready to handedness and compares it to his own treatment of the observer independent versus the observer relative. Mountains, rocks and rivers and the like are observer independent. They exist regardless of our observing them. Money, hammers, governments and marriage are creations of humans and depend on our intentions for their existence. Heidegger has that exactly backwards.
All in all, a good collection of essays.
February 5, 2020
Good articles that appeared in various journals all placed into one volume. My particular favorites are the papers on the why he isn't a property dualist and analytic philosophy in relation to phenomenology.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews