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The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957
The personal correspondence between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Anthony Eden during the time they were simultaneously in office tells the dramatic story of a relationship that began with great promise but ended in division and estrangement. Many of the letters have only recently been declassified, making it possible for the first time to publish this unique historic collection in its entirety. Peter G. Boyle's introduction, annotations, and conclusion provide context for the letters--details about the personalities and careers of Eden and Eisenhower and major issues that influenced the Anglo-American relationship up to 1955, such as relations with the Soviet Union, nuclear concerns, colonialism, the Middle and Far East, economic issues, and intelligence matters. The letters themselves offer an intimate look into the special connection between Britain and the United States through the often eloquent words of their leaders. They offer particular insight into the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Eden's and Eisenhower's views greatly diverged over the use of force to resolve the situation. Their personal relationship cooled from that point on and ended with Eden's resignation in January 1957.
240 pages, Hardcover
First published April 18, 2005
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August 26, 2018
Out of Eden
While starting out rather dry this examination of the Eisenhower/Eden relationship proved to be more interesting than expected. The first section begins with a look at Eden's background and position as Churchill's heir in waiting, continues with a rather standard biography of Eisenhower and concludes with a look at John Foster Dulles US Secretary of State and Eden's opposite number while he was foreign minister.
The letters themselves, a tradition initiated by Churchill with Roosevelt during the war , begin with rather ordinary exchanges of pleasantries between the two leaders. As they progress various issues arise and Boyle adds commentary to fill in the background outlining where the two nations policies overlapped and differed. Of primary concern were policies wrt the Soviet Union and the containment of communism ranging from the conduct of espionage, trade with communist countries (Britain was in favor of conventional commercial trade, the Americans against), deployment of conventional and nuclear weapons and the courting of foreign leaders and the sale of military goods as a sweetener to potential allies in order to keep them out of the Soviet camp.
The 2nd half of the letters deals with the Suez crisis of 1956. Eden's view of Nasser was that he was a dangerous demagogue, recalling Italian adventurism in Eritrea, akin to a latter day Mussolini. He also makes an appeal to Eisenhower comparing him to the former Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq who was overthrown with US help in 1953, suggesting a need for regime change. On March 15, 1956 (pp123) Eden passes on a secret memo of Nasser's plans to form a United Arab States complete with a common economic system with its own Arab currency, predicated on the overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan and the monarchy in Libya. Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal on July 26 which Eden takes to heart as a threat against British trade routes to India and the far east and a severe blow Britain's self perception as a world empire. Eisenhower too was bothered by Nasser's policies and overtures to the Soviets, but since Suez was due to revert to Egypt 12 years later in 1968 (pp149), felt that this was not the issue to confront him on.
Boyle does a good job presenting the order of events which is important to understanding the evolution of the crisis. On Sept. 25 Harold MacMillan, Eden's Foreign Minister visits Eisenhower in the US and after a brief discussion of Suez brings back the impression that Eisenhower would go along with an invasion. At the UN tries to a Suez Users coalition is proposed to ameliorate Nasser's nationalization but these talks fail to defuse the situation. On October 24th British, French and Israeli representatives sign a deal in Sevres outside of Paris, coincidentally one day after a Hungarian revolution against Soviet control. Israel invades on October 29th and France and Great Britain issue a pre-arranged ultimatum that Israel and Egypt are to withdraw to a line 10 miles on either side of the canal - at the time no-one notices that the Israelis were not yet at that point. On Nov 5 the British and French land their forces at the north end of the Canal and seize control.
However 1956 is an American election year and Eisenhower, who campaigned on a platform of peace and stability is both frustrated and furious. The Soviet invasion of Hungary, which should have been the preeminent issue of the day, is brought up by Eden but is all but ignored by Eisenhower who considers the action an embarrassment and a betrayal of the 1950 Tripartite agreement between the US, England and France designed to keep the peace between the Arabs and Israelis. Fearing that the operation would only strengthen Nasser, he demands a withdrawal and (better handled in the book Pearson's Prize) a face saving proposal by the Canadian Foreign Minister Mike Pearson is adopted. In the aftermath of the crisis Eden is forced to resign citing (very real) health problems. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet survives the crisis intact, only to impale in mid 1957 on the military cost French colonial rule in Algeria; apropos it is Nasser's material support of the rebels that led to his involvement.
An objectively written commentary on the views of the day and the letters form an invaluable research asset for those interested in the Eisenhower or Eden administrations. Recommended.
While starting out rather dry this examination of the Eisenhower/Eden relationship proved to be more interesting than expected. The first section begins with a look at Eden's background and position as Churchill's heir in waiting, continues with a rather standard biography of Eisenhower and concludes with a look at John Foster Dulles US Secretary of State and Eden's opposite number while he was foreign minister.
The letters themselves, a tradition initiated by Churchill with Roosevelt during the war , begin with rather ordinary exchanges of pleasantries between the two leaders. As they progress various issues arise and Boyle adds commentary to fill in the background outlining where the two nations policies overlapped and differed. Of primary concern were policies wrt the Soviet Union and the containment of communism ranging from the conduct of espionage, trade with communist countries (Britain was in favor of conventional commercial trade, the Americans against), deployment of conventional and nuclear weapons and the courting of foreign leaders and the sale of military goods as a sweetener to potential allies in order to keep them out of the Soviet camp.
The 2nd half of the letters deals with the Suez crisis of 1956. Eden's view of Nasser was that he was a dangerous demagogue, recalling Italian adventurism in Eritrea, akin to a latter day Mussolini. He also makes an appeal to Eisenhower comparing him to the former Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq who was overthrown with US help in 1953, suggesting a need for regime change. On March 15, 1956 (pp123) Eden passes on a secret memo of Nasser's plans to form a United Arab States complete with a common economic system with its own Arab currency, predicated on the overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan and the monarchy in Libya. Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal on July 26 which Eden takes to heart as a threat against British trade routes to India and the far east and a severe blow Britain's self perception as a world empire. Eisenhower too was bothered by Nasser's policies and overtures to the Soviets, but since Suez was due to revert to Egypt 12 years later in 1968 (pp149), felt that this was not the issue to confront him on.
Boyle does a good job presenting the order of events which is important to understanding the evolution of the crisis. On Sept. 25 Harold MacMillan, Eden's Foreign Minister visits Eisenhower in the US and after a brief discussion of Suez brings back the impression that Eisenhower would go along with an invasion. At the UN tries to a Suez Users coalition is proposed to ameliorate Nasser's nationalization but these talks fail to defuse the situation. On October 24th British, French and Israeli representatives sign a deal in Sevres outside of Paris, coincidentally one day after a Hungarian revolution against Soviet control. Israel invades on October 29th and France and Great Britain issue a pre-arranged ultimatum that Israel and Egypt are to withdraw to a line 10 miles on either side of the canal - at the time no-one notices that the Israelis were not yet at that point. On Nov 5 the British and French land their forces at the north end of the Canal and seize control.
However 1956 is an American election year and Eisenhower, who campaigned on a platform of peace and stability is both frustrated and furious. The Soviet invasion of Hungary, which should have been the preeminent issue of the day, is brought up by Eden but is all but ignored by Eisenhower who considers the action an embarrassment and a betrayal of the 1950 Tripartite agreement between the US, England and France designed to keep the peace between the Arabs and Israelis. Fearing that the operation would only strengthen Nasser, he demands a withdrawal and (better handled in the book Pearson's Prize) a face saving proposal by the Canadian Foreign Minister Mike Pearson is adopted. In the aftermath of the crisis Eden is forced to resign citing (very real) health problems. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet survives the crisis intact, only to impale in mid 1957 on the military cost French colonial rule in Algeria; apropos it is Nasser's material support of the rebels that led to his involvement.
An objectively written commentary on the views of the day and the letters form an invaluable research asset for those interested in the Eisenhower or Eden administrations. Recommended.
Displaying 1 of 1 review