World Peace discussion

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message 1: by Héctor (last edited Aug 25, 2016 11:50AM) (new)

Héctor I do not hope that the politicians solve the problems of anybody. We must take the bull by the horns and solve our own problems. The world not must nothing us.

In the 60´we fought against Nixon, the politicians and the government, but we failed when not facing us to the corporations. Now we have a country controlled not only by the elect leaders, but also by whom financed them. The next fight is to take the country off the hands to the one more richer percent of the population. We must remove its money from the policy, so that they cannot continue controlling them.

All the optimism that I have comes from knowledge that every day arrives new people at the world and which arrive singing. They arrive making music.

Source: Rolling Stone Argentina, july 2007.

message 2: by Héctor (last edited Aug 25, 2016 11:51AM) (new)

Héctor About the worst Corporations of 2006, to read: "J'Accuse: The 10 Worst Corporations of 2006" by Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman in:

message 3: by Héctor (last edited Aug 25, 2016 12:02PM) (new)

Héctor Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance by Peter A. Gourevitch & James Shinn (Princeton University Press, 2007)

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