A new biography of J. Edgar Hoover has arrived, and in light of my rather sparse understanding of Hoover as well as the history of the FJ Edgar Hoover
A new biography of J. Edgar Hoover has arrived, and in light of my rather sparse understanding of Hoover as well as the history of the FBI I thought it would be a good read, and I was right.
Beverly Gage has given us a thoughtful biography of a giant of American law enforcement. The book is over 700 pages long, but Hoover’s tenure was so long, and his impacts so large, that a multi-volume work could have easily been done. Professor Gage, even with the enormous amount of material to cover, does so in a way that gives us a good view of Hoover’s rise to the pinnacle of power and authority in federal law enforcement. Hoover’s reputation is now in tatters and the book does not shy away from criticism of the subject. In so doing Professor Gage still tries to strike a balance, and I believe that she has found that balance correctly.
John Edgar Hoover started out as a Justice Department functionary that took over and built the then called Bureau of Investigation. Before taking over as Director Hoover got his start as the head of what was called the “radical division” of the Bureau, charged with tracking, arresting and deporting “subversives.” In many ways Hoover never really gave up that function, as he waged a life long battle against any and all groups deemed “subversive.” Hoover’s rise was greatly aided by his proficiency in utilizing the index card system he learned, and developed himself, while working for the Library of Congress. His ability to track information, and people, through this system, made him a superstar.
Hoover has been vilified for much during his nearly half a century tenure as the Director of the FBI. Much of the vilification can be justified, but this book shows us that much of what Hoover did was not only sanctioned, but actively pushed for, by Presidents of the United States. Hoover became adroit at politics, making himself indispensable to Presidents, providing what was considered vital intelligence to them. FDR, with WWII to deal with, used Hoover and the FBI to combat domestic subversion, real and imagined. Hoover was resistant to standard police work until a crime wave of bank robberies by criminals that captured much publicity forced his hand, John Dillinger, Pretty Boy Floyd, Machine Gun Kelly, and others were simply too much for local law enforcement. They traveled across state lines and essentially forced Hoover to take on a role that he had not sought for the FBI. He did take it on successfully and used that effort to further build support and resources for the FBI. His astute political handling of the publicity surrounding this battle created an image of the FBI as serious crime fighters.
The book, as mentioned, covers a lot of ground, and every reader may take a different piece of the story as the most significant. Hoover’s ability to balance different political cross-currents, especially with the many Presidents he served, was fascinating to me. He had some real trouble with Harry Truman, and was really at loggerheads with his boss Robert Kennedy during the Kennedy Administration, but even during those difficult periods Hoover managed to keep his political balance. His political skills were substantial.
Hoover, in the law enforcement area, recognized early that setting the FBI up as a competitor to local law enforcement would bring nothing but problems for him, setting up a potentially potent political roadblock to future growth and funding for the Bureau. Hoover instead moved to make the FBI a resource for local law enforcement, providing services that he built from scratch, including a nationwide fingerprint database as well as creating the FBI crime lab. Hoover’s achievements in these areas were truly monumental, deserving of the credit that Professor Gage gives to him.
Hoover’s lifelong commitment to combatting communism is a big part of the book. This obsession brought Hoover, especially in later years, to make some decisions that were frankly abhorrent. This area of the book is indeed fascinating, showing us Hoover, despite his strong anti-communist bent, keeping Joe McCarthy at arms length. His willingness to work with the House Un-American Activities Committee was done on his terms. He was very adept at avoiding getting the FBI involved directly in matters that he was not comfortable with, even if he hovered in the background.
Hoover’s closest friendships with Presidents would likely be Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. Hoover went way back with Nixon, working with him when he was a Congressman serving on HUAC. They became very close over the years, and Hoover would play a significant, if indirect role, in some of the decisions Nixon made as President that led to his downfall. By the time Nixon became President, in 1969, Hoover was discerning that what had previously been done by the FBI by way of illegal activities (illegal entries, illegal wiretapping and a host of other activities) could no longer be performed without a high risk of detection and legal jeopardy. When young Nixon staffer Tom Huston came up with an inter-agency plan for an intelligence war on the left Hoover, participating in the task force, simply placed roadblock after roadblock in the way. Nixon, understanding that Hoover’s opposition was politically fatal, withdrew the proposal. With Hoover’s refusal to be of assistance after the leak of the Pentagon Papers Nixon decided to act on his own, creating the “Plumbers Unit” working directly from the White House. That decision, driven by Hoover’s unwillingness to engage in the type of activities demanded by Nixon, did indeed eventually bring Nixon down. Hoover’s friendship with LBJ is covered, and for me it showed how LBJ both understood people, and was able to manipulate even those with political skills. When LBJ had Hoover and Tom Dewey issuing a report on racial unrest many were perplexed when the conservative Hoover, through the report, cited “underlying economic and social conditions” as one of the root causes.
“Against all odds, Johnson ‘maneuvered his anticommunist FBI director into issuing a report that endorsed the war on poverty[and] helped blunt the Goldwater challenge,’ one historian noted. Though Hoover had spent forty years insisting that the FBI could not be swayed by political concerns, he turned out to be as susceptible as anyone to Johnson’s masterful blend of praise, coercion, and power.”
Gage, Beverly: “G-Man J. Edgar Hoover and the Making of the American Century.” Pg 600-601
Hoover’s massive infiltration operations against many organizations are highlighted, and his relentless attacks on Martin Luther King are parts of his record that have helped to bring Hoover’s legacy to the low point it is at today. Professor Gage does not give Hoover a pass in these areas. In todays world Hoover would not likely be as much of a darling of the right as he was in his day. His FBI expanded federal power in law enforcement, which would not likely be a popular position today with many conservatives.
Hoover had ambitions that included the FBI acting as the foreign espionage service for the U.S. In fact Hoover had started in this field in Latin America, and politically opposed the creation of the CIA. While not covered greatly it was one of the few bureaucratic battles that Hoover lost. (Harry Truman saw it differently)
Professor Gage has written what many are calling the definitive biography of the most important American law enforcement figure of the 20th century. I would have to agree. This book is highly recommended. ...more
One of the most important books of 2022, and most certainly one of the best. Author Chris Miller has produced a history of the semiconductor industry One of the most important books of 2022, and most certainly one of the best. Author Chris Miller has produced a history of the semiconductor industry that brings us to the present, and helps to frame some of the most critical national security issues facing the U.S. (and China) in a crisp, readable book.
The development of the semiconductor industry occurred in the United States, with some true giants of business with loads of brainpower leading a wave of technological innovation that changed the world. How that industry has developed over the years, and most importantly, where it is today is the journey the author takes us on. How has so much of the actual production of chips been moved away from the U.S. to Korea and Taiwan? This book provides that roadmap.
The story of the early development of the industry was fascinating. Those business and technology giants include Gordon Moore, Andy Grove, Bob Joyce, William Shockley (later infamous for his racial theories) and maybe most importantly Morris Chang. The companies developed? Fairchild Semiconductor, Intel, Texas Instruments, Sony, Samsung, and maybe most importantly the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. That early development was seeded, in part, by the U.S. military, who came to understand from their Vietnam experience, that “dumb” bombs frequently missed their target. (See the failure of bombing interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail) As the military started to seek “smart weapons” they started funding some of the research that brought us chip technology. As part of this development Gordon Moore, a true visionary, ultimately came to theorize that the number of components that could fit on a silicon chip would double every year. (Eventually he modified this, in 1975, to a doubling every two years) This theory became known as “Moore’s Law” and has driven chip development ever since, and in its way has brought us to the manufacturing conundrum facing the U.S. today.
With the U.S. military having some success in creating precision guided munitions the Soviet Union saw the potential and understood that it needed to get into the technology race. But they were hopelessly behind, and Soviet Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov knew it.
“By traditional metrics like numbers of tanks or troops, the Soviet Union had a clear advantage in the 1980’s. Ogarkov saw things differently: quality was overtaking quantity. He was fixated on the threat posed by America’s precision weapons. Combined with better surveillance and communication tools, the ability to strike targets accurately hundreds or even thousands of miles away was producing a ‘military-technical revolution,’ Ogarkov argued to anyone who’d listen. The days of vacuum tune-guided Sparrow missiles missing 90 percent of their targets in the skies over Vietnam were long gone. The Soviet Union had many more tanks than the United States, but Ogarkov realized his tanks would soon be many times more vulnerable in a fight with the U.S.”
Chip War by Chris Miller pg. 146
The Soviets deployed the usual tactics, looking to simply “copy” U.S. chip technology through industrial espionage. The Soviets, like many to come, simply tripped over Moore’s Law. As they stole and created chip technology the U.S. was moving to newer, better technology. Loading ever more transistors onto silicon in accordance with the forecast by Gordon Moore the U.S. simply outran the Soviets. Marshall Ogarkov’s fears were confirmed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a Soviet military client. Some Soviet experts expected a longer drawn out war, but U.S. weapons systems made short work of the Iraqi defenses.
“‘It is the triumph of silicon over steel’ declared a New York Times headline. ‘War Hero Status Possible for the Computer Chip,’ read another.”
Chip War by Chris Miller pg. 154
The overwhelming superiority of U.S. technology made Soviet conventional advantage much less intimidating, creating a dynamic that required ever escalating investment by the Soviets to keep (catch) up. They simply could not do so.
While military applications were a major factor in the start of the U.S. semiconductor industry the companies at the forefront of that development realized that civilian use was the future. Carver Mead, a Caltech professor, was prescient in 1972.
“‘In the next ten years,’ Mead predicted in 1972, ‘every facet of our society will be automated to some degree.’ He envisioned a ‘tiny computer deep down inside of our telephone, or our washing machine, or our car,’ as these silicon chips became pervasive and inexpensive.”
Chip War by Chris Miller pg. 71
The mass market drove the economics, and with that market developing the major companies moved from military to civilian use, seeing the ability to generate huge revenues.
Miller gives us a very understandable view of the development of the industry, with a critically important view of how chip manufacturing developed, and why “fabs” are located where they are. This brings us to the present day, and the challenges facing the two superpowers as they compete for semiconductor supremacy. This history shows us some tremendous innovation in the U.S. along with some major missteps that drove some key manufacturing out of the U.S. Former Texas Instruments executive Morris Chang had the idea to fabricate chips based on the design of others. That key idea was rejected by key folks in the U.S. industry, with even Gordon Moore telling Chang that:
“Morris, you’ve had a lot of good ideas in your time. … This isn’t one of them.”
Chip War by Chris Miller pg. 167
The government of Taiwan, looking to create a chip industry, brought Morris Chang in to help create that industry. Chang has succeeded beyond any reasonable expectations at the time of his creation of TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) in Taiwan, and the idea of separating chip design from chip manufacturing took off, making TSMC a chip giant, and creating a worldwide system of chip supply that exists today. That system brings us to the main battle lines between China and the U.S. today, which is where the real value of this book comes in.
Morris Chang’s idea of separating chip design from chip manufacturing enabled TSMC to begin manufacturing chips for many companies. For some, like myself, not familiar with the how and why of chip manufacturing, adopting an industrial policy in the U.S. that drove such manufacturing back to the U.S. should be an achievable goal for the government. This book shows us why simple solutions are not so simple.
Chang’s concept, and the eventual dominant role for TSMC in chip manufacturing, started with Chang’s insight, but has really been driven by massive government support and the complexity of chip manufacturing. Moore’s law, and how that has made chip manufacturing ever more expensive and complex, has made the creation of “chip fabs” ever more difficult due to that expense. Reliance on TSMC became natural, and has led to a real dominance for that company in creating chips designed by others, including Apple. Miller gives us a view of that complexity through the difficulty of lithography necessary for chip manufacturing.
With Taiwan dominating chip manufacturing, and with China facing the same issues of cost and complexity as the U.S. in trying to create chip manufacturing onshore, the competition between the countries is heating up. The Chinese saber-rattling on Taiwan is not simply a territorial issue, but one with significant geopolitical and economic ramifications for the world. Those issues are explored expertly by Chris Miller in this book, and constitute possibly the greatest national security issue facing the United States. The chip shortage recently experienced by the U.S. is a small indication of how impactful on our economy these advanced chips are. A couple of important facts. China imported, by dollar volume, more chips than oil in 2020. TSMC has over 50% share of the worldwide chip market.
When President Biden indicated that the U.S. would militarily intervene in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, although walked back, we got to understand the importance of Taiwan to the U.S. and the world economy.
What is the future? This book gives a look at what has become the major national security issue of our day. As China becomes more aggressive in the neighborhood the changes are profound, including accelerated military spending by Japan. If you read one book this year this should be high on the list. ...more
Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has written a book on the relationship between the U.S. and China, and the potential for that relationshipFormer Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has written a book on the relationship between the U.S. and China, and the potential for that relationship to rupture so badly that war is the result. It is an important book that brings some great insight to the diplomatic relationship so critical to the world in the years to come.
Rudd is not just a former Australian Prime Minister. He has a long history of interaction with top Chinese officials in his various governmental roles, speaks fluent Mandarin, and continues to be a key figure through his presidency of the Asia Society Political Institute. This book is reflective of that knowledge, and brings his ideas on the best way forward for both countries. The book importantly brings his ideas on what the Chinese perspective is, with the advantage of having spoken directly with Xi on many occasions, and before Xi ascended to his current position.
I would not describe the book as a text, but it is a policy book that looks at specifics, and on that basis is not for everyone. But I believe it is important to actually examine what policy goals are driving Chinese actions, and what might be prudent U.S. responses.
Rudd does not look at the CCP as some have in the past, seeing hope for adoption of western style democracy. The error made by those who held such views, confusing a drive towards economic modernization with a move to political pluralism in China, is laid to rest fairly quickly. The misunderstanding of Deng Xiaoping and his sweeping economic reforms is explained:
“While not an orthodox Marxist, Deng remained a fully committed Leninist. Unsurprisingly, he was determined not to cede the party’s political powerful the sake of American economic engagement or common strategic endeavor against the Soviet Union. Even as he began his his reform and opening campaign in 1979, he vowed from the outset adherence to the Four Cardinal Principles and that China would forever ‘uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat’ and ‘the leadership of the Communist Party.’ In Deng’s words, while it was important for China to ‘open the windows wide to breathe the fresh air,’ the party’s responsibility was to continue to ‘swat away the flies and insects that came with it.’”
Rudd, Kevin “The Avoidable War” pg 35
Rudd’s book does not sugarcoat Chinese views. He gives us his view of Chinese priorities (Xi priorities) as ten concentric circles that he believes are core Chinese principles. His listing, and explanations, take up a large section of the book. It is an interesting approach, and covers some critical areas of the U.S.-China relationship, including “the view from Washington” on these China goals and principles.
Rudd ends up advocating what he calls “managed strategic competition” between the U.S. and China, with the goal of containing misunderstandings or miscalculations that could lead to the outbreak of war. Rudd’s view is that such a competition would importantly contain guardrails that would manage the relationship in a way that would allow for each nation to pursue its national interests within an agreed upon space that would prevent the outbreak of catastrophe.
Rudd’s prescriptions most certainly sound reasonable, and he challenges critics to offer alternatives. I do believe that his ideas on “managed strategic competition” are sound, and the idea of managing strategic competition without war have precedent in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Of course such a “managed relationship” requires both parties to be willing to do the diplomatic heavy work required to achieve that sort of consensus. It also requires that some issues that are fairly intractable, like Taiwan, be put off, effectively kicking the can down the road. From the U.S. perspective I am quite sure that such a short term forestalling of the Taiwan issue would be quite satisfactory. I am not so sure it would be satisfactory to China. Since the Shanghai Communique both sides have finessed the issue of Taiwan, but the entire point of the newly ambitious program of Xi is to do away with some of the finesse. The principle of Chines foreign policy put forward by Deng, “hide your strength, bide your time” has effectively been replaced by a much more assertive posture undertaken by XI. Relative to Taiwan Rudd believes the issue can still be dealt with diplomatically, but he candidly deals with the military situation in the event of Chinese military action.
…”What it would require is for the United States to restore the wider military balance of power with China across the East Asian theater by redressing gaps and vulnerabilities in its current force structure and capabilities. It would also require the Taiwanese to take seriously their military deficiencies, which have accumulated over several decades and which neither side of Taiwanese politics has so far demonstrated sufficient determination to resolve.”
Rudd, Kevin “The Avoidable War” pg 379-380
He talks, in this context, of joint economic action by the U.S., Taiwan and Japan to fortify Taiwan economically in the event of a Chinese economic blockade of the island. It is also necessary, in my view, that Japanese military spending be increased dramatically to meet the challenges posed by China in the neighborhood. Current war-gaming has not shown good results for the U.S. military in a showdown over Taiwan, and those “gaps and vulnerabilities’ referenced diplomatically by Rudd need to be addressed if a military showdown were to be successfully prosecuted by the U.S.
Rudd homes in on the technological war between the countries, and the so vital access to chip technology driving the world economy today. It is a vital part of this strategic competition, especially with Taiwan being such a vital cog in that supply chain. A transfer of Taiwan today to Chinese control would have major, and very negative ramifications for the U.S. in that area.
It is not a unipolar world any longer. Understanding the other side of the key strategic relationship facing the U.S. today is vital if we are to get to solutions and policies that serve the nation’s interests while preventing war. Kevin Rudd has given us a book that will help to promote that necessary understanding. Even if you do not agree with all of his policy ideas the book brings the conversation where it needs to go. ...more
I had this book on my list for a bit, and a Kindle deal got me to finally sit down with it. I am glad that I did.
I have done a lot of reading on WorlI had this book on my list for a bit, and a Kindle deal got me to finally sit down with it. I am glad that I did.
I have done a lot of reading on World War II, but I suspect that I am likely in the larger (American) group that concentrated on the European theatre. I just did not have an understanding of the war in the Pacific, especially the naval war. This book, the first of a trilogy, concentrates on the naval war between the Japanese Empire and the United States. It does not pay much attention to land, but despite that manages to stick in a few shots at Douglas MacArthur. But I digress. This first book covers the period from Pearl Harbor to Midway.
Why do I rate the book so highly? Toll does not just jump into battle but rather gives us a real good overview of the political situation well before FDR even assumed office. This overview provides a short primer on some of the underlying tensions between the U.S. and Japan going back to the presidency of Teddy Roosevelt. We get a great look at how influential Teddy was on the U.S. Navy, and how when FDR was appointed as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy by Woodrow Wilson TR sent him some “unsolicited advice.”
"In May 1913, TR wrote to congratulate the younger man on his appointment, and also to offer unsolicited guidance. Never permit the fleet to be divided between the Pacific and the Atlantic, he warned, and added: “I do not anticipate trouble with Japan, but it may come, and if it does it will come suddenly.”
Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942 (Vol. 1) (The Pacific War Trilogy) . W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
The book “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History” by Alfred Mahan is highlighted as a bible for naval strategists, read by all, including FDR. Toll comes back to it continually.
One of the strengths of the book, in my view, is the great look at the Japanese perspective that Toll brings. I was not at all acquainted with Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, but Toll brings us a some great insight here. The Admiral, despite being the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, was a war opponent before the fighting started. Yamamoto was opposed to the treaty of alliance with Germany and Italy, and correctly sized up Japanese prospects before the war started.
"… Yamamoto told Nagano bluntly that the pending war would be a catastrophe. He saw the entire picture clearly, and laid it out with devastating clarity. “It is obvious that a Japanese-American war will become a protracted one,” he said: As long as tides of war are in our favor, the United States will never stop fighting. As a consequence, the war will continue for several years, during which materiel will be exhausted, vessels and arms will be damaged, and they can be replaced only with great difficulties. Ultimately we will not be able to contend with [the United States]. As the result of war the people’s livelihood will become indigent . . . and it is not hard to imagine [that] the situation will become out of control. We must not start a war with so little a chance of success."
Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942 (Vol. 1) (The Pacific War Trilogy) (p. 118-119). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
Before Toll gets to the fighting, in addition to the look at some of the naval figures of Japan, he gives us a great look at the true dysfunction within the government of Japan. Yes, it came to be dominated by the militarists, but Yamamoto was not the only one to discern the calamitous course Japan was on.
"Vice Admiral Yorio Sawamoto reflected on the reasons why the navy allowed itself to be pressured into a war that it was not really prepared to fight. The reasons had to do with “a competition of mediocrities; there was no outstanding leader of outstanding ability. Pressure from subordinates was the order of the day. Younger officers would not respect their seniors and this made the matter even more difficult. . . . Everybody wanted to evade responsibility and no one had the grit to sacrifice himself to do his duty . . . The atmosphere was such that it put a premium on parochial and selfish concerns for either the army or the navy; considerations of the nation and the world were secondary.”
Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942 (Vol. 1) (The Pacific War Trilogy) (pp. 116-117). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
A competition of “mediocrities” driving the Japanese public with propaganda ended up overwhelming common sense in Japan.
Toll also gives us a great view of the American naval group. Nimitz and Halsey are there, as well as someone who does not get a lot of historical coverage, Admiral Raymond Spruance, who played a major role, replacing an ailing Halsey before the Battle of Midway. The role of the code-breakers, and the horrible treatment afforded to Captain Joseph Rochefort by the Navy, is also a big part of this story. Rochefort and his team provided key intel by breaking the Japanese naval code, giving Nimitz a look at the Japanese battle plan before the assault on Midway was launched. His reward was eventual banishment to nondescript positions in the Navy, as he had proven his critics, who were mediocrities with strong political strength, wrong.
The book goes into some of the military hardware, but in terms that laymen can understand. We see the initial shock on the American side as they come to understand the superior hardware, and skill set, of the Japanese Navy. American ideas of a quick sweep to victory after an initial mobilization were put to rest fairly quickly, as the Japanese rolled to one victory after another in the initial stages of the war. Japanese Admiral Yamamoto had foreseen early success for the Japanese, but as prior discussed felt that the industrial might of the United States would eventually overcome Japan. The only hope for Japan, by Yamamoto’s way of thinking, was to leverage that early success into a diplomatic solution that would entail Japan giving back some of its early war gains, as they had in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.
"That Japan had scored so many easy victories in the war’s early stages came as no surprise to Yamamoto. In a typical passage in one of his prewar letters, the C-in-C had predicted: “For a while we’ll have everything our own way, stretching out in every direction like an octopus spreading its tentacles. But it’ll last for a year and a half at the most.” The war could only end with an armistice, followed by negotiations and concessions. The fall of Singapore, an event he had expected to occur about six months into the war, would present the ideal moment to open truce talks. Britain, he believed, would cut a deal to keep India, a colony it would hate to lose as much as an “old man” would hate “being deprived of his foot warmer.” The United States would also have to be appeased, probably through a restoration of conquered territories. Perhaps the Western powers would acknowledge Japan’s preeminence in China, as they had once acknowledged Japan’s preeminence in Korea. Fight, conquer, bargain, concede—Yamamoto had repeatedly urged that formula upon the Tojo-led cabinet, but his ideas had been ignored."
Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942 (Vol. 1) (The Pacific War Trilogy) (pp. 273-274). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
Toll is not afraid to get at some military controversies that are still discussed today (the failure of the Japanese to win a more complete victory at Pearl Harbor, the decision by the Americans not to pursue what remained of the Japanese fleet after Midway)and in so doing gives a balanced treatment to all points of view. The change in naval doctrine that finally recognized the primacy of aircraft carriers is covered, with some relevance for today.
Toll lightly covers some of the WWII “what ifs” relative to Japanese decisions on where to strike militarily. The most obvious one was the Japanese decision not to attack Soviet Russia, which allowed Stalin to send troops west to stem the German attack. The military cohesion between Japan and Germany was simply not there, especially when compared with the British-American effort, which involved joint commands and a high level of strategic planning. The pressure on FDR on the “Europe first” strategy was immense, and maybe only he could have balanced it out. A loss at Midway by the U.S. may have made that balancing untenable, forcing additional U.S. resources into the Pacific. Good fortune for the U.S. and FDR, and very bad fortune for Germany and Hitler.
Despite some of the technical coverage I found Toll’s writing to be outstanding. We all know the results but this book, in my view, became a page turner. I read it quickly because it was so fascinating, especially for one without a lot of prior naval or Pacific war reading. Great writing, great history. Highly recommended! ...more
Another book on Lincoln? There has been so much written on the life of Abraham Lincoln that I was a bit skeptical about a new book, but with Jon MeachAnother book on Lincoln? There has been so much written on the life of Abraham Lincoln that I was a bit skeptical about a new book, but with Jon Meacham writing I had to invest the time to find out for myself. I am glad I did.
Meacham has taken a different road to examining Lincoln. There is biographical material, but that is not the point of the effort. Meacham wants to understand Lincoln, not just as a political person, but as a moral one. Meacham takes on some of the Lincoln criticism, and his evolution as a politician, and as a man. The acknowledgement of Lincoln as “flawed” is stipulated to up front. But those flaws, including the “colonization” idea, and some references in early speeches on race that do not comport with Lincoln’s reputation, are part of his evolution. In that sense Meacham focuses heavily on the religious evolution of Lincoln, and the book is heavy on religious influences of the day, especially the ones that impacted Lincoln.
Meacham does not avoid the practical, political part of the Lincoln persona. He acknowledges that Lincoln was constrained from advocacy of what may have been his true goal, emancipation, from day one by the underlying racism that existed at that time. Meacham gives us a fine evaluation of the “reformer” vs the “politician” put forward by Wendell Phillips:
“The reformer is careless of numbers, disregards popularity, and deals only with ideas, conscience, and common sense. Wendell Phillips remarked. He feels, with Copernicus, that as God waited long for an interpreter, so he can wait for his followers. He neither expects nor is overanxious for immediate success. The politician dwells in an everlasting NOW. His motto is ‘Success-his aim, votes.’ His object is not absolute right, but… as much right as the people will sanction. His office is not to instruct public opinion, but to represent it.”
Meacham, Jon. And There Was Light Abraham Lincoln and the American Struggle. Pg 321-322
Lincoln, while representing public opinion, but nudging it towards his views, was just too slow for many in the Republican Party. Talk of dumping Lincoln for re-election in 1864 did not materialize, but pointed to the enormous pressure that Lincoln felt, from both ends of the political spectrum. I was amused by the observation from Jesse Fell on Lincoln’s “speed” in getting to the right position.
“While Lincoln ‘Don’t go forward as fast as some of us like, he never goes backward.’”
Meacham, Jon. “And There Was Light Abraham Lincoln and the American Struggle. “Pg 321
That was not a flip comment, as Lincoln faced enormous pressure to modify some of his actions, including the Emancipation Proclamation, as well as the ultimate war objectives. But as Meacham points out repeatedly once Lincoln staked out a position he simply could not be moved, even where the perception existed that these positions were politically problematic. To Meacham this is evidence of Lincoln’s growth on the moral side. Yes, Lincoln was an astute politician, but not everything he did was driven by political considerations.
Meacham does not always have to connect the dots on lessons that may be derived for today. He tells us of some of the charges lobbed by the pro-slavery forces at those who favored abolition.
“‘The parties in this conflict are not merely abolitionists and slaveholders- they are atheists, socialists, communists…on the one side, and friends of order and regulated freedom on the other,’ the Presbyterian clergyman James Henley Thornwell, a defender of slavery from South Carolina, said in a representative sermon.”
Meacham, Jon. “And There Was Light Abraham Lincoln and the American Struggle.” Pg 180
The playbook is indeed very old.
In the epilogue Meacham quotes abolitionist Elizabeth Cody Stanton, who had opposed Lincoln’s re-election in 1864, on Lincoln:
“I see now the wisdom of his course, leading public opinion slowly but surely up to the final blow for freedom.”
Meacham, Jon. “And There Was Light Abraham Lincoln and the American Struggle.” Pg 419
Lincoln was indeed “flawed” but his actions, and the results of those actions, not only saved the Union, but destroyed the institution of slavery.
Meacham sums it up beautifully:
“In life, Lincoln’s motives were moral as well as political- a reminder that our finest presidents are those committed to bringing a flawed nation closer to the light, a mission that requires an understanding that politics divorced from conscience is fatal to the American experiment in liberty under law. In years of peril he pointed the country toward a future that was superior to the past and to the present; in years of strife he held steady. Lincoln’s life shows us that progress can be made by fallible and fallen presidents and peoples- which in a fallible and fallen world, should give us hope.”
Meacham, Jon. “And There Was Light Abraham Lincoln and the American Struggle.” Pg 420
I am a Meacham fan so I have a bias towards his work, but I do believe that this new work does bring a perspective on Lincoln that is worthwhile, and definitely worth a read. ...more
Another book nominally on Trump, but with a totally different angle. I was drawn in by the author, Mark Leibovich, who is, for me, a great writer thatAnother book nominally on Trump, but with a totally different angle. I was drawn in by the author, Mark Leibovich, who is, for me, a great writer that manages to find some of the absurd with a writing style that is entertaining, informative, and humorous. I have read his book, “This Town” which was a terrific book about Washington D.C. which shredded the political class. He provides the same type of shredding to the folks in prominent positions in the GOP who have fallen into line behind Donald Trump despite their rather obvious distaste for him and his politics.
After reading this book I am at a loss as to how he got Lindsey Graham, and many others, on the record with him. Leibovich shows us the contortions that so many of them have engaged in to deflect, deny, and justify, sometimes all in the same conversation, the fealty to Donald Trump. He does so in a way that brought me a bunch of snickers, but whether it was sarcasm or simply making light of the absurd Leibovich manages to get his point across. He has some real fun with the ill-fated first Press Secretary to President Trump, Sean Spicer:
“Whenever Spicer was asked about his willingness to defend Trump, he was ready with some variation on this pat answer. Problematic clients are an occupational hazard in his business. “There are doctors who help people who have done bad things,” he told The Washington Post’s Ben Terris. “There are lawyers who defend bad people,” he added. “I don’t think it’s unique to my profession.” Spicer had a knack for these explanations, which he would deliver with racing self-assurance. Then, when you caught up to his words, you realized Spicer was comparing his patron to a “bad person” who did “bad things.” His rationale, essentially, was that even Jeffrey Dahmer was entitled to representation.”
Leibovich, Mark. Thank You for Your Servitude (pp. 69-70). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
Leibovich managed to speak with Spicer after the fiasco of a briefing on the crowd size of the Trump inaugural. Some great stuff:
“Spicer used to “get the joke,” in a relatively benign way. Now he appeared convinced that many of his old Washington friends and colleagues had written him off as a joke himself, given how he’d beclowned himself on Donald Trump’s behalf. Spicer’s default bearing was now cringe-inducing defensiveness. He gave the impression of someone whose fight-or-flight response had been permanently activated. I asked Spicer about his “largest audience to ever witness an inauguration—period” debut. In retrospect, this maybe was not the best icebreaker. “I’m not here to relitigate every fucking number,” he said, and then launched into a lengthy relitigation. Spicer’s assistant stepped into his office to remind him that he had a TV interview with Fox in a few minutes. Spicer walked over to a small desk in the corner and started rubbing foundation onto his face. I made a verbal note of this into my tape recorder—that Spicer was putting on makeup. “Don’t you dare!” Spicer said. “Just so we’re clear.” “Clear about what?” I asked. Spicer demanded to know whether I planned to report that he was applying makeup to himself. “Well, you are putting on makeup, aren’t you?” I said. I assured Spicer that this would not exactly be a Watergate-level revelation on my part. (ALL THE PRESIDENT’S YES-MEN—AND THEIR MASCARA!) Spicer seemed concerned that if I disclosed that he was wearing makeup, it could further emasculate him in the eyes of the president. I mentioned—by way of more reassurance—that Trump himself probably wore more makeup than Tammy Faye Bakker. But Spicer had lost interest in the argument. He patted his cheeks a few more times with a makeup puff and was out the door.”
Leibovich, Mark. Thank You for Your Servitude (p. 75-76). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
Of course Leibovich tackles the silent walks of GOP Senators and Reps through the building walkways as they are being accosted by a press gaggle yelling for comment about the latest outrage.
“For more sober-styled Republicans, the most foolproof approach to Trump-proofing was to simply walk through the Capitol as if protected by a selectively permeable bubble, filtering out certain unwelcome words (for example, “Trump”).”
Leibovich, Mark. Thank You for Your Servitude (p. 106). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. Leibovich had great access to Senator John McCain and his sidekick Lindsey Graham, and he has some pretty cutting pieces on McCain’s disgust with Graham’s slide into sycophancy.
“What McCain objected to most in his final months was the theatrical degree to which Graham was willing to submit to Trump. “Do you really have to keep saying how great of a fucking golfer he is?” McCain would ask Graham. Graham was becoming an object of ridicule, McCain told him.”
Leibovich, Mark. Thank You for Your Servitude (p. 127). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The book has many examples such as this, and pays some close attention to Graham. Although the author gets us to smile there is nothing to celebrate here. He has focused on the folks that he believes know better, but have allowed themselves to become enablers under the guise of maintaining “relevancy” as well as a desire to maintain their elected positions. As I mentioned about “This Town” Leibovich’s writing brings to mind some of the better political writing of Hunter S. Thompson. I know the market is a bit saturated with books looking at the Trump effect, but this one is worth a look....more
The new book by Henry Kissinger looks at six historical figures and the leadership skills that they brought to bear on the rather monumental problems The new book by Henry Kissinger looks at six historical figures and the leadership skills that they brought to bear on the rather monumental problems they faced in the post World War II era. I took a look at some of the reviews before I bought the book and will need to dispense with some of the issues raised in those reviews, as they are a constant when dealing with all things Kissinger.
We always will get a substantial group of reviewers that indicate that the book was terrible because it includes some self serving revisionism by Kissinger, and that in any case he is a war criminal etc, etc. Relying on the review of someone describing Kissinger in those terms will not bring a potential reader a fair estimation of the book. I discard those reviews despite having some real disagreements with Kissinger/Nixon policies in Indochina, and with some of his actions as National Security advisor and Secretary of State to President Nixon. Disagreements do not take away from Kissinger’s underlying brilliance, and have nothing to do with books by Kissinger, or about him.
This book looks at six leaders from the Post World War II era, with Kissinger describing a specific type of leadership trait in each that he believes produced groundbreaking results for the countries they led. His observations, in my view, are insightful, and bring some important concepts on leadership forward that have practical meaning for current and future leaders.
Kissinger has highlighted the career and leadership traits of:
Konrad Adenauer (The Strategy of Humility) Charles DeGaulle (The Strategy of Will) Richard Nixon (Strategy of Equilibrium) Anwar Sadat (Strategy of Transcendence) Lee Kuan Yew (Strategy of Excellence) Margaret Thatcher (Strategy of Conviction)
Kissinger knew, and in some fashion worked with, each of these individuals. In reviewing the book Admiral James Stavridis said:
“This is an extraordinary book, one that braids together two through lines in the long and distinguished career of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The first is grand strategy: No practical geopolitical thinker has more assuredly mastered the way the modern global system works or how nations use the tools of statecraft to bend an often-resistant world to their will. But Mr. Kissinger is also an astute observer of the personal element in strategy—the art and science of leadership, or how, on the executive level, “decisions [are] made, trust earned, promises kept, a way forward proposed.” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2022 “Follow the Leaders” James Stavridis
To me that snippet from the review gives us a great overview of what this book is about. Different problems, and differing approaches to problem-solving unique to these leaders and the specific time in history that thrust them into leadership positions. After some biographical information about each Kissinger gives us a great view on how each of these leaders contributed in areas that required extraordinary skills to navigate, and the leadership qualities that helped them to succeed. Kissinger does not sugarcoat deficiencies but hyper-criticism is not the point of the book. Kissinger ties it together with a last chapter aptly titled “Conclusions” that brings additional historical insights and observations.
As you read Kissinger you understand his views, and how those views color his analysis. His chapter on Nixon, the strategy of equilibrium, fairly well establishes a core Kissinger value. Equilibrium is a constant theme for Kissinger, more so than the oft-described philosophy of “realism” used to describe him frequently.
Each one of these individuals contributed to the new world order developed after the calamity of World War II. Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the West German government that arose after the war, gave a speech that would give an idea of where he would steer the German people.
“Criticizing Germany’s conduct under Hitler. Adenauer asked an audience of thousands in the severely damaged main hall of the University of Cologne how it was possible that the Nazis had come to power. They had then committed ‘great crimes’, he said, and the Germans could find their way toward a better future only by coming to terms with their past. Such an effort would be necessary for their country’s revival. From this perspective, Germany’s attitude after the Second World War needed to be the opposite of its reaction to the First. Instead of indulging in self-pitying nationalism once again, Germany should seek its future within a unifying Europe. Adenauer was proclaiming a strategy of humility.”
Leadership, Kissinger, Henry p 9
Adenauer, in one of his final conversations with Kissinger, highlighted a true leadership conundrum. Adenauer had, through his leadership, steered post war Germany towards reconciliation and European integration, with special emphasis on repair of the relationship with France. This was not always a consensus view but Adenauer had steered the Federal Republic towards it on a long term basis. This conversation, after Adenauer’s retirement, brought forward the question to Kissinger (in response to Kissinger asking him to evaluate the existing leadership of West Germany) “Are any leaders still able to conduct a genuine long range policy? Is true leadership still possible today?” Leadership, Kissinger, Henry p 42
That question was posed in 1967 and is still a bona fide concern in the democracies today.
Adenauer and Lee Kwan Yew would likely be the least recognizable of the six figures, and in some respects the most significant, in terms of studying effective leaders. Lee Kwan Yew should be required study for all those that aspire to political leadership. His building of the city-state of Singapore is a textbook example of success not being reliant on size. His methodology would not always pass a test of democratic norms, but his strong emphasis on good, corruption free governance, excellence in business and an adherence to the rule of law brought real results. Kissinger cited some pretty impressive statistics.
“An assessment of Lee’s legacy must begin with the extraordinary growth of Singapore’s per capita gross domestic product from $517 in 1965 to $11,900 in 1990 and $60,000 at present (2020.)”
Leadership, Kissinger, Henry p 313
Of course Kissinger is not an economist so we get an examination of Lee from a foreign policy point of view. Kissinger has strong admiration for the balancing act that Lee performed between China, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Kissinger admires Lee’s devotion to “order” and the way he strategically balanced his foreign policy in a multi-polar world. (Equilibrium?) Lee was a truly fascinating leader worthy of more study.
Kissinger, as mentioned, did not dwell on the negative, but managed to provide balance, with an occasional wry observation that makes a point with a bit of humor. In speaking of a dispute between Charles de Gaulle and Marshall Petain over literary credit on a post World War I book, Kissinger observed:
“The capacity for gratitude not being among de Gaulle’s most highly developed traits….”
Leadership, Kissinger, Henry p 58
Kissinger’s relationship with Sadat may be one of the most important, in a sense of real accomplishment, by both men. Kissinger acknowledges a truth that was highlighted in Martin Indyk’s book “Master of the Game,” which was that he initially dismissed Sadat, not considering him to be a first rate leader, anticipating that he would be a short termer. That misjudgment was a contributing factor in the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war launched by Sadat and Hafez al-Assad against Israel. Kissinger does manage to stick in a very indirect criticism of a piece of the Jimmy Carter Middle East policy, due to the inclusion of the Soviets, but concedes that Sadat took that policy and in leapfrogging it ended up in Jerusalem.
The chapters on the Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher and Richard Nixon will of course bring some criticism but are worthy and well done. I did not fully agree with the characterization of the Thatcher policy on Northern Ireland but that did not detract from my understanding and appreciating the larger points made. As always with Nixon Kissinger does not hesitate to acknowledge the flaws but highlights some of the major accomplishments of the Nixon Administration on foreign policy. Self interested? Maybe a bit, but the Nixon Presidency is worthy of plenty of discussion, and has some impacts that are still with us today.
In the Admiral Stavridis review he regrets that Kissinger did not make the book longer by including some other figures such as Deng of China and Bismarck. I agree, but would also include Zhou Enlai, who Kissinger has described as one of the most impressive men he has ever met. Even at his age he is still producing impressive works of literature that impart valuable insights. You do not have to agree with everything Kissinger believes to glean value from those insights. Highly recommended....more
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