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Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy
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Buttressed by input from scholars, diplomats, and observers with an intimate knowledge of U.S. foreign policy, Honey and Vinegar examines ""engagement""—strategies that primarily involve the use of positive incentives. The book contends that although engagement has received little scrutiny relative to other, more punitive foreign policy approaches, it has great potential as a tool for modifying the behavior of regimes with which the United States has significant disagreements.Heightened awareness of the costs associated with the use of sanctions or military force has catalyzed a search for policy alternatives. In this quest to find other appropriate policy options for pursuing foreign policy goals, strategies of engagement warrant serious consideration. As argued in these pages, the use of incentives, rather than penalties, may be particularly well suited to the post–Cold War world, where globalization has made the economic isolation of any country difficult to achieve. At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union has meant that American carrots may be especially savory to many regimes once reliant on Soviet support. Paradoxically, engagement can be a good choice, even when it fails, in that it can open the door for other policy options. For instance, the two years in which America tried to engage Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War worked to the advantage of the United States later. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, American efforts to build a military coalition to oppose Iraq were facilitated by the sense in the region that the United States had earlier pursued a conciliatory policy, but to no avail.Contributors to this volume have provided seven cases exploring episodes of relations between the United States and China; Europe's ""Critical Dialogue"" with Iran; U.S. engagement with Iraq from 1988 to 1990; U.S. efforts to engage North Korea; the combination of U.S. persuasion and coercion toward South Africa in the apartheid era; the lessons of U.S.-Soviet détente; and the process of normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam. In addition to contemplating the historical record, the book is forward looking, discussing ways in which incentives might be better introduced as the United States seeks continued or new relations with a variety of problem countries including China, Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and Syria. While the editors are careful to point out the difficulties of managing strategies of engagement, they nevertheless conclude that incentives should be accorded consideration equal to the more conventional punitive options of sanctions and military force.
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Buttressed by input from scholars, diplomats, and observers with an intimate knowledge of U.S. foreign policy, Honey and Vinegar examines ""engagement""—strategies that primarily involve the use of positive incentives. The book contends that although engagement has received little scrutiny relative to other, more punitive foreign policy approaches, it has great potential as a tool for modifying the behavior of regimes with which the United States has significant disagreements.Heightened awareness of the costs associated with the use of sanctions or military force has catalyzed a search for policy alternatives. In this quest to find other appropriate policy options for pursuing foreign policy goals, strategies of engagement warrant serious consideration. As argued in these pages, the use of incentives, rather than penalties, may be particularly well suited to the post–Cold War world, where globalization has made the economic isolation of any country difficult to achieve. At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union has meant that American carrots may be especially savory to many regimes once reliant on Soviet support. Paradoxically, engagement can be a good choice, even when it fails, in that it can open the door for other policy options. For instance, the two years in which America tried to engage Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War worked to the advantage of the United States later. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, American efforts to build a military coalition to oppose Iraq were facilitated by the sense in the region that the United States had earlier pursued a conciliatory policy, but to no avail.Contributors to this volume have provided seven cases exploring episodes of relations between the United States and China; Europe's ""Critical Dialogue"" with Iran; U.S. engagement with Iraq from 1988 to 1990; U.S. efforts to engage North Korea; the combination of U.S. persuasion and coercion toward South Africa in the apartheid era; the lessons of U.S.-Soviet détente; and the process of normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam. In addition to contemplating the historical record, the book is forward looking, discussing ways in which incentives might be better introduced as the United States seeks continued or new relations with a variety of problem countries including China, Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and Syria. While the editors are careful to point out the difficulties of managing strategies of engagement, they nevertheless conclude that incentives should be accorded consideration equal to the more conventional punitive options of sanctions and military force.
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223 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 2000
63 people want to read
About the author
Richard N. Haass
42 books292 followersDr. Richard Nathan Haass is in his fourteenth year as president of the Council on Foreign Relations, an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, publisher and educational institution dedicated to being a resource to help people better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries.
In 2013, he served as the chair of the multiparty negotiations in Northern Ireland that provided the foundation for the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. For his efforts to promote peace and conflict resolution, he received the 2013 Tipperary International Peace Award.
From January 2001 to June 2003, Dr. Haass was director of policy planning for the Department of State, where he was a principal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. Confirmed by the U.S. Senate to hold the rank of ambassador, Dr. Haass also served as U.S. coordinator for policy toward the future of Afghanistan and U.S. envoy to the Northern Ireland peace process. In recognition of his service, he received the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award.
Dr. Haass has extensive additional government experience. From 1989 to 1993, he was special assistant to President George H.W. Bush and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the staff of the National Security Council. In 1991, Dr. Haass was awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal for his contributions to the development and articulation of U.S. policy during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Previously, he served in the Departments of State (1981–1985) and Defense (1979–1980), and was a legislative aide in the U.S. Senate.
Dr. Haass also was vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. A Rhodes scholar, Dr. Haass holds a bachelor’s degree from Oberlin College and master’s and doctorate degrees from Oxford University. He has also received numerous honorary degrees.
Dr. Haass is the author or editor of thirteen books on American foreign policy and one book on management. His latest book is A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order, published in 2017 by Penguin Press.
In 2013, he served as the chair of the multiparty negotiations in Northern Ireland that provided the foundation for the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. For his efforts to promote peace and conflict resolution, he received the 2013 Tipperary International Peace Award.
From January 2001 to June 2003, Dr. Haass was director of policy planning for the Department of State, where he was a principal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. Confirmed by the U.S. Senate to hold the rank of ambassador, Dr. Haass also served as U.S. coordinator for policy toward the future of Afghanistan and U.S. envoy to the Northern Ireland peace process. In recognition of his service, he received the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award.
Dr. Haass has extensive additional government experience. From 1989 to 1993, he was special assistant to President George H.W. Bush and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the staff of the National Security Council. In 1991, Dr. Haass was awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal for his contributions to the development and articulation of U.S. policy during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Previously, he served in the Departments of State (1981–1985) and Defense (1979–1980), and was a legislative aide in the U.S. Senate.
Dr. Haass also was vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. A Rhodes scholar, Dr. Haass holds a bachelor’s degree from Oberlin College and master’s and doctorate degrees from Oxford University. He has also received numerous honorary degrees.
Dr. Haass is the author or editor of thirteen books on American foreign policy and one book on management. His latest book is A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order, published in 2017 by Penguin Press.
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