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July 22, 2018
this chapter will argue that if one were to read Jung in a certain way, one would find important epistemological and methodological insights; moreover, it will be further argued that these insights are of relevance today and they can enrich substantially current debates in these fields.
Jung did not write clearly and specifically about epistemology and methodology; whenever he addressed these issues he did so in passing, in the context of writing about something else.
Jung’s implications for epistemology are not easily noticeable either by the specialist epistemologists or by the majority of Jungian psychologists; the former would not even look in Jung’s writings for this kind of information, and the focus of the latter has been mainly on his innovative contributions to the theory and practice of psychotherapy.
Another difficulty in developing Jung’s contribution to epistemology and methodology is that such an activity would seemingly contradict Jung’s own strong views about the very essence of his work. Jung is known for being adverse to any suggestion that his theoretical formulation could be separated from his overall psychology. More specifically, he detested the idea that his work could be considered as constituting any ‘free-standing’ philosophical statement, abstracted, distinct and independent from its clinical-therapeutic context: ‘I have set up neither a system nor a general theory, but
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Jung perceived a sharp distinction between two possible ways that his work could be understood: according to the first one, his work was ‘empirical’ and grounded on solid clinical observations; and, according to the second one, his work was a collection of philosophical speculations and abstractions unrelated to the clinical realities. Throughout his life and in his writings, Jung struggled to gain legitimacy for his work and endeavoured to condemn strongly the latter position and did everything he could to convince others to espouse the former position. However, this sharp distinction
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Consequently, all possible epistemological and methodological insights were tainted as being philosophical and were, thus, rejected by Jung.
any comprehension and (more so) any presentation of ‘empirical’ ‘facts’ inevitably involves theoretical and philosophical assumptions that need to be taken on board.
This means that Jung’s very perception of his work (in terms of this sharp distinction) prevented him (and others after him) from appreciating any contribution he made which could have been construed as being ‘philosophical’.
Jung was particularly concerned not to venture into anything that he considered that could dilute the validity of his psychological work and in doing so, in effect, he minimised the importa...
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the main objectives of this chapter are to attempt, first, to argue that Jung indeed had a remarkable epistemological sensitivity and vigilance, second, to delineate those parts of his work that could convey his epistemological awareness and to develop them into a more coherent formulation, third, to trace his epistemological development through the different phases of his career and the way this development interacted with his wider theoretical formulations and with his own life, and finally to examine the present-day relevance of his epistemological contribution in the light of wider
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Epistemology is the logos of episteme. The Greek logos is often translated as study, science, discipline, systematic investigation and discourse. In Greek, episteme means knowledge but, not surprisingly, it has an interesting history and a wide range of meanings; the Latin equivalent, scientia, does not seem to share this rich philosophical past. Etymologically, episteme is related to the verbs ephistemi and epistamai which mean ‘to set or place upon’ and ‘to know how’, respectively. Both verbs refer to standing over or upon (epi) implying some king of ‘over-seeing’ activity. Whereas in
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There is long debate about the meaning of episteme in ancient Greek philosophy (mainly in Plato and Aristotle). This is mainly in connection to its opposition to techne (which is often translated as art, craft or practice). In short, the general trend has been to attribute episteme to knowledge of pure theory and techne to the know-how connected with practice and application.
the predominant tradition has been to equate episteme to theoretical knowledge and tec...
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according to Socrates, applied and theoretical knowledge are not in a mutually excluding and oppositional relationship.
Michael Whan (1987) suggests that Jung’s approach transcends the opposition between episteme and techne and proposes the term phronesis as the most appropriate term that characterises the Jungian approach.
for Whan, Jungian therapeutic practice is not based either on ‘theoretical knowledge’ or on ‘technical knowledge’ but on an awareness which he terms ‘ethical consciousness’.
Jung would have strongly agreed that an ethical stance cannot be divorced from epistemological and technical considerations; indeed, on numerous occasions he emphasised this very point (e.g., Jung 1949: par. 1412, 1934a: par. 315; McFarland Solomon and Twyman 2003; von Franz 1975).
to understand and deal with the effects of political violence from exclusively psychological and psychopathological perspectives [without considering] intrapsychic, interpersonal and external dimensions … [and without appreciating] the wider political, historical, social, economic, ethical, spiritual and moral perspectives. (Papadopoulos 2005: 46)
often we tend to become ‘prone to get confused and commit methodological and epistemological errors, ending up psychologising the political realm and pathologising human suffering’ (Papadopoulos 2005: 46).
the majority of definitions in non-specialist dictionaries refer to epistemology as ‘the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods and validity’ (Oxford English Dictionary). Other, more technical texts define epistemology as ‘the philosophical inquiry into the nature, conditions, and extent of human knowledge’ (Sosa and Kim 2000b: ix).
Essentially, epistemology is the study of how we know that we know, of what constitutes a valid understanding/explanation/knowledge.
epistemology is the systematic investigation of what makes us accept (think/feel) that we know something, of what makes us mark a certain territory as observed and comprehended. This means that epistemology addresses not only the conditions that make the knower know but also the interaction between the knower and the ...
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methodology is the logos of methodos. The Greek word methodos is a composite of meta and odos. Meta means after (implying development), and odos is the road, the route. Therefore, methodos literally means ‘a following after’ (Liddell and Scott 1869), following a road, adhering to a set way. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines method as ‘a particular procedure for accomplishing or approaching something’, and also ‘orderliness of thought or behaviour’; hence, methodology (according to OED) is ‘a system of methods used in a particular field’. This means that methodology refers to the
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methodology refers to the application of the epistemological premises that a person holds at a given time.
In this chapter, methodology will be used to refer to the specific ways that Jung used to apply his epistemology, i.e., the ways he followed which were guided (consciously or unconsciously) by his particu...
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In other words, whereas epistemology would be related to his assumptions about sources of knowledge and evidence, methodology would be related to the manner in which Jung applied these insigh...
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the process of countertransference is nothing but an example of an epistemological procedure in action, during psychotherapy. When the analyst tries to catch himself or herself and observes where certain feelings, thoughts or even words said to the analysand come from, to all intents and purposes, the analyst is performing an epistemological tracking (in addition, of course, to attending to a whole lot of other parameters). The attempt to trace back the origin and context of one’s own assumptions is the essence of the epistemological procedure and this is what countertransference is about.
although it was Freud who first ‘discovered’ the phenomenon of countertransference (Freud 1910), it was Jung who emphasised its positive contribution to the therapeutic process (e.g., Jung 1916/1948).
Freud, for most of his life, considered countertransference as an obnoxious interference of the analyst’s pure position as observer of the analysand. On the contrary, Jung appreciated that countertransference is an essential tool through which analysts can trace the source of their own thoughts, feelings and even actions (verbal and otherwise) in relation to their analysands, and it is for these reasons that he recommended that ‘the sine qua non is the analysis of the analyst, what is called the training analysis’ (Jung: Memories, Dreams, Reflections (MDR), p. 154).
Jung proposed the institution of personal analysis (training analysis) for analysts-in-training not so that they become perfect and pure but in order to learn how to learn from their own reactions during the course of their analytical work; in other words, ...
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therapy becomes almost synonymous with the very epistemological tracking of one’s sources of knowledge.
Another example of Jung’s epistemological vigilance is to be found in his views about the uses and abuses of case histories. With incisive perceptiveness, he warned that The empirical intellect, occupying itself with the minutiae of case-histories, involuntarily imports its own philosophical premises not only into the arrangement but also into the judgement of the material and even into the apparently objective presentation of data. (Jung 1935a: par. 548)
By ‘philosophical premises’, Jung here refers to the cognitive process that inevitably orders and structures our perception according to various ways that create ‘involuntarily’ certain premises, assumptions that colour our understanding and make us accept that we have a certain knowledge about something – a patient, in this example.
Jung stresses that this structuring process happens at least at three levels – at the very ‘presentation’ of the (case-) material, at the ‘arrangement’ and at the ‘judgement’ of it.
it is not easily acceptable that there is a certain degree of ‘involuntary’ interference by some ‘philosophical premises’ even in the ‘apparently objective presentation of data’. Usually, people believe that a ‘fact’ is a ‘fact’ and when a therapist presents the ‘facts’ of the case, it is usually believed that no epistemological colouring (of a substantial degree) is involved in influencing the presentation.
‘What is the use of even the most accurate and punctilious work if it is prejudiced by an unavowed assumption? Any science worthy of the name must criticize its own assumptions’ (Jung 1935a: par. 548).
‘all knowledge is the result of imposing some kind of order upon the reactions of the psychic system as they low into our consciousness’ (Jung 1947: par. 362).
In a letter to Freud, very early in their professional relationship (on 29 December 1906), Jung felt the need to delineate their differences and identified five points on which ‘we do not see eye to eye’ (McGuire 1974: 14). The first was about the different clinical ‘material’ Jung was working with (‘I am working … with uneducated insane patients … with Dementia praecox’, as opposed to Freud’s educated elite of Vienna which Jung did not mention in the letter, but it is implicit); the third was about their differences in experience (Jung was nineteen years younger than Freud), and the fourth
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these differences, so clearly outlined by Jung, were not followed up either by him or Freud again.
While he was still a student, Jung gave five lectures (1896–1899) at the Zofingia student society of which he was a member. In these lectures, he addressed issues such as the nature of science, psychology, religion and the nature of scientific enquiry, all from a thoughtful and philosophical perspective. These lectures show the depth of his understanding of epistemological and methodological issues and provide the researcher with a unique opportunity to trace Jung’s early philosophical and scientific premises.
some authors went as far as claiming that Jung’s ‘philosophical attitude’ revealed in these lectures remained unaltered till the end of his life (Nagy 1991: 12).
authors went as far as claiming that Jung’s ‘philosophical attitude’ revealed in these lectures remained unaltered till the end of his life (Nagy 1991: 12).
in tracing the ‘Border Zones of Exact Science’, Jung rejects the positions of both ‘contemporary sceptical materialist opinion’ (1896–1899: par. 63) and metaphysics arguing for the need of a third position in between. At that time he found vitalism to be that third possibility. According to vitalism, life is a vital principle which is distinct from the material realm of physics and chemistry, although connected with
Jung retained this tendency to reject both the mechanistic approach to science as well as the blindly religious approach and always strove to develop a third principle.
a strong emphasis on the primacy of the psychological as an independent realm, not as a product either of mechanistic materialism or of abstract metaphysics. The physical phenomena have been studied and threshed out down to the last detail. Metaphysical phenomena are virtually a closed book. Surely it would be valuable to inquire into properties other than those with which we have long been familiar. (Jung 1896–1899: par. 65)

