Hegelian Ethics

New Studies in Ethics

by William Henry Walsh

Walsh's study is based on a comparison of Hegel with Kant. Examining their methods, the scope of their ethical theories, and their views as to the content of ethics, he concludes that, while Hegel worked with a moral psychology very different from Kant's, his ethical theory should not be dismissed for that reason. Walsh explains how Hegel sought in his own ethical theory to overcome the deficiencies of Kantian ethics, first in his early writings through the notion of a morality of love, and then in his mature system by means of the conception of "concrete ethics" (sittlichkeit). The studies concludes with a brief account of the ethical doctrines of Hegel's English followers, Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet.

88 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1969

Reviews

[Ethan]

This was a very thin little book that I picked up for cheap at a second hand store. I figured I'd plough through it and see if I could extract anything of use from it.

To Walsh's credit, it is well-written and well-presented, but I think as a genuine introduction to Hegelian ethics, it is pretty weak. It seems more apt to describe it as a primer for the analytic-entrenched reader to even take Hegel seriously in moral philosophy. The exposition of Hegel is very thin for the most part, and it is a bit of a murky question whether Walsh wants to give an exegesis of Hegel directly, or if he wants to compare with Kant as a touchstone (Kant is taken up in a few chapters and similarly dropped in others).

There are also moments in which Hegel's language is criticised, but I've always found this weak. It is the unique attribute of Hegel's work that the subject and the object of the sentence are somewhat vague, precisely because what Hegel is talking about is the subject and object (or substance and subject) in a dialectical interaction, which will be hard to represent without grammatical peculiarity. When you read Hegel on slightly more straightforward matters (e.g. his history), he is a genuinely very lucid writer. It is to Hegel's misfortune not that he wrote poorly, but that his most popular subject matter demanded difficult verbiage. Walsh therefore capitulates to the arbitrary standard of "clarity" set by an ahistorical analytic tradition (which has improved of course), rather than defending the subject of his study in a fair-minded way. Such examples abound, such as when he implicitly criticises Hegel's use of the term "concrete" in concrete ethics as not referring to individual moral experiences, but the institutions in a society (a criticism which loses all immediate force when you distinguish moralität and sittlichkeit).

Despite this, it was not a terrible book, and I do not regret reading it given how short it is. I would not recommend this, however, over simply reading the Philosophy of Right, which, while dense, is not as difficult as purported. Some things just require attention.

[Lingui5t]

Hard to get much out of it. Not known for their clarity. Did take away a few small tidbits.