The Logic of Scientific Discovery Quotes

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The Logic of Scientific Discovery The Logic of Scientific Discovery by Karl Popper
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The Logic of Scientific Discovery Quotes Showing 1-13 of 13
“For myself, I am interested in science and in philosophy only because I want to learn something about the riddle of the world in which we live, and the riddle of man's knowledge of that world. And I believe that only a revival of interest in these riddles can save the sciences and philosophy from an obscurantist faith in the expert's special skill and in his personal knowledge and authority.”
Karl Raimund Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“In so far as a scientific statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable: and in so far as it is not falsifiable, it does not speak about reality.”
Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“The point is that, whenever we propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it. Few of us, unfortunately, practice this precept; but other people, fortunately, will supply the criticism for us if we fail to supply it ourselves.”
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“With the idol of certainty (including that of degrees of imperfect certainty or probability) there falls one of the defences of obscurantism which bar the way of scientific advance. For the worship of this idol hampers not only the boldness of our questions, but also the rigour and the integrity of our tests. The wrong view of science betrays itself in the craving to be right; for it is not his possession of knowledge, of irrefutable truth, that makes the man of science, but his persistent and recklessly critical quest for truth.”
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“Every test of a theory, whether resulting in its corroboration or falsification, must stop at some basic statement or other which we decide to accept. If we do not come to any decision, and do not accept some basic statement or other, then the test will have led nowhere. But considered from a logical point of view, the situation is never such that it compels us to stop at this particular basic statement rather than at that, or else give up the test altogether. For any basic statement can again in its turn be subjected to tests, using as a touchstone any of the basic statements which can be deduced from it with the help of some theory, either the one under test, or another. This procedure has no natural end.”
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“Again, we cannot search the whole world in order to make sure that nothing exists which the law forbids. Nevertheless, both kinds of strict statements, strictly existential and strictly universal, are in principle empirically decidable, each, however, in one way only: they are unilaterally decidable. Whenever it is found that something exists here or there, a strictly existential statement may thereby be verified, or a universal one falsified.”
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“The belief in causality is metaphysical. It is nothing but a typical metaphysical hypostatization of a well-justified methodological rule- the scientist's decision never to abandon his search for laws. The metaphysical belief in causality seems thus more fertile in its various manifestations than any indeterminist physics metaphysics of the kind advocated by Heisenberg. Indeed, we can see that Heisenberg's comments have had a crippling effect on research. Connections which are not far to seek may easily be overlooked if its continually repeated that the search for any such connections is 'meaningless'.”
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it.4 Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.”
Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“A tudomány nem sziklaalapzaton nyugszik. Elméleteinek merész épülete, mondhatni, mocsárra épül. Olyan, mint egy cölöpökre felhúzott ház. A cölöpöket felülről verik bele a mocsárba, de nem valamilyen "természetes" vagy adott alapzatba, és ha feladjuk kísérleteinket, hogy mélyebb szintet találjunk, ahová cölöpjeinket beverhetnénk, ez nem azért van, mert szilárd talajig jutottunk. Egyszerűen azért állunk meg, mert elég szilárdnak találjuk a cölöpöket ahhoz, hogy megtartsák az épületet, legalábbis egyelőre.”
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“A tapasztalatok motiválhatnak egy döntést, és így egy állítás elfogadását vagy elvetését is, de velük épp úgy nem lehet egy alapállítást igazolni, mint azzal, hogy ököllel rácsapunk az asztalra.”
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“Science can be viewed from various standpoints, not only from that of epistemology; for example, we can look at it as a biological or as a sociological phenomenon. As such it might be described as a tool, or an instrument, comparable perhaps to some of our industrial machinery. Science may be described as a means of production - as the last word in ‘roundabout production.”
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“The point is that, whenever we propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to overthrow out solution, rather than defend it. Few of us, unfortunately, praise this precept; but other people, fortunately, will supply the criticism for us if we fail to supply it ourselves. Yet criticism will be fruitful only if we state our problem as clearly as we can and put our solution in a sufficiently definite form - a form in which it can be critically discussed.”
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
“Those among us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the hazard of refutation do not take part in the scientific game.”
Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery