Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing

by Peter Robison

Boeing had no competing aircraft. In the mind of its president, Allen, this was not necessarily a bad thing. The Douglas model was designed to take about eighty people around five hundred miles. The carriers who flew those routes were generally small and struggling—not exactly profitable customers. One internal study in 1965 estimated that Boeing could lose $150 million (equivalent to $1.25 billion in 2020) if its own competing entry into the market didn’t sell. But some on Allen’s board hated the idea of ceding any ground to Douglas. They argued it would be fine to build a loss leader—an entry-level model that small airlines could start with before moving up to bigger Boeing jets. It was the General Motors strategy: Sell young buyers a Chevrolet before they could afford a Cadillac. Reluctantly, Allen decided to design a new plane. — And so the 737 was born—quick and dirty. Most of Boeing’s engineering resources were going into the massive 747, not to mention the hugely ambitious project for a supersonic transport. The company’s first successful sales meeting, with Germany’s Lufthansa in 1965, didn’t have an auspicious start. Boeing had shipped to Cologne a hardwood box with massive hinges and a Yale lock, containing charts and diagrams about the plane’s performance, for the airline’s board to examine. It had neglected to include a key. The airline’s chief executive had to pry the box open with a hammer and a screwdriver. Two years behind the DC-9 in the race to put out a ...