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Studies in Asian Security
Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice
Normalizing Japan seeks to answer the question of what future direction Japan's military policies are likely to take, by considering how policy has evolved since World War II, and what factors shaped this evolution. It argues that Japanese security policy has not changed as much in recent years as many believe, and that future change also will be highly constrained by Japan's long-standing "security identity," the central principle guiding Japanese policy over the past half-century. Oros' analysis is based on detailed exploration of three cases of policy evolution—restrictions on arms exports, the military use of outer space, and cooperation with the United States on missile defense—which shed light on other cases of policy change, such as Japan's deployment of its military to Iraq and elsewhere and its recent creation of a Ministry of Defense. More broadly, the book refines how "ideational" factors interact with domestic politics and international changes to create policy change.
- GenresJapan
304 pages, Paperback
First published April 23, 2008
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
June 2, 2015
Along with the work of Tomohito Shinoda, Richard Samuels, Soeya Yoshihide, and Michael Green, Andrew Oros's book on Japanese security rightly deserves to be called a classic on the subject.
In focusing on Japan's security identity, Oros is in someways picking up where constructivists like Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein left off.
Oros's books examines the persistence of Japan’s security identity from the post-War period through the Cold War into the post-Cold War period. As the author recognizes, many authors, such as Kliman (2006), examine how Japan is being normalized by shifts in the material structure of the international system. Oros argues that despite these shifts in material structure, there has been a relatively persistent Japanese security identity that has been “hegemonic” in Japanese domestic politics.
This security identity shapes the public debate, provides its vocabulary, but does not determine the outcome. Or as Oros says, “Japan’s security identity structures specific policy outcomes in three ways: through its influence on political rhetoric, its structuring of public opinion and the coalition-building opportunities this enables, and its institutionalization into the policy-making process” (p. 32); also by “exacting costs for violators of the security identity” (p. 33).
Thus, Oros’s book looks at the relative permanence and flexibility of Japanese internal social structure. As Oros argues, these principles shape what is considered “normal” in Japanese politics. This security identity is not a “strategy” in that it is constructed by political elites, but rather “a resilient identity that is politically negotiated and comprises a widely accepted set of principles on the acceptable scope of state practices in the realm of national security” (3).
Oros finds that the main pattern of security change has been the three “Rs”: “reach, reconcile, and reassure” (p. 33). Each new security initiative is followed by a period where this new initiative is reconciled with the prevailing security identity and then the public is reassured about the extent of its influence. Oros is not blind to reforms in defense that stress adjustments to the worsening security dilemma in Asia. However, his explanatory framework emphasizes the relative consistency in Japanese policy from the Cold War into the post-Cold War.
Though the book was written nearly seven years ago, one can still see many of the qualities of "reach, reconcile, and reassure" in the recent defense initiatives proposed by the current conservative government.
For Oros, the dominant security identity of Japan is not “pacifism”, but rather domestic anti-militarism. According to Oros, the three central tenets of domestic anti-militarism are: no traditional armed forces, no use of force by Japan except in self-defense, no Japanese participation in foreign wars. Though the security identity does not determine agent actions, those politicians who wish to cross a boundary, must pay the political costs.
Even as Japan continues its rightward turn, works like Oros's that focus on Japan's anti-militarist identity will still hold important value. They will help explain why defense reforms tend to stop, stutter, and restart, moving at a glacial pace, even as external threats loom large. They will also help explain why conservative governments, with strong desires for a "normal military" end up settling for half-measures that usually channel these desires through initiatives that focus on more anti-militarist measures like peacekeeping, global cooperation, and disaster assistance.
In focusing on Japan's security identity, Oros is in someways picking up where constructivists like Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein left off.
Oros's books examines the persistence of Japan’s security identity from the post-War period through the Cold War into the post-Cold War period. As the author recognizes, many authors, such as Kliman (2006), examine how Japan is being normalized by shifts in the material structure of the international system. Oros argues that despite these shifts in material structure, there has been a relatively persistent Japanese security identity that has been “hegemonic” in Japanese domestic politics.
This security identity shapes the public debate, provides its vocabulary, but does not determine the outcome. Or as Oros says, “Japan’s security identity structures specific policy outcomes in three ways: through its influence on political rhetoric, its structuring of public opinion and the coalition-building opportunities this enables, and its institutionalization into the policy-making process” (p. 32); also by “exacting costs for violators of the security identity” (p. 33).
Thus, Oros’s book looks at the relative permanence and flexibility of Japanese internal social structure. As Oros argues, these principles shape what is considered “normal” in Japanese politics. This security identity is not a “strategy” in that it is constructed by political elites, but rather “a resilient identity that is politically negotiated and comprises a widely accepted set of principles on the acceptable scope of state practices in the realm of national security” (3).
Oros finds that the main pattern of security change has been the three “Rs”: “reach, reconcile, and reassure” (p. 33). Each new security initiative is followed by a period where this new initiative is reconciled with the prevailing security identity and then the public is reassured about the extent of its influence. Oros is not blind to reforms in defense that stress adjustments to the worsening security dilemma in Asia. However, his explanatory framework emphasizes the relative consistency in Japanese policy from the Cold War into the post-Cold War.
Though the book was written nearly seven years ago, one can still see many of the qualities of "reach, reconcile, and reassure" in the recent defense initiatives proposed by the current conservative government.
For Oros, the dominant security identity of Japan is not “pacifism”, but rather domestic anti-militarism. According to Oros, the three central tenets of domestic anti-militarism are: no traditional armed forces, no use of force by Japan except in self-defense, no Japanese participation in foreign wars. Though the security identity does not determine agent actions, those politicians who wish to cross a boundary, must pay the political costs.
Even as Japan continues its rightward turn, works like Oros's that focus on Japan's anti-militarist identity will still hold important value. They will help explain why defense reforms tend to stop, stutter, and restart, moving at a glacial pace, even as external threats loom large. They will also help explain why conservative governments, with strong desires for a "normal military" end up settling for half-measures that usually channel these desires through initiatives that focus on more anti-militarist measures like peacekeeping, global cooperation, and disaster assistance.
April 21, 2020
Another governmental bureaucrat arguing, like in October 1936 of the "strategic" importance of a "strong" Asian ally. The only change is in the language used on the paper.
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March 2, 2026skimmed for my bachelor's thesis
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interesting analytical approach, a little too much fact-heavy at times
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interesting analytical approach, a little too much fact-heavy at times
June 28, 2016
This is an interesting but a little bit difficult to read, repetitive and overstuffed book about Japan's politics, especially related to its pacifist stance in the world and the security related issues. It covers from the end of the Second World War till the beginning of the 21st century (it was published before Fukushima or the last political changes in the country, as the return of Abe to power or the East Asia political changes), and it does a good job in doing it, even if it keeps to the basics: political numbers and Japanese relationship with USA (it is very USA centred).
Oros does a good job in relating the idea of the Japanese view on war, pacifism and its position in the world with how things have been changing since the forties, but he keeps a superficial understanding of the matter (as said, it is basically politics, with only a little bit of economics and not as much as there should be about social, cultural or structural aspects of Japanese society). In any aspect of any society much is going on, though, so we can't expect every author to cover all aspects. But a little bit of a broader view on the subject would have helped in improving the book.
Oros's style is ok, nothing to start a party for, but it is easy to understand. It becomes a little bit repetitive, though, and can be also dense. But the ideas get through and the reader will get a better understanding of how or why Japan has reacted politically in the way it has done in the last decades. But the reader should try to read more about the subject to get a more comprehensive understanding of how identity or politics are done.
6/10
Oros does a good job in relating the idea of the Japanese view on war, pacifism and its position in the world with how things have been changing since the forties, but he keeps a superficial understanding of the matter (as said, it is basically politics, with only a little bit of economics and not as much as there should be about social, cultural or structural aspects of Japanese society). In any aspect of any society much is going on, though, so we can't expect every author to cover all aspects. But a little bit of a broader view on the subject would have helped in improving the book.
Oros's style is ok, nothing to start a party for, but it is easy to understand. It becomes a little bit repetitive, though, and can be also dense. But the ideas get through and the reader will get a better understanding of how or why Japan has reacted politically in the way it has done in the last decades. But the reader should try to read more about the subject to get a more comprehensive understanding of how identity or politics are done.
6/10
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews