Formosa Betrayed

by George H. Kerr

In their view the law was a nuisance, and it came as a distinct surprise that “degraded Formosans” dared to expose them in the press and attempted ceaselessly to bring charges into the Courts.

This involved a painful loss of face.

Circumstances compelled Chen Yi to appoint qualified Formosans as district and local judges and procurators. The majority were bilingual, having studied literary Chinese while passing through the higher schools, and having taken law degrees at the Japanese universities.

They enjoyed the confidence of the Formosan layman, and they kept me well informed of many incidents affecting Formosan interests under the new dispensation.

Standing against them were Chen Yi’s civil police force, brought in from the mainland.

The authorized pay was of much less interest than the prospect of bribes and perquisites.

Soon after he took office and assumed control of the police organization it became evident that Huang’s officers were collaborating with the underworld gangsters known locally as loma or “tiger eels.”

Day after day the Formosan press recorded incidents involving the police as irresponsible incompetents, law-breakers, or racketeers.

In the view of Chen Yi’s Public Health Director, Dr. King, one does not waste a saleable commodity on prisoners.

Abuses of the “scavenger period” in late 1945 were felt most keenly in and near the ports and the larger towns, where the ill-disciplined Nationalist Army conscripts wandered about, but abuses of the regular police system were felt in every town and village across the island.

Obviously the solution lay in an elective system whereby the public could choose the governor, the mayors, and the magistrates.

They neatly entangled leading Formosans for a month or two just as the Japanese left their posts, thus giving mainland Chinese an opportunity to fill them.

No references were made to the fact that for ten years Formosan voters had been going to the polls and candidates had become thoroughly familiar with all the necessary campaign business of posters, public addresses, and the shepherding of votes.

It was true that before 1945 the end-product was a very limited voice in district assemblies in which half the members had been nominated by the Japanese administration.

But for this very reason the Formosans now looked forward eagerly to truly represen...

Thoughtful Formosans promptly objected to the oath which required them to swear allegiance to the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang, in these words:

If it were rejected, there was no appeal.

The difficulties here were two; the governor’s man was usually a Kuomintang member and approval often had a price tag attached to it.

The next hurdles were the Civil Service...

the public felt that Lim Hsien-tang, the Home Rule leader now sixty years of age, should have enjoyed the first Chairmanship after his lifelong fight to establish such an Island Assembly.

According to subsequent press accounts, he asserted that Formosans “have thoughts of independence; they are slave-converts [of the Japanese], they are discriminating against people of other provinces, and they are indifferent to public affairs.” He then branded all Formosans as “backward people, unfit to be considered true Chinese.”

These May meetings provided the first real opportunity for Formosan leaders to emerge in a quasi-political character. Many members used the forum as a means of personal advertisement, which was unfortunate, and the traditional fragmentation of Formosan community life was strongly evident. Prominent men bickered among themselves and local cliques failed to submerge their differences in unity for a common cause.

But they suffered certain disabilities; they were honest men, and they believed in the principles and practices of democratic representative government — not notable qualifications for employment under Chen Yi.

The central government was extremely sensitive to any mention of the sovereignty issue and deeply resented any suggestion of intervention however friendly the foreign power or powers might be.

Every means was taken to quench the issue. The official line was firmly established for propaganda guidance: Japan’s surrender automatically brought about the return of “stolen territory” to China. The Cairo Declaration had done the trick. Formosans were united in support of the Nationalist government.

But they held to the proposition that Formosans must be citizens of China, enjoying local self-government while contributing to China’s growth as an independent constitutional state.

At the same time they looked to the United States to assume moral responsibility for the actions of Chiang’s Nationalist government in Formosa because of Washington’s unlimited support for the Generalissimo.

All agreed that the island must be considered a province of China, but felt that a federated relationship would serve the island’s interests to best advantage.

They agreed that Formosa lacked strong leadership, political sophistication, and organization, and that few Formosans were of sufficient stature to command island-wide support and respect.

after a dog (Japanese) is being driven away, a swine came into its place here in Taiwan.

its name shall be “The Great Chinese joint-Stock Company, Unlimited.” Chiang Kai-shek is the Chief of the Trustees, T. V. Soong the Vice Chief of the Trustees, Chen Yi, the swine, is the Manager of the Branch Office.

that age of political unsophistication when all things seem possible to achieve through direct action.

If the Nationalist government collapsed on the mainland, Formosa would be a most advantageous place; in a time of general civil war, the island could be cut off, to achieve the autonomy so desired by the Formosans, but certainly not under their control or in their interest.

The Army’s proposal was generally interpreted as a central government move designed to empty Formosa of hot-headed youths, thereby making it a safer place for Chiang’s retreat.

While the older leaders protested devotion to Mother China, the younger ones began to look elsewhere for alternatives.

It was widely speculated that Chen Yi and his men were preparing for a break with the mainland, anticipating a final chaotic dissolution of the economic and political structure at Shanghai.

Now mainlanders on the street were challenged “Are you sweet potato or are you pig?” and if the proper answer were not promptly forthcoming a hot chase took place, and sometimes a beating.

But foreign observers in all parts of the island reported later that they saw no Formosans carrying weapons.

Mainland Chinese were occasionally stoned, or beaten with sticks, but no guns, knives, or swords were seen in the hands of the angry Formosans. Moreover, there was no looting.

Martial law was declared at six o’clock as winter dusk settled over a tense, unhappy city.

It was a neat propaganda coup, designed to place the Formosans in the worst possible light in the international press.

It should be noted here that after March 1 there were few instances reported of bodily harm done to any mainland Chinese at Taipei.

Once a formal Settlement Committee was established, the spontaneous outburst of anger gave way to a new public mood and a rather remarkable show of public cooperation with Formosan leaders who, for nearly one week, formed the effective government.

The use of dum-dum bullets was outlawed by international agreements.

We were to realize later that by this device Chen Yi learned exactly where the individual Formosan leaders stood vis-à-vis the national government, the Party, and his own regime.

If they reached Taipei before the broadcast, he would not have to make this humiliating public acceptance of the committee’s demands. If they could reach the city before the crowd had left the auditorium, he would be in a position to seize all the most prominent members of the Opposition.

but alert people of Hsinchu along the way had removed rails on the main line just outside the town.

Chen Yi and his henchmen had never before tried to ride down an unarmed provincial population technically so well prepared to organize and maintain close communication throughout the area. This was not “backward” China.

On the other hand the governor’s man Stanway Cheng controlled the radio stations and the cable services, and knew precisely how to manipulate rumor, plant stories, and twist facts.

In the news dispatches sent to Japan it could not be admitted that the Chinese were unable to govern Formosa.