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Simon Bolivar's Quest for Glory
Earning glory on the fields of battle, Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) was one of the most influential and enigmatic figures of Latin American history. Most North Americans know little of "the Liberator" who freed South America from Spanish rule from 1810 to 1826. Richard W. Slatta and Jane Lucas De Grummond bring forth the entire life and legacy of Simón Bolívar, with special attention to the ups and the downs of his military career in Bolívar's Quest for Glory. Bolívar's life contained all the makings of an epic war hero: repeated comebacks from defeat, flashes of military genius, tremendous mood swings, dogged persistence, a near-manic quest for glory, and fall from political grace. He exhibited both military leadership and foolhardiness. Egomaniacal, he strived for military might and political power. The tragedy of his life and his political legacy remain hotly debated, but no one would deny this man's historical significance. Drawing from an immense corpus of writings left behind by Bolívar, his allies, and his enemies, the authors transport the reader back to the life and times of the Liberator, introducing lesser known people who fought on both sides of the conflict and showing how Bolívar did not win Spanish American independence all on his own. Voices of the past ring from this rich narrative—expressions of admiration for Bolívar's courage, leadership, and vision, as well as proclamations of the leader's failures and weaknesses. The first ever biography to suggest that Bolívar suffered from bipolar disorder, Bolívar's Quest for Glory treads new ground and shows how the conflicts he faced during the independence era set a political pattern followed by much of Latin America for the next century. Scholars and fans of military history, anyone interested in the development of modern Latin America, and readers of great biography will all welcome this book.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published June 25, 2003
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October 5, 2025
This book might prove difficult for me to review. I was lost and confused for much of the time I was reading it, I am not sure who the intended audience is supposed to be.
I was attracted to this title as it was, presumably, a military history of Bolivar. Bolivar is, first off, someone who is hardly known at all in the United States when he very much should be.
As someone with a lifelong interest in military theory and military history, I had noticed that precious little is ever written about Bolivar or South America in general. Military history is still heavily Eurocentric.
I saw this title and the publisher, which made me recall that this series included Norman Goda's work on Hitler's plans for Spain and North Africa, one of the best books I've ever read. But this book falls very short of that one.
Slatta begins in the preface by saying that the book was based on an uncompleted manuscript by Jane de Luca Grummond. I have not read any of her works, but Slatta informs us that he edited and rewrote much of the manuscript so that it is, in his own estimation, sixty-percent Slatta and forty-percent Grummond. He might have done better to leave more Grummond in.
I say this because this book is written in a very monotonous way that is far from engaging or exciting. It is just flat out boring. Painfully boring. I found myself getting angry at times because I set myself a certain amount of pages to read each day and even finishing the minimum amount proved very difficult with how tedious this writing is.
Unfortunately this is not quite what I was anticipating as far as the narrative goes. I had expected a conventional military history like you can easily find for subjects like Napoleon and Wellington. Bolivar, being a great general and ostensibly intensively-studied, at least in South America, could surely be the focus of a military history? Something along the lines of the 'as military commander series?'
Alas, this is not that. There is much detail on the military aspects, but much of it is confusing and hard to follow. There are almost no maps or illustrations of any kind to break the monotony. It is just relentless dense text that is excruciatingly dull and hard to make sense of.
While a book by, say, Michael Glover on Wellington or Marshall-Cornwall on Napoleon will have you easily and crisply following the operations as they unfold, I found myself re-reading much of what happened because it is all just dizzying. So many figures that are on other side, sometimes they switch sides, sometimes the names are similar so you can't figure out who is who.
This is, perhaps, less Slatta's fault and more due to the nature of the subject. Bolivar's wars I feel are far less well-understood than major wars in Europe that are the primary subjects of military theory. Writing about Bolivar is more difficult because sources are fewer and there are probably not particularly useful guides to illustrate operations.
So even after slogging this work I can't say I'm confident in having comprehended any of Bolivar's major campaigns, I can only describe my knowledge as a bare outline of what happened.
That said, there are some strengths of this book. Bolivar's romantic interests are mentioned, and especially Manuela Saenz is given much prominence. As much as she deserves, as she was a courageous woman who spied on the Spaniards and even took a beating for Bolivar so he could escape his assassins (though I don't know how much that reflects on his 'machismo').
I think the strongest aspect of this book is on the attention paid to Bolivar's rivals and lieutenants, and I found the last sections the most compelling.
McFarlane once compared the collapse of Spanish America to that of the Soviet Union, but we might draw another analogy with the Alexander and the Diadochi. This book is unique in that it argues that Bolivar was sterile, and that he was bipolar. He could not have children, and various proposals to make him king could not work because he had no heir.
Like Alexander, when he died he might easily have designated his successor as 'the strongest.' Even before his death, as his health declined and his grip weakened, the state he founded began to disintegrate. Gran Colombia would, of course, split into numerous states as men such as Paez and Flores founded independent republics in Ecuador and Venezuela.
There is a bewildering cast of characters here, Boves, Monteverde, Morillo, Santander, Sucre, Padilla, it is just impossible to keep track. One must be deeply familiar with this time period and region, and while I have been trying to improve my knowledge I have a long way to go before this all becomes familiar to me.
Bolivar seemed to have a guardian angel, because there are numerous attempts on his life catalogued in this work, and by some chance or other he escaped all of them. Even when some of his entourage were killed, he still always escaped. He might have, like Napoleon, fairly called himself a man of destiny.
One fact we glean is that the contest was largely decided by who controlled the vast plains of the Llanos. The Llaneros were fierce horsemen, and the Llanos provided food in the form of cattle and crops. When the Spaniards dominated the Llanos while Boves was alive, everything went against the Patriots. When Boves died and Paez became the leader of the Llaneros, and Bolivar's ally, the Patriots were much more successful.
Privateering also proved crucial for sustaining the coastal cities, like Cartagena, and for obtaining money and supplies. Here Bolivar's tenacity is much to be commended, as he was driven to exile in Haiti and Jamaica numerous times when the Patriot cause seemed finished, but always he rallied and returned, backed by the sailors of New Granada. Here we might draw comparisons with the fighting merchants of the Greek War of Independence, like Canaris. Bolivar had his own Canaris in men like Brion and Padilla.
In regards to Padilla, Bolivar was relatively progressive for his time and place. He boldly proclaimed the abolition of slavery, but even still he was yet formed by the ideas of the Spanish caste system. Bolivar meant to create Creole republics and distrusted the non-European masses, his execution of Padilla and his fear of pardocracy demonstrate that the South American revolutions were limited. Like the American Revolution, the rebels intended to replace the rule of white Europeans born in Europe with that of white Europeans born in America. The war was a brother war between Europeans rather than non-Europeans against Europeans. The social liberation of Latin America's African and Native populations would have to await someone still more progressive than Bolivar.
Bolivar himself drew some classical analogies, when he said he hoped Panama would be like Corinth, the site of a league of American states as Corinth had been for Ancient Greece. Though he omitted to say that the League of Corinth was rather imposed on the Greeks by an intrusive Macedonia. Might the United States have proven a Macedonia?
Slatta seems to take an overtly pro-Bolivarian stance. The controversies surrounding Miranda constitute the beginning of the narrative (which gives us an interesting glimpse of the Patria Boba), and while many were critical of Bolivar for betraying the Precursor, Slatta takes Bolivar's side and justifies his actions.
We see San Martin is given a somewhat negative portrait, as someone who was cautious, and constantly sick. Slatta would have us believe Bolivar was much the superior. Perhaps politically he was, and the controversy of what was said between them rages on, though Slatta is careful not to speculate too much here.
Which brings us to another theme, Bolivar as Bonaparte. Bolivar himself said that Washington was his role model, but he was not the austere honest man of integrity that Washington was. Bolivar was not above using devious underhand methods to won over enemies through methods like bribery and treachery, and his numerous affairs reflect on his character.
Slatta, like Madariaga, suggest that Bolivar's real model was Napoleon. Bolivar actually saw Napoleon being crowned in Notre Dame, and he famously made his oath in Rome after witnessing this event. Bolivar was critical of Napoleon and claimed that he did not want Napoleon's power, but on the other hand he was jealous of glory and was increasingly authoritarian in his approach to government.
Like Napoleon, Bolivar was also buried in a monument extolling national glory, a sort of Venezuelan counterpart to the Hotel de Invalides. Bolivar was also immensely jealous of other successful generals, a trait Napoleon might have shared. It's worth reflecting that, as Andrea Wulf wrote in her biography of Humboldt, Bolivar's Gran Colombia was larger than Napoleon's empire.
But as a general Bolivar was very far from a Napoleon. Many of his campaigns read as slapdash and improvised, often won by sheer good luck. Oftentimes his subordinates or his soldiers would take the initiative to conduct a cavalry or bayonet charge and this would win the day. A few battles are downright impossible to understand, like Boyaca, and Cucuta, which were seemingly lost by the Patriots and then suddenly, inexplicably, they won.
No doubt the soldiers on either side were not of particularly high quality, as they were locally raised. Many of them didn't even have firearms, or shoes, or clothes! To be fair to Bolivar, Napoleon commanded the Grande Armee at its height while the Liberator had to make do with far fewer numbers of ragtag peasants and Llaneros.
That he won with these is a great credit to his skill, even if his planning and execution were somewhat wanting as a commander. This contrasts enormously with San Martin, described as cautious here, but San Martin's campaign to cross the Andes and his invasion of Peru was a model of set-piece strategy. He planned and executed this maneuver with precision and determination, which is very difficult from Bolivar's haphazard operations.
These wars are endlessly fascinating, as they were fought from the Vargas Swamps to the volcanic peak of Pinchicha. From Panama to Chile. Bolivar's move south proved decisive and whatever his faults as a commander, he and San Martin succeeded in driving the Royalists out of their Peruvian stronghold and liberating all of South America.
Some attention is paid to the failings of Ferdinand VII, who is largely at fault for losing America. Slatta quotes Madariaga to the effect that the Patriots placed their hopes in the incompetence of Ferdinand and were not disappointed. One is again reminded that he was undoubtedly Spain's worst king.
We learn that the British were conniving in splitting up Gran Colombia, just as we learned they were instrumental in creating an independent Uruguay to deny Argentina domination of the River Plate, as mentioned by Richard Bourne in Garibaldi in South America. Divide et impera, the British had their fingers in many pies with their 'informal imperialism.' There was even talk of placing a French Bourbon prince on the throne of Gran Colombia, which Britain again opposed.
We learn some interesting asides such as that Garibaldi met with Saenz in 1851, a fact *not* mentioned by Richard Bourne in his book on Garibaldi in South America. We read Bolivar's own words in speeches and reveries, such as his celebrated Delirium on Chimborazo.
One interesting quotation is about the Monroe Doctrine. Upon hearing of it, Bolivar hoped that the United States would provide more meaningful assistance to the Latin American rebels, but in a diplomatic communication the Americans said that the Monroe Doctrine was more rhetorical than material, and that the United States did not intend to oppose the Holy Alliance by force of arms. Curious indeed, as this strengthens the argument that the real force behind the Monroe Doctrine was Britain and the Canning Declaration.
Finally, we learn that Bolivar remains an important and inspiration figure in contemporary Latin America. Hugh Chavez renamed Venezuela as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuea. His image is constantly exploited by the regime to incite nationalist fervor, and his political ideals continue to inspire parties in South America in a way somewhat similar to that of Mustapha Kemal in Turkey. There's even a Bolivar Prize!
This is somewhat remarkable given his tense relationships with his rivals and colleagues, given the fact that, like Miranda, his allies eventually turned on him due to his overbearing nature and sought to carve out their own holds on power. It is a shame Bolivar died young before he could effectively address these challenges.
The history Lemley writes in a passage quoted by Slatta, that Bolivar rode the length and breadth of South America, traveling more miles than Alexander, Napoleon,, even Genghis Khan. The topography and geography of South America is just stupendous, and the fact that Bolivar was able to win in the Llanos and the Andes is very impressive.
Bolivar may have been a second-rate Napoleon, as his detractors frequently stated, but he was no slouch, and despite all the flaws of this book, I think Slatta succeeded in proving that Bolivar's force of personality was a major influence in history. He mattered, and the history of the region might have gone far different had he not lived.
I was attracted to this title as it was, presumably, a military history of Bolivar. Bolivar is, first off, someone who is hardly known at all in the United States when he very much should be.
As someone with a lifelong interest in military theory and military history, I had noticed that precious little is ever written about Bolivar or South America in general. Military history is still heavily Eurocentric.
I saw this title and the publisher, which made me recall that this series included Norman Goda's work on Hitler's plans for Spain and North Africa, one of the best books I've ever read. But this book falls very short of that one.
Slatta begins in the preface by saying that the book was based on an uncompleted manuscript by Jane de Luca Grummond. I have not read any of her works, but Slatta informs us that he edited and rewrote much of the manuscript so that it is, in his own estimation, sixty-percent Slatta and forty-percent Grummond. He might have done better to leave more Grummond in.
I say this because this book is written in a very monotonous way that is far from engaging or exciting. It is just flat out boring. Painfully boring. I found myself getting angry at times because I set myself a certain amount of pages to read each day and even finishing the minimum amount proved very difficult with how tedious this writing is.
Unfortunately this is not quite what I was anticipating as far as the narrative goes. I had expected a conventional military history like you can easily find for subjects like Napoleon and Wellington. Bolivar, being a great general and ostensibly intensively-studied, at least in South America, could surely be the focus of a military history? Something along the lines of the 'as military commander series?'
Alas, this is not that. There is much detail on the military aspects, but much of it is confusing and hard to follow. There are almost no maps or illustrations of any kind to break the monotony. It is just relentless dense text that is excruciatingly dull and hard to make sense of.
While a book by, say, Michael Glover on Wellington or Marshall-Cornwall on Napoleon will have you easily and crisply following the operations as they unfold, I found myself re-reading much of what happened because it is all just dizzying. So many figures that are on other side, sometimes they switch sides, sometimes the names are similar so you can't figure out who is who.
This is, perhaps, less Slatta's fault and more due to the nature of the subject. Bolivar's wars I feel are far less well-understood than major wars in Europe that are the primary subjects of military theory. Writing about Bolivar is more difficult because sources are fewer and there are probably not particularly useful guides to illustrate operations.
So even after slogging this work I can't say I'm confident in having comprehended any of Bolivar's major campaigns, I can only describe my knowledge as a bare outline of what happened.
That said, there are some strengths of this book. Bolivar's romantic interests are mentioned, and especially Manuela Saenz is given much prominence. As much as she deserves, as she was a courageous woman who spied on the Spaniards and even took a beating for Bolivar so he could escape his assassins (though I don't know how much that reflects on his 'machismo').
I think the strongest aspect of this book is on the attention paid to Bolivar's rivals and lieutenants, and I found the last sections the most compelling.
McFarlane once compared the collapse of Spanish America to that of the Soviet Union, but we might draw another analogy with the Alexander and the Diadochi. This book is unique in that it argues that Bolivar was sterile, and that he was bipolar. He could not have children, and various proposals to make him king could not work because he had no heir.
Like Alexander, when he died he might easily have designated his successor as 'the strongest.' Even before his death, as his health declined and his grip weakened, the state he founded began to disintegrate. Gran Colombia would, of course, split into numerous states as men such as Paez and Flores founded independent republics in Ecuador and Venezuela.
There is a bewildering cast of characters here, Boves, Monteverde, Morillo, Santander, Sucre, Padilla, it is just impossible to keep track. One must be deeply familiar with this time period and region, and while I have been trying to improve my knowledge I have a long way to go before this all becomes familiar to me.
Bolivar seemed to have a guardian angel, because there are numerous attempts on his life catalogued in this work, and by some chance or other he escaped all of them. Even when some of his entourage were killed, he still always escaped. He might have, like Napoleon, fairly called himself a man of destiny.
One fact we glean is that the contest was largely decided by who controlled the vast plains of the Llanos. The Llaneros were fierce horsemen, and the Llanos provided food in the form of cattle and crops. When the Spaniards dominated the Llanos while Boves was alive, everything went against the Patriots. When Boves died and Paez became the leader of the Llaneros, and Bolivar's ally, the Patriots were much more successful.
Privateering also proved crucial for sustaining the coastal cities, like Cartagena, and for obtaining money and supplies. Here Bolivar's tenacity is much to be commended, as he was driven to exile in Haiti and Jamaica numerous times when the Patriot cause seemed finished, but always he rallied and returned, backed by the sailors of New Granada. Here we might draw comparisons with the fighting merchants of the Greek War of Independence, like Canaris. Bolivar had his own Canaris in men like Brion and Padilla.
In regards to Padilla, Bolivar was relatively progressive for his time and place. He boldly proclaimed the abolition of slavery, but even still he was yet formed by the ideas of the Spanish caste system. Bolivar meant to create Creole republics and distrusted the non-European masses, his execution of Padilla and his fear of pardocracy demonstrate that the South American revolutions were limited. Like the American Revolution, the rebels intended to replace the rule of white Europeans born in Europe with that of white Europeans born in America. The war was a brother war between Europeans rather than non-Europeans against Europeans. The social liberation of Latin America's African and Native populations would have to await someone still more progressive than Bolivar.
Bolivar himself drew some classical analogies, when he said he hoped Panama would be like Corinth, the site of a league of American states as Corinth had been for Ancient Greece. Though he omitted to say that the League of Corinth was rather imposed on the Greeks by an intrusive Macedonia. Might the United States have proven a Macedonia?
Slatta seems to take an overtly pro-Bolivarian stance. The controversies surrounding Miranda constitute the beginning of the narrative (which gives us an interesting glimpse of the Patria Boba), and while many were critical of Bolivar for betraying the Precursor, Slatta takes Bolivar's side and justifies his actions.
We see San Martin is given a somewhat negative portrait, as someone who was cautious, and constantly sick. Slatta would have us believe Bolivar was much the superior. Perhaps politically he was, and the controversy of what was said between them rages on, though Slatta is careful not to speculate too much here.
Which brings us to another theme, Bolivar as Bonaparte. Bolivar himself said that Washington was his role model, but he was not the austere honest man of integrity that Washington was. Bolivar was not above using devious underhand methods to won over enemies through methods like bribery and treachery, and his numerous affairs reflect on his character.
Slatta, like Madariaga, suggest that Bolivar's real model was Napoleon. Bolivar actually saw Napoleon being crowned in Notre Dame, and he famously made his oath in Rome after witnessing this event. Bolivar was critical of Napoleon and claimed that he did not want Napoleon's power, but on the other hand he was jealous of glory and was increasingly authoritarian in his approach to government.
Like Napoleon, Bolivar was also buried in a monument extolling national glory, a sort of Venezuelan counterpart to the Hotel de Invalides. Bolivar was also immensely jealous of other successful generals, a trait Napoleon might have shared. It's worth reflecting that, as Andrea Wulf wrote in her biography of Humboldt, Bolivar's Gran Colombia was larger than Napoleon's empire.
But as a general Bolivar was very far from a Napoleon. Many of his campaigns read as slapdash and improvised, often won by sheer good luck. Oftentimes his subordinates or his soldiers would take the initiative to conduct a cavalry or bayonet charge and this would win the day. A few battles are downright impossible to understand, like Boyaca, and Cucuta, which were seemingly lost by the Patriots and then suddenly, inexplicably, they won.
No doubt the soldiers on either side were not of particularly high quality, as they were locally raised. Many of them didn't even have firearms, or shoes, or clothes! To be fair to Bolivar, Napoleon commanded the Grande Armee at its height while the Liberator had to make do with far fewer numbers of ragtag peasants and Llaneros.
That he won with these is a great credit to his skill, even if his planning and execution were somewhat wanting as a commander. This contrasts enormously with San Martin, described as cautious here, but San Martin's campaign to cross the Andes and his invasion of Peru was a model of set-piece strategy. He planned and executed this maneuver with precision and determination, which is very difficult from Bolivar's haphazard operations.
These wars are endlessly fascinating, as they were fought from the Vargas Swamps to the volcanic peak of Pinchicha. From Panama to Chile. Bolivar's move south proved decisive and whatever his faults as a commander, he and San Martin succeeded in driving the Royalists out of their Peruvian stronghold and liberating all of South America.
Some attention is paid to the failings of Ferdinand VII, who is largely at fault for losing America. Slatta quotes Madariaga to the effect that the Patriots placed their hopes in the incompetence of Ferdinand and were not disappointed. One is again reminded that he was undoubtedly Spain's worst king.
We learn that the British were conniving in splitting up Gran Colombia, just as we learned they were instrumental in creating an independent Uruguay to deny Argentina domination of the River Plate, as mentioned by Richard Bourne in Garibaldi in South America. Divide et impera, the British had their fingers in many pies with their 'informal imperialism.' There was even talk of placing a French Bourbon prince on the throne of Gran Colombia, which Britain again opposed.
We learn some interesting asides such as that Garibaldi met with Saenz in 1851, a fact *not* mentioned by Richard Bourne in his book on Garibaldi in South America. We read Bolivar's own words in speeches and reveries, such as his celebrated Delirium on Chimborazo.
One interesting quotation is about the Monroe Doctrine. Upon hearing of it, Bolivar hoped that the United States would provide more meaningful assistance to the Latin American rebels, but in a diplomatic communication the Americans said that the Monroe Doctrine was more rhetorical than material, and that the United States did not intend to oppose the Holy Alliance by force of arms. Curious indeed, as this strengthens the argument that the real force behind the Monroe Doctrine was Britain and the Canning Declaration.
Finally, we learn that Bolivar remains an important and inspiration figure in contemporary Latin America. Hugh Chavez renamed Venezuela as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuea. His image is constantly exploited by the regime to incite nationalist fervor, and his political ideals continue to inspire parties in South America in a way somewhat similar to that of Mustapha Kemal in Turkey. There's even a Bolivar Prize!
This is somewhat remarkable given his tense relationships with his rivals and colleagues, given the fact that, like Miranda, his allies eventually turned on him due to his overbearing nature and sought to carve out their own holds on power. It is a shame Bolivar died young before he could effectively address these challenges.
The history Lemley writes in a passage quoted by Slatta, that Bolivar rode the length and breadth of South America, traveling more miles than Alexander, Napoleon,, even Genghis Khan. The topography and geography of South America is just stupendous, and the fact that Bolivar was able to win in the Llanos and the Andes is very impressive.
Bolivar may have been a second-rate Napoleon, as his detractors frequently stated, but he was no slouch, and despite all the flaws of this book, I think Slatta succeeded in proving that Bolivar's force of personality was a major influence in history. He mattered, and the history of the region might have gone far different had he not lived.
October 29, 2017
This biography of Simon Bolivar was completed by Richard W. Slatta from a manuscript left unfinished by the late Jane Lucas De Grummond. It is sad to have to report that the two authors achieve zero style, but such is the case. Although the book is aimed at a general readership and eschews (wrongly, I think) the usual scholarly apparatus of end-notes, it is not in fact that readable. A biography of Bolivar is, perforce, essentially a piece of military history; and military history is difficult to write clearly. Although one does come away from this book with an impression of the Liberator himself, who was indeed on a “quest for glory,” the blizzard of other personae, general and leaders on both the Patriot and Royalist sides, do not emerge clearly from the text, and remain easily confused names only. They needed to be introduced carefully – pictures would have helped.
You do get the major message that the leadership of both sides was rent by intense rivalries and jealousies: “In his autobiography, [Jose Antonio] Paez recorded that…he acknowledged the need for a supreme chief. He declined, however, to recognize either [Santiago] Marino or Bolivar as filling that role, preferring to visualize himself as supreme chief.”
There is a delightfully apt typo at one point, when Marino re-swears his allegiance to Bolivar: “It is now, and from this moment, our most scared duty to become a model of submission and obedience to the supreme chief!” Yes, I imagine it was his “scared” as well as “sacred” duty.
Although the book contains a number of maps in the front material, they are inadequate to the needs of the story. Many, many locations mentioned in the text are unmarked on the maps; and of the maps of specific battles and military marches that the book cries out for, there are none. It is easy to become very geographically confused as the story makes its way through modern-day Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.
It is highly regrettable that the book leans to the dull and tangled, because the material is rich. Bolivar’s multiple liaisons alone provide a lot of potential side-drama that the authors fail to make much of (“Make love AND war!”, apparently). Highly dramatic episodes such as the mass killing of 22 Capuchin friars by an over-zealous Patriot officer, or the tale of the general who tosses his baby into the air on a balcony, only to watch it crash to its death below, pass without any sense of occasion.
The Bibliography and Guide to Further Reading are good, and further reading will be necessary if you really want to understand fully what was going on.
You do get the major message that the leadership of both sides was rent by intense rivalries and jealousies: “In his autobiography, [Jose Antonio] Paez recorded that…he acknowledged the need for a supreme chief. He declined, however, to recognize either [Santiago] Marino or Bolivar as filling that role, preferring to visualize himself as supreme chief.”
There is a delightfully apt typo at one point, when Marino re-swears his allegiance to Bolivar: “It is now, and from this moment, our most scared duty to become a model of submission and obedience to the supreme chief!” Yes, I imagine it was his “scared” as well as “sacred” duty.
Although the book contains a number of maps in the front material, they are inadequate to the needs of the story. Many, many locations mentioned in the text are unmarked on the maps; and of the maps of specific battles and military marches that the book cries out for, there are none. It is easy to become very geographically confused as the story makes its way through modern-day Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.
It is highly regrettable that the book leans to the dull and tangled, because the material is rich. Bolivar’s multiple liaisons alone provide a lot of potential side-drama that the authors fail to make much of (“Make love AND war!”, apparently). Highly dramatic episodes such as the mass killing of 22 Capuchin friars by an over-zealous Patriot officer, or the tale of the general who tosses his baby into the air on a balcony, only to watch it crash to its death below, pass without any sense of occasion.
The Bibliography and Guide to Further Reading are good, and further reading will be necessary if you really want to understand fully what was going on.
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