Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing

by Peter Robison

Conversations that used to take place at the specialist level became tense negotiations with higher-ranking executives in the Boeing regulatory unit. Steve Foss, a former FAA test pilot, watched as Boeing executives buttonholed his supervisors in parking lots after meetings. “It was push, push, push, shove, shove, shove, to get the airplane into the customer’s hands,” he said. When the specialists raised technical issues, they’d be told to stand down—often by Bahrami, the official in Seattle most responsible for ensuring the safety of Boeing airplanes. One senior manager who disagreed with the new approach remembers Bahrami frequently assuring staffers they should trust Boeing. “They know the systems, they know the rules,” Bahrami would say. After this person raised his concerns privately, Bahrami gave the impression the manager’s career depended on going along: “I’m trying to help you,” Bahrami said. The fragmentation of responsibilities left Ken Schroer, the FAA program manager who’d had such a warm feeling about collaboration with Boeing on the 777, struggling to get clear answers; it was often difficult to tell who was telling who what. He retired in part because of his frustration.