This book works through some of the theoretical issues that have been accumulating in informal logic over the past 20 years. At the same time, it defines a core position in the theory of argument in which those issues can be further explored. The underlying concern that motivates this work is the health of practice of argumentation as an important cultural artifact. A further concern is for logic as a discipline. Argumentative and dialectical in nature, this book presupposes some awareness of the theory of argument in recent history, and some familiarity with the positions that have been advanced. It will be of interest to academics, researchers, and advanced undergraduate and graduate students in the disciplines of logic, rhetoric, linguistics, speech communication, English composition, and psychology.
This book is about the practice of argument. In particular, the book asks one big overarching question: What makes an argument a “good argument”?
The author—a leading academic in the interdisciplinary field of argumentation theory—is Canadian. Right out of the blocks, he pronounces the practice of rational argument in North America to be under siege. Television in particular is identified as having played a lead role in dumbing down public discourse.
Extrapolating this gloomy take to today, once the social media barbarians started their assault on the (already only weakly defended) bastion of rational argument, things could only go from bad to ugly.
Providing ironic support to the author’s lament about the dark argumentative ages we live in, his book has so far never been reviewed (or rated) on Goodreads.
The book has two main parts. It first provides a review of past attempts to come up with a “theory of argument,” where a “theory” is supposed to provide tools to analyze the structure of arguments and criteria to appraise the quality (=goodness) of an argument. The author sets up a gaunlet of adequacy conditions a useful theory would have to pass through unharmed. However, all the candidates for such a theory, including what the author calls deductivism, positivism, and conductivism, get clobbered. Therefore, the book’s first main conclusion: Despite 2,500 years of trying hard, mankind still doesn’t have a useful theory of argument.
In the second part of the book, the author sketches and defends his own theory of argument. The details of the proposed argument analysis tools and appraisal criteria are difficult to summarize in a few sentences, but they sound promising. Unsurprisingly, the proposal hews closely to some the ideas of the argument research program (=informal logic) with which the author himself is closely associated. The author is careful to note that there are still major difficulties associated with his proposal. Hence, the book’s second main conclusion: A useful theory of argument is feasible, although more work will be needed.
As already noted, at least from the point of view of the general public, this book seems to have fallen “dead-born from the press,” as happened to other now celebrated intellectual efforts. At the same time, the book takes up valiantly a profound challenge that may well have to be met to ensure the survival of democracy.