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Metaphysical Journal
Book consists of Marcel's reflections on problems of existence and covers the early, developmental period of his thought (1914-1923). Highly praised upon its original publication in the US, this book has been judged "a necessity for anyone who would try to solve the intricate thinking" of Marcel. (From the back cover).
- GenresPhilosophy
344 pages, Paperback
Published January 1, 1967
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About the author
Gabriel Marcel
160 books125 followersGabriel Marcel (1889–1973) was a philosopher, drama critic, playwright and musician. He converted to Catholicism in 1929 and his philosophy was later described as “Christian Existentialism” (most famously in Jean-Paul Sartre's “Existentialism is a Humanism”) a term he initially endorsed but later repudiated. In addition to his numerous philosophical publications, he was the author of some thirty dramatic works. Marcel gave the Gifford Lectures in Aberdeen in 1949–1950, which appeared in print as the two-volume The Mystery of Being, and the William James Lectures at Harvard in 1961–1962, which were collected and published as The Existential Background of Human Dignity.
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October 9, 2024
MARCEL’S JOURNAL OF HIS RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT
Gabriel Honoré Marcel (1889-1973) was a French philosopher, playwright, music critic and Christian existentialist. [NOTE: page numbers refer to the 344-page Gateway paperback edition.]
He wrote in the Preface to the English edition, “It is true that while I was keeping my Journal I had no idea that one day it would be published as it stood. I thought of it as a preparation for what would one day be a system exposition... in 1948, I was invited … to give the Gifford Lectures... [T]he central theme of the Metaphysical Journal … is precisely the impossibility of thinking of being as object. This criticism of objectivisation…is… the backbone of the Metaphysical Journal. Being can not be indicated, it cannot be SHOWN; it can only be alluded to…”
On January 23rd, 1914, he wrote, “On what conditions can we think something to be truth? First of all we must determine the exact meaning of the problem, and the limits within which it can have a meaning. We are not concerned with finding a standard by which we can determine whether an idea… is true or not; but with knowing the conditions which or order must satisfy to permit of truth. But it may be claimed that as soon as we raise the problem we have already solved it, and that we have done so in a contradictory way that is equivalent to positing the transcendence of thought in relation to truth. But if thought is not in itself a form of truth, then truth has no existence, and if it is in itself a form of truth this determination is impossible.” (Pg. 27)
On February 14th, he wrote, “there is still the problem of how the believer can reject a historical investigation into the miraculous without thereby surrendering his sincerity. Is not this a very serious antinomy? If not the prohibition of reflection on the miraculous equivalent to self-negation as thought? Of course we already know that the believer has to prohibit himself from reflection on God… but is that of the same order? God can only be thought of as transcending all judgment. But the miraculous? If it is historical how can it escape the conditions that make all history possible? Is history on which the mind is not permitted to reflect anything but false history posing as true?” (Pg. 77) On December 12th, 1918 he suggests, “at bottom it is meaningless to ask: ‘Do you believe in God?’ when belief in God is understood not an opinion on the existence of a person but as a ‘mode of being.’” (Pg. 153)
On November 27, 1919, he said, “By what right do I posit a condition in the supra-empirical or metaphysical order where there is no difference in the empirical conditions? ‘In reality,’ it can be said, ‘you are looking for a means of justifying the over-bold step by which you, judging from your point of view, condemn someone who places himself on grounds other than yours. The difficulty arises from the fact that you refused to admit that your point of view and that of the agent we are discussing are absolutely different. But in this way you may be creating artificial and insurmountable obstacles for yourself.
"I who have accepted the fundamental conditions of all social life claim the right to judge the man who withdraws himself from them. But this is very questionable; for what do we mean by judging somebody? A judgment by its very essence should be recognised as just by the man who is judged. And that is precisely what is possible in this case. And if I be told that one can judge without preoccupying oneself about his eventual reactions, just as we verify an operation of logic? But can a human being be compared to a logical complexity?” (Pg. 218)
He said on December 15th, 1919, “Why is it absurd to imagine that a given individual can demonstrate the existence of God …? That of which the existence was capable of demonstration would not be, and could not be, God. The impossibility of an objective proof of the existence of God, the absurdity of this way of stating the religious problem---there we have something BEYOND DOUBT.” (Pg. 228)
On December 18th he adds, “God is that which absolutely cannot be thought of as a hypothesis. For a hypothesis is a certain method of representing the way in which things happen in a case in which observation, for some reason, is impossible… To love God, to pray to God… could that have any meaning if God could really be treated as a hypothesis?” (Pg. 230)
He notes on February 2nd, 1922, “Every time I find myself up against the impossibility of affirming the EXISTENCE of the absolute recourse or appeal, I feel the same uneasiness. I cannot help asking myself whether I am merely dealing with an idea that FALLS SHORT of existence. The basic question remains: how is it possible to conceive a THOU which is not at the same time a HIM.” (Pg. 281)
In an Appendix, he observes, “there is nothing problematical in existence and … if skepticism sets out to attack it, it tends to destroy itself. To doubt existence is to say that it is not possible to affirm validly regarding anything that THAT exists. But, as we immediately see, this doubt itself presupposes a definite idea of existence that we hesitate to apply. Thus it seems that between this idea and the experience there is no guaranteed contact. We do not set out from a THIS which certainly does exist so as to ask whether THAT also exists. We doubt the application of this idea considered as a whole. But how then are we to avoid being tempted to conclude that this idea is a PSEUDO-IDEA, that it has no hallmark to guarantee it and that it must be thrown on to the scrapheap as a useless tool?” (Pg. 320)
Marcel’s work is important for anyone studying Existentialism, or contemporary Catholic philosophy.
Gabriel Honoré Marcel (1889-1973) was a French philosopher, playwright, music critic and Christian existentialist. [NOTE: page numbers refer to the 344-page Gateway paperback edition.]
He wrote in the Preface to the English edition, “It is true that while I was keeping my Journal I had no idea that one day it would be published as it stood. I thought of it as a preparation for what would one day be a system exposition... in 1948, I was invited … to give the Gifford Lectures... [T]he central theme of the Metaphysical Journal … is precisely the impossibility of thinking of being as object. This criticism of objectivisation…is… the backbone of the Metaphysical Journal. Being can not be indicated, it cannot be SHOWN; it can only be alluded to…”
On January 23rd, 1914, he wrote, “On what conditions can we think something to be truth? First of all we must determine the exact meaning of the problem, and the limits within which it can have a meaning. We are not concerned with finding a standard by which we can determine whether an idea… is true or not; but with knowing the conditions which or order must satisfy to permit of truth. But it may be claimed that as soon as we raise the problem we have already solved it, and that we have done so in a contradictory way that is equivalent to positing the transcendence of thought in relation to truth. But if thought is not in itself a form of truth, then truth has no existence, and if it is in itself a form of truth this determination is impossible.” (Pg. 27)
On February 14th, he wrote, “there is still the problem of how the believer can reject a historical investigation into the miraculous without thereby surrendering his sincerity. Is not this a very serious antinomy? If not the prohibition of reflection on the miraculous equivalent to self-negation as thought? Of course we already know that the believer has to prohibit himself from reflection on God… but is that of the same order? God can only be thought of as transcending all judgment. But the miraculous? If it is historical how can it escape the conditions that make all history possible? Is history on which the mind is not permitted to reflect anything but false history posing as true?” (Pg. 77) On December 12th, 1918 he suggests, “at bottom it is meaningless to ask: ‘Do you believe in God?’ when belief in God is understood not an opinion on the existence of a person but as a ‘mode of being.’” (Pg. 153)
On November 27, 1919, he said, “By what right do I posit a condition in the supra-empirical or metaphysical order where there is no difference in the empirical conditions? ‘In reality,’ it can be said, ‘you are looking for a means of justifying the over-bold step by which you, judging from your point of view, condemn someone who places himself on grounds other than yours. The difficulty arises from the fact that you refused to admit that your point of view and that of the agent we are discussing are absolutely different. But in this way you may be creating artificial and insurmountable obstacles for yourself.
"I who have accepted the fundamental conditions of all social life claim the right to judge the man who withdraws himself from them. But this is very questionable; for what do we mean by judging somebody? A judgment by its very essence should be recognised as just by the man who is judged. And that is precisely what is possible in this case. And if I be told that one can judge without preoccupying oneself about his eventual reactions, just as we verify an operation of logic? But can a human being be compared to a logical complexity?” (Pg. 218)
He said on December 15th, 1919, “Why is it absurd to imagine that a given individual can demonstrate the existence of God …? That of which the existence was capable of demonstration would not be, and could not be, God. The impossibility of an objective proof of the existence of God, the absurdity of this way of stating the religious problem---there we have something BEYOND DOUBT.” (Pg. 228)
On December 18th he adds, “God is that which absolutely cannot be thought of as a hypothesis. For a hypothesis is a certain method of representing the way in which things happen in a case in which observation, for some reason, is impossible… To love God, to pray to God… could that have any meaning if God could really be treated as a hypothesis?” (Pg. 230)
He notes on February 2nd, 1922, “Every time I find myself up against the impossibility of affirming the EXISTENCE of the absolute recourse or appeal, I feel the same uneasiness. I cannot help asking myself whether I am merely dealing with an idea that FALLS SHORT of existence. The basic question remains: how is it possible to conceive a THOU which is not at the same time a HIM.” (Pg. 281)
In an Appendix, he observes, “there is nothing problematical in existence and … if skepticism sets out to attack it, it tends to destroy itself. To doubt existence is to say that it is not possible to affirm validly regarding anything that THAT exists. But, as we immediately see, this doubt itself presupposes a definite idea of existence that we hesitate to apply. Thus it seems that between this idea and the experience there is no guaranteed contact. We do not set out from a THIS which certainly does exist so as to ask whether THAT also exists. We doubt the application of this idea considered as a whole. But how then are we to avoid being tempted to conclude that this idea is a PSEUDO-IDEA, that it has no hallmark to guarantee it and that it must be thrown on to the scrapheap as a useless tool?” (Pg. 320)
Marcel’s work is important for anyone studying Existentialism, or contemporary Catholic philosophy.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews