What do you think?
Rate this book
Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933 -1939
History faced by the disaster of depression, Congress in the early 1930s proved amenable to the far-reaching demands and programs presented to it by the newly elected President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, but by 1937 it showed increasing resistance, even outright opposition, to many New Deal measures. In this study, James T. Patterson examines this resurgence of conservative strength in Congress, focusing upon the personalities and backgrounds of the men involved and upon the key domestic issues whi
Hardcover
First published January 1, 1981
40 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
September 12, 2011
A fascinating and detailed look at the gradual alienation and mobilization of a block of conservative Democratic congressmen during the New Deal. The shaky alliance they eventually formed with the Republican party ruled Congress from 1939 until at least the Great Society legislation of the 1960s.
Patterson sets the stage for this revolt well. When Roosevelt took office the national crisis had become so desperate that even Republicans like Arthur Vandenberg and Alfred Landon (the latter the Republican presidential candidate in 1936) openly broached the idea of a benevolent dictator. When the popular Roosevelt came to office in March 1933 with a comprehensive plan, a grateful Congress eager to pass the buck submitted to his whims. Many radical acts were passed almost unanimously or by a voice vote. The House passed the innovative Banking Act of 1933 without even distributing the bill and with only an hour's debate. By 1935, though, the emergency had passed, as many congressmen openly said, and yet Roosevelt kept pushing more actively interventionist bills. His Utility "death sentence," which would allow him to eliminate power holding companies, and his Revenue Act, which created an an "intercorporate dividends" tax, both of which were designed to break down large companies, created a fire-storm of opposition, and for the first time led to clear administration defeats, though only on amendments. The fact that even this was seen as a momentous change demonstrates how completely Roosevelt had corralled his party. Now many spoke openly of the need for Congressional independence and their exhaustion with Presidential "commands." Still, some continued to "bleed inwardly" and vote with Roosevelt out of party loyalty.
The 1936 elections returned the largest majorities of any modern Congress, 331 to 89 in the House (!) and 76-16 in the Senate (with a smattering of Independents), but these were no more liberal than their fore bearers, and the huge majority created a critical mass of conservatives in the Democratic party. Roosevelt thought what was mainly a referendum on his personal popularity and was actually a mandate on radical reform. Without warning Congress, he proposed his infamous court-packing plan and $1.5 billion more for the WPA. Finally, conservatives broke openly, and their leader, Senator Josiah Bailey of North Carolina, issued a Conservative Manifesto concerning states rights and free enterprise.
Patterson actually shows the difficulties of bipartisan coalition in this period. In the 1938 election all attempts at conservative cooperation broke down on the shoals of local party opposition and patronage. In the South, even rumors of Republican support served to hurt Democratic contenders. The real coalition existed only in the halls of Congress, and was always shifting with the political tides. Yet this surreptitious coalition did have a profound effect on this nation's history. Patterson gives it its due, while also conducting an impressive piece of Congressional scholarship.
Patterson sets the stage for this revolt well. When Roosevelt took office the national crisis had become so desperate that even Republicans like Arthur Vandenberg and Alfred Landon (the latter the Republican presidential candidate in 1936) openly broached the idea of a benevolent dictator. When the popular Roosevelt came to office in March 1933 with a comprehensive plan, a grateful Congress eager to pass the buck submitted to his whims. Many radical acts were passed almost unanimously or by a voice vote. The House passed the innovative Banking Act of 1933 without even distributing the bill and with only an hour's debate. By 1935, though, the emergency had passed, as many congressmen openly said, and yet Roosevelt kept pushing more actively interventionist bills. His Utility "death sentence," which would allow him to eliminate power holding companies, and his Revenue Act, which created an an "intercorporate dividends" tax, both of which were designed to break down large companies, created a fire-storm of opposition, and for the first time led to clear administration defeats, though only on amendments. The fact that even this was seen as a momentous change demonstrates how completely Roosevelt had corralled his party. Now many spoke openly of the need for Congressional independence and their exhaustion with Presidential "commands." Still, some continued to "bleed inwardly" and vote with Roosevelt out of party loyalty.
The 1936 elections returned the largest majorities of any modern Congress, 331 to 89 in the House (!) and 76-16 in the Senate (with a smattering of Independents), but these were no more liberal than their fore bearers, and the huge majority created a critical mass of conservatives in the Democratic party. Roosevelt thought what was mainly a referendum on his personal popularity and was actually a mandate on radical reform. Without warning Congress, he proposed his infamous court-packing plan and $1.5 billion more for the WPA. Finally, conservatives broke openly, and their leader, Senator Josiah Bailey of North Carolina, issued a Conservative Manifesto concerning states rights and free enterprise.
Patterson actually shows the difficulties of bipartisan coalition in this period. In the 1938 election all attempts at conservative cooperation broke down on the shoals of local party opposition and patronage. In the South, even rumors of Republican support served to hurt Democratic contenders. The real coalition existed only in the halls of Congress, and was always shifting with the political tides. Yet this surreptitious coalition did have a profound effect on this nation's history. Patterson gives it its due, while also conducting an impressive piece of Congressional scholarship.
Displaying 1 of 1 review