Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991

by James A. Winnefeld, Dana J. Johnson

With the current downsizing of the U.S. military putting a premium on joint response to threats, this landmark study of joint U.S. air operations over the past fifty years provides timely information on a topic of vital concern. The most comprehensive single-volume discussion available, it examines six major air campaigns - Midway, the Solomon Islands, Korea, Vietnam, El Dorado Canyon (Libya), and Desert Storm - in a search for lessons learned that might be applied in the planning and organizing of future joint operations.
The focus of the book is on the differences - at times bitter acrimony - among the services on the control and employment of theater air forces. With each service having an "air force" of its own, each with a distinctive doctrine, the study confirms that their views are often diametrically opposite and that joint doctrine has been slow to evolve.
The authors, RAND Corporation analysts, are refreshingly objective and clear in addressing the problems and issues that continue to hamper effective joint air operations but point to the progress shown in Desert Storm, as indicated by their interviews with some fifty airmen, planners, and major commanders of the operation. Their recommendations for the future take advantage of the diversity inherent in U.S. air power while minimizing sources of disharmony.
Based on a RAND study published in 1991, this book has been expanded and revised to appeal to a broader audience and promises to stimulate discussion and debate on how to optimize the effectiveness of U.S. forces facing cuts in funding. It is must reading not only for military professionals but for military history enthusiasts and everyone interested in the nature of America's future air battles.

219 pages, Hardcover

First published May 1, 1993

Reviews

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

An engaging overview of using air-power in support of joint military operations. Winnefeld is obviously a first-rate scholar and writer on military affairs, and his scholarship here is impressive, but the time span he covers is too long to offer much in the way of very nuanced insight into any specific period or conflicts, and because it only runs up to the end of the Cold War, NATO's use of air-power in Kosovo is left out which is a shame since that would perhaps be the most useful and telling example to further Winnfeld's views on conmmand and control of air-power.