Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) has been enduringly influential in philosophy of science, challenging many common presuppositions about the nature of science and the growth of scientific knowledge. However, philosophers have misunderstood Kuhn's view, treating him as a relativist or social constructionist. In this book, Brad Wray argues that Kuhn provides a useful framework for developing an epistemology of science that takes account of the constructive role that social factors play in scientific inquiry. He examines the core concepts of Structure and explains the main characteristics of both Kuhn's evolutionary epistemology and his social epistemology, relating Structure to Kuhn's developed view presented in his later writings. The discussion includes analyses of the Copernican revolution in astronomy and the plate tectonics revolution in geology. The book will be useful for scholars working in science studies, sociologists and historians of science as well as philosophers of science.
This book is a perfect read for anyone after having read The Structure of Scientific Revolutions wondered, "Why did people consider this so important to Postmodernism and relativistic philosophy again?" This book gives a solid account of what Kuhn actually was thinking, how he inspired philosophers and sociologists of science, and why he is often falsely understood as a huge threat to the practice of science.
On the other hand, if you have read Kuhn and found use in citing him in support of relativistic thinking, this book is a good reference for why you should only cite him for motivation for skepticism of scientific objectivity. Although he does open the door for relativism, Wray shows us that what Kuhn actually does is open many doors for many different routes of academic interest while simultaneously maintaining a consistent goal of trying to justify the possibility that despite the lack of objectivity, progression in science still occurs regardless of whether truth values will be achieved.
Furthermore, this is a useful book to clarify the justification Kuhn sought with social scientists' work with epistemological goals, and a brief overview of what those social scientists have done so far.
I believe this book achieves its goal spectacularly!
A concise and compelling defence of Kuhn as an epistemologist that draws heavily upon Kuhn's later work. This was an excellent refresher for me in Kuhn's work and the various controversies that surround it, as well as a welcome response to the attacks on Kuhn from philosophers of science that are too often taken as definitive.