Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey

by R. Duncan Luce, Howard Raiffa

Superb non-technical introduction to game theory, primarily applied to social sciences. Clear, comprehensive coverage of utility theory, 2-person zero-sum games, 2-person non-zero-sum games, n-person games, individual and group decision-making, more. Bibliography.

Genres: Economics, Mathematics, Nonfiction, Science, Philosophy, Textbooks, Business

544 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1957

About the author

R.Duncan Luce is Distinguished Research Professor of Cognitive Science and Research Professor of Economics at the University of California, Irvine.

From Wikipedia:
Robert Duncan Luce (born May 16, 1925) is the Distinguished Research Professor of Cognitive Science at the University of California, Irvine.

Luce received a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1945, and PhD in Mathematics from the same university in 1950. He began his professorial career at Columbia University in 1954, where he was an assistant professor in mathematical statistics and sociology. Following a lecturership at Harvard University from 1957 to 1959, he became a professor at the University of Pennsylvania in 1959, and was awarded the Benjamin Franklin Professorship of Psychology in 1968. After visiting the Institute for Advanced Study beginning in 1969, he joined the UC Irvine faculty in 1972, but returned to Harvard in 1976 as Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Psychology and then later as Victor S. Thomas Professor of Psychology. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1972 for his work on fundamental measurement, utility theory, global psychophysics, and mathematical behavioral sciences. In 1988 Luce rejoined the UC Irvine faculty as Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Sciences and (from 1988 to 1998) director of UCI's Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences. He received the 2003 National Medal of Science in behavioral and social science for his contributions to the field of mathematical psychology.

Contributions for which Luce is known include formulating Luce's choice axiom formalizing the principle that additional options should not affect the probability of selecting one item over another, defining semiorders, introducing graph-theoretic methods into the social sciences, and coining the term "clique" for a complete subgraph in graph theory.

Reviews

[Bruce · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is an advanced game theory text. Readers should be prepared to chew on the math behind decision making strategies and rationality. Were I more math inclined, I'm sure I would've loved this book. The authors' are know the subject matter, and write well; the book is logically organized, with interesting chapters. However, as someone who (tried to) teach myself Calculus, I couldn't manage; I may have just been scared off by the math. Someday I hope to return to this volume, better prepared. (If just to be able to map just how far from rational my decision making falls.)

This volume, and some others on negotiation theory and decision theory, accomplished what a number of well meaning teachers and my parents could not, a desire to learn math! Had I been given examples of the practical application of statistics (beyond sports stats), calculus, algebra, ..., I may have tried harder to master the concepts.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 3 out of 5]

In its day, a classic on decision making. The book examined game theory and related models of decision making. Not an easy read for a nonspecialist, but this book, after all, was aimed at professional social scientists. For instance, one brief example noted is the classic Prisoner's Dilemma.

Historically, an important work in the study of decision making in the social sciences.

[Waxy McClure · Rating 3 out of 5]

My goal is to finish this book in one week and read it only while exercising. Can it be done?

[Robertjulia]

Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey" is a classic book by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa that explores the mathematical theory of games and decision-making. Originally published in 1957, this book is still widely regarded as a seminal work in the field of game theory and decision analysis.

The book is divided into four main sections. The first section introduces the basic concepts of game theory, including the ideas of strategic behavior, equilibrium, and the minimax theorem. The second section explores cooperative games and bargaining, while the third section delves into decision theory and the concept of expected utility. The final section examines some applications of game theory, including voting systems and social choice theory.

One of the strengths of this book is its clear and concise writing style. The authors present complex mathematical concepts in a way that is accessible to readers with a basic understanding of algebra and probability theory. They also provide numerous examples and exercises throughout the book to help readers better understand the material.

Another strength of the book is its critical approach to the subject matter. The authors are not afraid to question some of the assumptions and limitations of game theory and decision analysis, and they provide a balanced and nuanced perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of these theories.

[Dwight]

I have a little rudimentary knowledge of game theory and I thought this would be a good next step, but after two chapters I decided I need to solidify my foundation. I'd like to get back to it but I need to spend more time on introductory game theory first.

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is absolutely incredible.

[Tom Schulte · Rating 4 out of 5]

The classic work on game theory - well worth reading.