In the form it has finally assumed, this volume falls into two very different parts. Part 1 was written by Dr. Steve Canby, Ken Brower, and Martin van Creveld at the invitation of Air University, Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama. It represents the authors joint attempt to clarify the relationship between air power and maneuver warfare since 1939, a subject that derives its importance from the fact that maneuver warfare has been the U. S. Army’s official doctrine since the early eighties and remains so to the present day. By contrast, part 2 was added ex post facto. It contains the collective wisdom of the military doctrine analysts of the Air University on the same subjects, as well as the way in which the authors in the first section have presented them. The reader is invited to wade through the entire volume and draw his/her own conclusions about the past, present, and future of air power on the one hand and maneuver warfare on the other, assuming indeed that they do have a future.
Martin Levi van Creveld is an Israeli military historian and theorist.
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.