On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson

by George C. Dyer

Endless debates have raged over the reasons the Japanese were able to execute their surprise attack on the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor so successfully. Military neglect, political and diplomatic ineptitude, and even what could only be described as accusations of malfeasance against the President of the United States all have been argued and reargued for more than 60 years. One key source of information for this ongoing and sometime passionate discussion is "On the Treadmill to Pearl the Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson". As commander of the U.S. Fleet in 1940 and 1941, Admiral Richardson was in a unique position to observe and reach conclusions about the readiness or lack of readiness of the fleet, as well as the political atmosphere in which crucial strategic and tactical decisions were reached. Because many crucial naval records perished at Pearl harbor, Admiral Richardson's recollections, as told to Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, constitute an important primary source for war plans, including War Plan Orange for operations in case of a war with Japan. He also addresses his deep concern about the lack of preparedness of the Navy, particularly its low prewar staffing levels, and the folly of sending a poorly prepared naval force to Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to aggression by a better prepared Japanese fleet. He forthrightly places much of the blamed for this situation on President Roosevelt and his advisers. Interestingly, in light of the many conspiracy theories surrounding December 7, 1941, he criticizes these men for consistently underestimating the Japanese threat rather than courting an attack as a way of embroiling the U.S. in the war. On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor is an important source for naval historians and students of World War II, as well as an intriguing first-person account of the crucial months preceding "the day of infamy". Originally published in 1973. 558 pages, ill.

574 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1971

Reviews

[Eric Byrd · Rating 4 out of 5]

The prose is dry and the format proto-PowerPoint, but this is a fascinating account of a tragic civil-military misunderstanding. James O. Richardson was CINCUS (Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet, or “Sink Us” in Fleet parlance) until January 1941, when he told Roosevelt in an Oval Office meeting that he had no confidence in the President’s leadership. Roosevelt promptly relieved him of command. Richardson’s portrait of Roosevelt is more damning than any conspiracy yarn. He portrays Roosevelt as a naval hobbyist, a vain amateur who had no real grasp of how fleets fight; and dangerously arrogant, unable to take Japan seriously. Roosevelt, fully obsessed with the undeclared U-Boat war in the Atlantic, where US Navy assets were secretly aiding the British, thought he could deter the Japanese from conquest by imposing oil and scrap metal embargoes, freezing its overseas assets, by sending stealthy flotillas of US ships to suddenly “pop up” in Japanese home waters, and by forward deployment of the US Pacific Fleet, “out on a limb,” as it were, at a vulnerable, second-rate Hawaiian base. Richardson advised the President and the Secretary of the Navy that these moves would provoke and tempt the Japanese leaders, not cow them. Richardson also noted an irony: moving the Fleet from its home port of San Diego to Hawaii was a political show of force, but the movement actually degraded the Fleet’s fighting edge and combat readiness – Pearl Harbor’s docking, repair, and training facilities were at the time woefully inadequate – and he suspected the Japanese admirals would call Roosevelt’s bluff. Richardson seems to have been one of those rare people capable of learning from history. His 1933 Naval War College thesis was on the Japanese penchant for undeclared commencements of hostilities and opportunistic surprise attacks, in past wars with Russia and China – but he didn’t style himself a prophet. He candidly admits that a carrier-borne air raid on Pearl Harbor was not his major worry. He feared that the Japanese would pounce on the measly US Asiatic Fleet in Chinese and Philippine waters, wipe that Fleet out, and then be in good position for a showdown with the undermanned and ill-prepared US Pacific Fleet, steaming frantically westward from Pearl Harbor. After attacking Pearl Harbor, the Japanese did wipe out the Asiatic Fleet, and sank its flagship, the heavy cruiser USS Houston, Roosevelt’s favorite ship in the Navy, and one that served as a Presidential yacht during late 1930s cruises of the Pacific and Caribbean. That must have stung.

[BSmith · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Military Officer View

ADM Richardson’s view of the prequel to WWII mirrors the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The USA sanctioned Japan before WWII just as NATO is sanctioning Russia in 2022. Japan felt cornered due to the sanction of trade of raw materials.
Parts of the book are difficult to push through. But the content is relevant to the 21 century.