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The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995
Does the new, more powerful Germany pose a threat to its neighbors? Does the new German Problem resemble the old? The German Problem Transformed addresses these questions fifty years after the founding of the Federal Republic and ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Many observers have underscored the reemergence of Germany as Europe's central power. After four decades of division, they contend, Germany is once again fully sovereign; without the strictures of bipolarity, its leaders are free to define and pursue national interests in East and West. From this perspective, the reunified Germany faces challenges not unlike those of its unified predecessor a century earlier.
The German Problem Transformed rejects this formulation. Thomas Banchoff acknowledges post-reunification challenges, but argues that postwar changes, not prewar analogies, best illuminate them. The book explains the transformation of German foreign policy through a structured analysis of four critical postwar the cold war of the 1950s, the détente of the 1960s and 1970s, the new cold war of the early 1980s, and the post-cold war 1990s. Each chapter examines the interaction of four factors--international structure and institutions, foreign policy ideas, and domestic politics--in driving the direction of German foreign policy at a key turning point.
This book will be of interest to scholars and students of German history, German politics, and European international relations, as well as policymakers and the interested public.
Thomas Banchoff is Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University.
Many observers have underscored the reemergence of Germany as Europe's central power. After four decades of division, they contend, Germany is once again fully sovereign; without the strictures of bipolarity, its leaders are free to define and pursue national interests in East and West. From this perspective, the reunified Germany faces challenges not unlike those of its unified predecessor a century earlier.
The German Problem Transformed rejects this formulation. Thomas Banchoff acknowledges post-reunification challenges, but argues that postwar changes, not prewar analogies, best illuminate them. The book explains the transformation of German foreign policy through a structured analysis of four critical postwar the cold war of the 1950s, the détente of the 1960s and 1970s, the new cold war of the early 1980s, and the post-cold war 1990s. Each chapter examines the interaction of four factors--international structure and institutions, foreign policy ideas, and domestic politics--in driving the direction of German foreign policy at a key turning point.
This book will be of interest to scholars and students of German history, German politics, and European international relations, as well as policymakers and the interested public.
Thomas Banchoff is Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University.
232 pages, Hardcover
First published July 15, 1999
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March 9, 2018
5 Key Points:
1. Banchoff argues that Germany's situation in the 21st Century differs from that of the Kaiserreich due to its active membership (even entanglement) in a number of international institutions: “A comparison of German policy at four key postwar turning points reveals not only the persistence of international institutions as a context for FRG foreign policy, but also their increasing salience through time. As the Federal Republic grew stronger economically and militarily, its leaders embedded it within an ever more intricate institutional framework.” (170)
2. “The enduring transformation of German foreign policy is most evident at its critical postwar turning points. Against a historical backdrop of dictatorship, war, and genocide, successive postwar chancellors secured domestic support for deeper ties with international institutions. During the cold war of the 1950s Konrad Adenauer integrated the Federal Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community (EC). Amid the detente of the 1970s Willy Brandt negotiated the Eastern Treaties and made the FRG part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the new cold war and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) crisis of the early 1980s Helmut Kohl strengthened German ties with NATO while preserving institutional links with the East.” (2)
3. Historical memories are important when looking at the embrace of international institutions: “Cumulative post-1945 institutional changes constrained FRG policy as much as they did only in combination with a dominant historical narrative- one that contrasted prewar disasters and postwar achievements. Had they been determined, German leaders might have embarked on a more independent foreign policy after 1990. Instead, they construed multilateralism and supranationalism as breaks with a catastrophic prewar past and as necessary foundations for the post-cold war future.” (3)
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“A particular historical narrative- a story linking power politics and nationalism with war and disaster, and international institutions with peace and prosperity- reinforced the strong German commitment to multilateralism and supranationalism. That narrative, originally contested within and across the parties, became an object of consensus by the late 1980s and early 1990s.” (166)
4. Germany's foreign policy dependence represents an example of path dependence in IR: “Scholarship on the staying power of institutions ·a core theme of "historical institutionalism" in political science has focused almost exclusively on their domestic policy effects through time. The German case provides an important example of foreign policy path dependence. International institutions linking the Federal Republic with its neighbors. originally an object of political controversy, gradually secured broad domestic support. Together, interlocking institutions and political consensus sustained German foreign policy continuity across the 1990 divide.” (2)
5. Rather than being traitors to national needs: “German leaders from Adenauer through Kohl did not abjure the pursuit of German interests or ignore international power realities. Against the back- drop of World War II, the rise of the superpowers, and the onset of European integration, they refused to conceptualize those interests in strictly national terms. They deliberately sought to anchor the exercise of German power within a multilateral, supranational framework-and were able to secure political support for their efforts. Given the legacy of German aggression this century, an independent, power-centered foreign policy would almost certainly have sparked anxieties abroad and threatened the Federal Republic with political isolation." (183)
1. Banchoff argues that Germany's situation in the 21st Century differs from that of the Kaiserreich due to its active membership (even entanglement) in a number of international institutions: “A comparison of German policy at four key postwar turning points reveals not only the persistence of international institutions as a context for FRG foreign policy, but also their increasing salience through time. As the Federal Republic grew stronger economically and militarily, its leaders embedded it within an ever more intricate institutional framework.” (170)
2. “The enduring transformation of German foreign policy is most evident at its critical postwar turning points. Against a historical backdrop of dictatorship, war, and genocide, successive postwar chancellors secured domestic support for deeper ties with international institutions. During the cold war of the 1950s Konrad Adenauer integrated the Federal Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community (EC). Amid the detente of the 1970s Willy Brandt negotiated the Eastern Treaties and made the FRG part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the new cold war and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) crisis of the early 1980s Helmut Kohl strengthened German ties with NATO while preserving institutional links with the East.” (2)
3. Historical memories are important when looking at the embrace of international institutions: “Cumulative post-1945 institutional changes constrained FRG policy as much as they did only in combination with a dominant historical narrative- one that contrasted prewar disasters and postwar achievements. Had they been determined, German leaders might have embarked on a more independent foreign policy after 1990. Instead, they construed multilateralism and supranationalism as breaks with a catastrophic prewar past and as necessary foundations for the post-cold war future.” (3)
&
“A particular historical narrative- a story linking power politics and nationalism with war and disaster, and international institutions with peace and prosperity- reinforced the strong German commitment to multilateralism and supranationalism. That narrative, originally contested within and across the parties, became an object of consensus by the late 1980s and early 1990s.” (166)
4. Germany's foreign policy dependence represents an example of path dependence in IR: “Scholarship on the staying power of institutions ·a core theme of "historical institutionalism" in political science has focused almost exclusively on their domestic policy effects through time. The German case provides an important example of foreign policy path dependence. International institutions linking the Federal Republic with its neighbors. originally an object of political controversy, gradually secured broad domestic support. Together, interlocking institutions and political consensus sustained German foreign policy continuity across the 1990 divide.” (2)
5. Rather than being traitors to national needs: “German leaders from Adenauer through Kohl did not abjure the pursuit of German interests or ignore international power realities. Against the back- drop of World War II, the rise of the superpowers, and the onset of European integration, they refused to conceptualize those interests in strictly national terms. They deliberately sought to anchor the exercise of German power within a multilateral, supranational framework-and were able to secure political support for their efforts. Given the legacy of German aggression this century, an independent, power-centered foreign policy would almost certainly have sparked anxieties abroad and threatened the Federal Republic with political isolation." (183)
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