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Francis Schaeffer's Apologetics: A Critique
Paperback. Wrappers are slightly edge worn, rubbed and scuffed. Some curling to edges and corners. Else good. 128 pages.
128 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1976
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November 2, 2024
Morris, Tom V. Francis Schaeffer’s Apologetic: A Critique. Baker Books.
I think Tom Morris, author of such classics as The Idea of God and The Logic of God Incarnate, originally wrote this volume when he was a senior in college. It has since been rereleased by Baker Books. The title of the book is somewhat misleading. Morris, at least when he wrote this some decades ago, shares much of Francis Schaeffer’s apologetic method. He simply points out (and corrects) the numerous minor mistakes in Schaeffer’s system.
To sound somewhat like a 1990s self-help seminar, I “found myself” reading through this book. What is the best apologetic method? It is the one that works for you. I know that sounds pragmatic, and it probably is. Even though truth is not determined by what works, there is a “psychological force” in using something that works. Schaeffer’s own method, to the degree he actually thought about it, is a cross between a gentle presuppositionalism and the cumulative case method, or inference to the best explanation. As a method, it has much to commend it. We are grateful to Professor Morris for cleaning up some of Schaeffer’s unguarded statements.
Schaeffer defines a presupposition as “a belief or theory which is assumed before the next step in logic is developed” (GWT, 179, quoted in Morris 18). This is an adequate definition, but Morris notes that it suffers from an almost impersonal view of human action. What Schaeffer says is true, but it sounds like two people working through a syllogism over lunch. This explains why your “logical arguments” rarely win people over at first. No one talks like this.
Schaeffer criticizes the unbelieving man for making a “mystical” (i.e., nonlogical) jump, but this criticism backfires: by Schaeffer’s own admission, Christianity rests upon nonlogical assumptions (Morris 29).
Schaeffer claims that an impersonal universe cannot account for why there is significance, but this, too, will not work. An unbeliever simply has to evaluate himself against another, noting that one is more significant than the other. Significance emerges. Granted, it is not a profound sense of significance, but that is not the point.
Schaeffer’s argument works up to a point. He is correct that an impersonal universe cannot account for x, y, and z. What he has not shown is that Christianity does. Or rather, even if Christianity does he has not ruled out other forms of theism (32).
Discussing “ultimate personality,” Schaeffer says the personal origin of the universe must be “big enough” (HIT 12, quoted in Morris 33). That is probably true, but Schaeffer leaves undefined such key points as “big enough” and “infinite.” As Morris asks, “Big enough for what?”
Schaeffer, like many presuppositionalists, believes the Trinity can solve issues like “infinite personality” and “unity in diversity.” Maybe it can, but his argument does not necessarily need that. At best, the Trinity is a “functional postulate” (35). He has to get that from biblical revelation, but that is not where he started.
The Epistemological Argument: The Problem
The terms “rational, rationality, and reason are nowhere clearly defined by Dr Schaeffer” (43). Schaeffer criticizes the unbeliever for “nonlogical moves,” but is that not ultimately what a presupposition is? Every human knower operates like this (53). To be sure, the unbeliever has wrong presuppositions, but he cannot initially be faulted for nonlogical moves.
The Epistemological Argument: The Answer
Schaeffer’s argument seems to be as follows: unbelieving man cannot account for the world because he sees it as a closed system, and as a result is stuck in his two-storey universe.
That might be true. Schaeffer then moves to the following claim:
Therefore, Christianity, positing an open-universe, is true.
That does not follow (57).
I think Schaeffer is aware of this problem, so he buttresses it by an appeal to (propositional) revelation. What is not clear, however, is why it must be the Christian set of propositions. Schaeffer cannot really adjudicate, at least not at this point in his argument, between rival sets of propositional religions (63).
Conclusion
Schaeffer’s use of presuppositions was never the problem. What Schaeffer failed to capture, at least in his argument, is the role of “predispositions.” If a presupposition is an object of belief, a predisposition is like a “basic personality orientation or tendency” (113). It seems Morris’s predispositions are close to Charles Taylor’s “social imaginary.” In other words, one can convince the unbeliever of x, but the unbeliever will not “jump ship.” Part of that is due to sin and the sovereign work of the Holy Spirit. Another part is due to the cultural river in which he swims. Ironically enough, Schaeffer did a very good job in living out that latter part.
I think Tom Morris, author of such classics as The Idea of God and The Logic of God Incarnate, originally wrote this volume when he was a senior in college. It has since been rereleased by Baker Books. The title of the book is somewhat misleading. Morris, at least when he wrote this some decades ago, shares much of Francis Schaeffer’s apologetic method. He simply points out (and corrects) the numerous minor mistakes in Schaeffer’s system.
To sound somewhat like a 1990s self-help seminar, I “found myself” reading through this book. What is the best apologetic method? It is the one that works for you. I know that sounds pragmatic, and it probably is. Even though truth is not determined by what works, there is a “psychological force” in using something that works. Schaeffer’s own method, to the degree he actually thought about it, is a cross between a gentle presuppositionalism and the cumulative case method, or inference to the best explanation. As a method, it has much to commend it. We are grateful to Professor Morris for cleaning up some of Schaeffer’s unguarded statements.
Schaeffer defines a presupposition as “a belief or theory which is assumed before the next step in logic is developed” (GWT, 179, quoted in Morris 18). This is an adequate definition, but Morris notes that it suffers from an almost impersonal view of human action. What Schaeffer says is true, but it sounds like two people working through a syllogism over lunch. This explains why your “logical arguments” rarely win people over at first. No one talks like this.
Schaeffer criticizes the unbelieving man for making a “mystical” (i.e., nonlogical) jump, but this criticism backfires: by Schaeffer’s own admission, Christianity rests upon nonlogical assumptions (Morris 29).
Schaeffer claims that an impersonal universe cannot account for why there is significance, but this, too, will not work. An unbeliever simply has to evaluate himself against another, noting that one is more significant than the other. Significance emerges. Granted, it is not a profound sense of significance, but that is not the point.
Schaeffer’s argument works up to a point. He is correct that an impersonal universe cannot account for x, y, and z. What he has not shown is that Christianity does. Or rather, even if Christianity does he has not ruled out other forms of theism (32).
Discussing “ultimate personality,” Schaeffer says the personal origin of the universe must be “big enough” (HIT 12, quoted in Morris 33). That is probably true, but Schaeffer leaves undefined such key points as “big enough” and “infinite.” As Morris asks, “Big enough for what?”
Schaeffer, like many presuppositionalists, believes the Trinity can solve issues like “infinite personality” and “unity in diversity.” Maybe it can, but his argument does not necessarily need that. At best, the Trinity is a “functional postulate” (35). He has to get that from biblical revelation, but that is not where he started.
The Epistemological Argument: The Problem
The terms “rational, rationality, and reason are nowhere clearly defined by Dr Schaeffer” (43). Schaeffer criticizes the unbeliever for “nonlogical moves,” but is that not ultimately what a presupposition is? Every human knower operates like this (53). To be sure, the unbeliever has wrong presuppositions, but he cannot initially be faulted for nonlogical moves.
The Epistemological Argument: The Answer
Schaeffer’s argument seems to be as follows: unbelieving man cannot account for the world because he sees it as a closed system, and as a result is stuck in his two-storey universe.
That might be true. Schaeffer then moves to the following claim:
Therefore, Christianity, positing an open-universe, is true.
That does not follow (57).
I think Schaeffer is aware of this problem, so he buttresses it by an appeal to (propositional) revelation. What is not clear, however, is why it must be the Christian set of propositions. Schaeffer cannot really adjudicate, at least not at this point in his argument, between rival sets of propositional religions (63).
Conclusion
Schaeffer’s use of presuppositions was never the problem. What Schaeffer failed to capture, at least in his argument, is the role of “predispositions.” If a presupposition is an object of belief, a predisposition is like a “basic personality orientation or tendency” (113). It seems Morris’s predispositions are close to Charles Taylor’s “social imaginary.” In other words, one can convince the unbeliever of x, but the unbeliever will not “jump ship.” Part of that is due to sin and the sovereign work of the Holy Spirit. Another part is due to the cultural river in which he swims. Ironically enough, Schaeffer did a very good job in living out that latter part.
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September 4, 2024AN EXCELLENT PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF SCHAEFFER'S APOLOGETIC APPROACH
Thomas V. Morris (born 1952) is a former Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame; he is also a business and motivational speaker as founder and chairman of the Morris Institute for Human Values. He has written a number of other books, such as 'Our Idea of God,' 'Making Sense of It All: Pascal and the Meaning of Life,' 'God and the Philosophers: The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason,' 'C. S. Lewis as Philosopher: Truth, Goodness and Beauty,' etc.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1976 book, "It is my opinion that Dr. Schaeffer is a modern, college-level counterpart of the old evangelical pamphleteer. His style and treatments are popular rather than philosophically rigorous so that he may reach a larger audience and have a more widespread effect on the church and the world...
"I will attempt to analyze Dr. Schaeffer's major apologetic thrust---his presuppositional approach to theistic argumentation... I will attempt to give a justification for the general type of apologetic enterprise in which both Dr. Schaeffer and I are involved, basing it on the way in which apologetic arguments can function in people's lives. Then I will sketch out very briefly how the valuable insights of Schaeffer's work may be appropriated and incorporated into a more complete Christian apologetic." (Pg. 12-13)
He states, "two criteria are presented. First, the ultimate personality must be 'big enough.' The ancient Greek gods are too limited in their finite personality to provide an adequate point of reference for absolutes which would extend over the whole of reality. Here Schaeffer states that 'only a personal-infinite God is big enough.' The notion of infinitude as it is here used is not explicated by Schaeffer. There is no argument offered as to why a God infinitely extensive in space, time, or any other mode is necessary for 'absolutes' (which is also a term undefined by him)." (Pg. 33)
He argues, "On the basis of ... the need for a significant unity and a significant diversity in the ultimate personal ground of being for the universe---Schaeffer puts forth the orthodox Christian concept of the Trinity... Once again, the popular and suggestive nature of Dr. Schaeffer's books must be remembered. He quite often merely alludes to a philosophical problem and suggests the adequacy of the orthodox Christian presuppositions to provide an answer. Thus, details are left unmentioned, and many arguments unstated." (Pg. 34)
He points out, "it is also clear that no world view, and in fact no human knowledge at all, is without dependence on the nonlogical or personal contributions of the knower. This is true of the Orthodox Christian presuppositions and world view as well as of any other. Therefore, the fact that there are nonlogical moves in a reasoning process cannot per se be criticized as a weakness of that process. However, this often seems to be what Dr. Schaeffer is doing. He does not fully acknowledge the nonlogical contribution of every human knower to his own knowledge, in whatever area... this problem is ... present in every epistemology, and therefore a damaging criticism of no particular epistemology." (Pg. 52-53)
He observes that Schaeffer "moves from 'if Christianity is true, then there are answers' to 'therefore, Christianity is true.' The logical gap between possibility and necessary actuality has, in this move, been jumped unwarrantedly as it was in the metaphysical argument. There may be an argument which would justify Schaeffer's repeated move... although none is specifically articulated by him... Dr. Schaeffer has not compellingly shown any area of necessity, and thus may not yet validly avail himself of such a move." (Pg. 58-59)
This analysis and critique will be "must reading" for anyone wanting to probe much more deeply into Schaeffer's apologetics, or into Christian philosophical apologetics in general.
Thomas V. Morris (born 1952) is a former Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame; he is also a business and motivational speaker as founder and chairman of the Morris Institute for Human Values. He has written a number of other books, such as 'Our Idea of God,' 'Making Sense of It All: Pascal and the Meaning of Life,' 'God and the Philosophers: The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason,' 'C. S. Lewis as Philosopher: Truth, Goodness and Beauty,' etc.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1976 book, "It is my opinion that Dr. Schaeffer is a modern, college-level counterpart of the old evangelical pamphleteer. His style and treatments are popular rather than philosophically rigorous so that he may reach a larger audience and have a more widespread effect on the church and the world...
"I will attempt to analyze Dr. Schaeffer's major apologetic thrust---his presuppositional approach to theistic argumentation... I will attempt to give a justification for the general type of apologetic enterprise in which both Dr. Schaeffer and I are involved, basing it on the way in which apologetic arguments can function in people's lives. Then I will sketch out very briefly how the valuable insights of Schaeffer's work may be appropriated and incorporated into a more complete Christian apologetic." (Pg. 12-13)
He states, "two criteria are presented. First, the ultimate personality must be 'big enough.' The ancient Greek gods are too limited in their finite personality to provide an adequate point of reference for absolutes which would extend over the whole of reality. Here Schaeffer states that 'only a personal-infinite God is big enough.' The notion of infinitude as it is here used is not explicated by Schaeffer. There is no argument offered as to why a God infinitely extensive in space, time, or any other mode is necessary for 'absolutes' (which is also a term undefined by him)." (Pg. 33)
He argues, "On the basis of ... the need for a significant unity and a significant diversity in the ultimate personal ground of being for the universe---Schaeffer puts forth the orthodox Christian concept of the Trinity... Once again, the popular and suggestive nature of Dr. Schaeffer's books must be remembered. He quite often merely alludes to a philosophical problem and suggests the adequacy of the orthodox Christian presuppositions to provide an answer. Thus, details are left unmentioned, and many arguments unstated." (Pg. 34)
He points out, "it is also clear that no world view, and in fact no human knowledge at all, is without dependence on the nonlogical or personal contributions of the knower. This is true of the Orthodox Christian presuppositions and world view as well as of any other. Therefore, the fact that there are nonlogical moves in a reasoning process cannot per se be criticized as a weakness of that process. However, this often seems to be what Dr. Schaeffer is doing. He does not fully acknowledge the nonlogical contribution of every human knower to his own knowledge, in whatever area... this problem is ... present in every epistemology, and therefore a damaging criticism of no particular epistemology." (Pg. 52-53)
He observes that Schaeffer "moves from 'if Christianity is true, then there are answers' to 'therefore, Christianity is true.' The logical gap between possibility and necessary actuality has, in this move, been jumped unwarrantedly as it was in the metaphysical argument. There may be an argument which would justify Schaeffer's repeated move... although none is specifically articulated by him... Dr. Schaeffer has not compellingly shown any area of necessity, and thus may not yet validly avail himself of such a move." (Pg. 58-59)
This analysis and critique will be "must reading" for anyone wanting to probe much more deeply into Schaeffer's apologetics, or into Christian philosophical apologetics in general.
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