Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan

by Herbert P. Bix

Winner of the Pulitzer PrizeIn this groundbreaking biography of the Japanese emperor Hirohito, Herbert P. Bix offers the first complete, unvarnished look at the enigmatic leader whose sixty-three-year reign ushered Japan into the modern world. Never before has the full life of this controversial figure been revealed with such clarity and vividness. Bix shows what it was like to be trained from birth for a lone position at the apex of the nation's political hierarchy and as a revered symbol of divine status. Influenced by an unusual combination of the Japanese imperial tradition and a modern scientific worldview, the young emperor gradually evolves into his preeminent role, aligning himself with the growing ultranationalist movement, perpetuating a cult of religious emperor worship, resisting attempts to curb his power, and all the while burnishing his image as a reluctant, passive monarch. Here we see Hirohito as he truly was: a man of strong will and real authority.

Supported by a vast array of previously untapped primary documents, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan is perhaps most illuminating in lifting the veil on the mythology surrounding the emperor's impact on the world stage. Focusing closely on Hirohito's interactions with his advisers and successive Japanese governments, Bix sheds new light on the causes of the China War in 1937 and the start of the Asia-Pacific War in 1941. And while conventional wisdom has had it that the nation's increasing foreign aggression was driven and maintained not by the emperor but by an elite group of Japanese militarists, the reality, as witnessed here, is quite different. Bix documents in detail the strong, decisive role Hirohito played in wartime operations, from the takeover of Manchuria in 1931 through the attack on Pearl Harbor and ultimately the fateful decision in 1945 to accede to an unconditional surrender. In fact, the emperor stubbornly prolonged the war effort and then used the horrifying bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, together with the Soviet entrance into the war, as his exit strategy from a no-win situation. From the moment of capitulation, we see how American and Japanese leaders moved to justify the retention of Hirohito as emperor by whitewashing his wartime role and reshaping the historical consciousness of the Japanese people. The key to this strategy was Hirohito's alliance with General MacArthur, who helped him maintain his stature and shed his militaristic image, while MacArthur used the emperor as a figurehead to assist him in converting Japan into a peaceful nation. Their partnership ensured that the emperor's image would loom large over the postwar years and later decades, as Japan began to make its way in the modern age and struggled -- as it still does -- to come to terms with its past.

Until the very end of a career that embodied the conflicting aims of Japan's development as a nation, Hirohito remained preoccupied with politics and with his place in history. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan provides the definitive account of his rich life and legacy. Meticulously researched and utterly engaging, this book is proof that the history of twentieth-century Japan cannot be understood apart from the life of its most remarkable and enduring leader.

Genres: History, Japan, Nonfiction, Biography, Asia, Japanese History, World War II

832 pages, Paperback

First published August 22, 2000

About the author

Herbert P. Bix (born 1938)is an American historian. He wrote Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, an acclaimed account of the Japanese Emperor and the events which shaped modern Japanese imperialism, which won the Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction in 2001.

Bix was born in Boston and attended the University of Massachusetts Amherst.He earned the Ph.D. in history and Far Eastern languages from Harvard University. He was a founding member of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. For several decades, he has written about modern and contemporary Japanese history in the United States and Japan.

Reviews

[William2 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Herbert P. Bix's biography of Hirohito surpasses that of Edward Behr (Hirohito: Behind the Myth, New York, 1989) in depth and nuance. Bix has spent an enormous amount of time among original Japanese-language sources. Behr consults Japanese-language sources infrequently, and when he does so it is through translation. Since Hirohito left virtually no writings that would have given substance to his views, Bix has had to look closely at the diaries left by those who worked with him, and other sources, and from this infer a character for Hirohito. It is this job of inference that is the foremost achievement of the book, and it is achieved largely through a mutual or overlapping confirmation of sources. Hirohito is at times directly quoted, but these moments are rare and usually come from his later years when he regularly sought to avoid accountability for his role. Bix largely confirms David Bergamini's conclusions of forty years ago (see Japan's Imperial Conspiracy: How Emperor Hirohito Led Japan Into War Against the West, New York, 1971). But whereas Bergamini's narrative could be strident, and a bit racist at times, Bix's is dispassionate and subtle. If Bergamini's Hirohito weren't such a caricature of so-called Asian inscrutibility, he would be sinister. Bix's Hirohito, by contrast, is more the vacillating politician. I learned a lot from the book. Some highlights: (1) the degree to which Japan's military was completely out of control in the 1930-40s and led the nation into war; (2) Hirohito's maddening penchant for vacillation while so many died; and (3) the picture of across the board governmental dysfunction. Hirohito's original impulse was to maintain Japan's alliance with Britain and the U.S. He was only too aware of how much Japan depended on those countries for imports of oil and scrapmetal. So he was--at the start--essentially left to sanction his army's wild and murderous caprices after the fact, or risk looking inept. When he finally steps out of the shadows to put down the young army officers rebellion in 1936, executing 17 ringleaders, the reader feels that finally he is becoming more decisive. Bix wants to show us that Hirohito could have stopped it. That his rejection of the army's unsanctioned campaigns would have certainly made him less sympathetic among his people, but he could have been at least partially effective in slowing the rush toward catastrophe. Instead, with the army out of control, Hirohito's impulse was to get out front of the breaking wave and try to ride it. He was certainly aware of the futility of such an intervention. In the days before Pearl Harbor he is told that the chance of winning a war against Britain and the U.S. is 50-50 at best. Yet he green lights the attack! By then the U.S. and Britain had begun trade sanctions against Japan for its military exploits in Manchuria. So while there was initial hesitation on Hirohito's part, once he became committed he gave it his all. He played an active role as commander in chief. That point Bix establishes beyond doubt. There's so much to learn about Japan from this book. I did not know prior to reading it of the extent of the army's wild disobedience. Neither was I aware that the "throne," or Imperial House (kokutai), considered democracy every bit as dangerous and subversive as Communism. Fascism though was widely embraced. The overwhelming sense Bix leaves us with is that World War II was a war Japan had to fight and had to lose. They had to fight it because there was no other acceptable course that the reactionary officer corps would have tolerated. They had to lose it so that they could develop further as a nation. In all World War II-related engagements Japan lost 2.1 million military personnel, or about 4% of its 1939 population. (This does not include those killed in the atomic and incendiary bombings by the U.S.) The U.S. by contrast, not counting Allied forces, lost 96,000 personnel during the Pacific War, or 0.07 percent of its 1939 population. Japan is now a highly pacifist state operating under a "peace constitution" that was largely written by MacArthur's American occupation. Highly recommended.

[Dmitri · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Our emperor is the direct descendant of the gods and rules the state as a living god. He originally dwelled with the gods and is inherently different from his subjects. That being so, our constitution has a nature completely different from the constitutions of other countries." - Uesugi (Pre-War writer)

"I liken the state to a human body in which the emperor is the brain. There was a question of a 'living god'. It disturbs me to be called that because I have the same bodily structure as an ordinary human being." - Hirohito (Post-War writing)

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Herbert Bix won a Pulitzer Prize for this book in 2001. He had earned Ph.D's from Harvard in Japanese history and language and was a professor in Japan at three universities between 1986 and 2013. Since then he taught in New York State as emeritus of history. His thesis is that Hirohito had led Japan into war and later scripted an account to absolve himself. An endorsement by General MacArthur and the war crimes tribunal in the occupation cemented opinion of the emperor as a hapless dupe controlled by the military, unable to oppose plans to colonize Asia and the Pacific islands.

Meiji
Bix begins in 1868 with Hirohito's grandfather the Emperor Meiji who assented to international law and a constitutional monarchy. The Diet was a semi-parliamentary system where he could veto laws, appoint prime ministers and the cabinet. He promulgated a myth of sun goddess descent. As head of Shinto religion he led a family with all Japan his children. He decreed armed forces and education loyal to him. Wars won in 1894 and 1904 against China and Russia united militarism with nationalism. In 1912 Hirohito's father, weak in ability and health, ruled under guidance of nobles and advisors.

Taisho
Darwinian ideas of Japanese imperialism and racial purity occupied nationalist discourse. Kaiser Wilhelm II and Czar Nicholas II were role models and cautionary tales. Trends toward democratic reform, both abroad and at home, were threats to the monarchy, slights in the Paris Conference and League of Nations an affront to Japan's prestige. Hirohito, a frail and sheltered boy, acquired attitudes of his teachers. In 1918 economic riots against excessive landlord levies stirred up fears of a revolution. The imperial house had its hands in private enterprise and the elites competed for influence.

Education
Hirohito was groomed during his youth by military men to become the commander-in-chief, with an absolute power under the law. All orders were to be followed as if issued by the infallible emperor himself. The military mission was to defend against both foreign expansion and domestic unrest. Governance was closer to an autocracy than a constitutional monarchy. Isolated from daily events Hirohito was expected to lead parliament, foreign policy and the economy. Early education was based on Confucian ethics and the samurai code. He would ascend to the throne in 1926 at age 25.

Regency
Hirohito assumed a role as regent to his ailing father in 1921. Coached by advisors he worked to restore lost power to the monarchy. He took a six month tour of Europe stopping at British colonies and visiting the Japanese colony in Taiwan. Communism and anarchism grew, an assassination attempt averted. Movements for democracy and against monarchy were suppressed. Time was nearing for a right wing reaction as would be seen in Europe as well. In WWI plans had been made to take over China and Indonesia, a foreshadowing of future events. Hirohito embraced his role as living deity.

Treaties
1922 treaties promised independence to China and an open door policy for the great powers to exploit Chinese resources and labor; Japan was in agreement. Hirohito didn't endorse arms limits or the peace code, but accepted them in interest of colonies in Korea and China. The US demand for Japan's return of Shandong, seized from Germany in WWI, was a disappointment. The League of Nations had rejected racial equality proposals and a 1924 US Immigration Act excluded Asians, further provoking tensions. As one of 'Five Powers' Japan assumed it should be allowed to dominate east Asia.

Buildup
Defining the US as enemy number one, but keeping within existing arms treaties, old navy ships were replaced by new submarines and aircraft. Troops recalled from China allowed the army to modernize for future war on the continent. Plans were carefully reviewed by Hirohito, as his practice until the end of the war. Ministers were culled from the military and mixed into the cabinet, hardline militarists demanded total independence from politics. As the left challenged imperial control the right became entrenched. Conservative factions promoted Shinto religion and mythology to justify rule.

Showa
A new nationalism took hold when the Taisho emperor died in 1926. Strains of racism in political thinking saw Japan as entitled to annex Chinese territory for its use, bolstered by the belief Asian economies should be exploited and saved from western encroachment. Hirohito held a court staff of seven main nobles; military, political and bureaucratic chiefs reported to him independently. With his court at the hub of communications command decisions were made in advance and enacted in a pantomime of parliament. Palace work was done behind the scenes for an appearance of autonomy.

Outbreak
Under pressure the Geneva military conventions weren't ratified and warship limits disputed. Hirohito favored a 'no-war' treaty with western powers, drawing anger from ultra-nationalists. Cuts in military budgets aggravated the crisis. As he meddled in politics incidents in China provided pretext to send in troops. Scuffles with Chiang's KMT and Chinese warlords, civil unrest in Korea, eroded army discipline and politicized officers. The army made secret plans to invade Manchuria and Mongolia. By the time Hirohito learned about the plot the army blew up a railway blaming the Chinese.

Manchukuo
While China complained to the League of Nations the army sent reinforcements. Taking cities in rapid succession it was advised Hirohito should approve of the action so as not to provoke militarists. When the parliament withheld troops Hirohito had a chance to stop things from spinning out of control but chose to heed the warnings of hardline factions. "As long as the operation succeeds" became the new rule of engagement. Japan's air attacks were the first in WWII and a puppet regime was set up in Manchuria. The League ordered withdrawal but Japanese rallied around their rebel army.

Agitation
After officers were given only administrative discipline plots to overthrow the government arose throughout the 1930's. Hirohito rewarded the officers and princes were made chiefs of navy and army. In 1932 naval and army officers murdered the PM, attacked political party headquarters and homes of court advisors, with demands to end naval treaties. Hirohito responded by appointing an admiral as PM. He had resisted incursions into China proper, concerned of sanctions, but was also afraid of militant and nationalist unrest. Japan quit the League in 1933 to pursue its expansionist imperatives.

Rebellion
The Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy in 1936 saw mass arrests of dissidents in Japan. Ideologues asserted that palace elites, political parties and big business subverted the emperor's sovereignty. To appease the right a campaign of emperor worship was launched, moderates removed from power. Hirohito abetted the cult to maintain his authority, as did the military to end its political control. An army uprising seized the ministry and police, killing cabinet members and statesmen, but failed to overthrow the government. Hirohito declared martial law and put down rebels within the navy.

Escalation
Policies after the rebellion propelled Japan into war. Military spending ballooned to 70% of the budget. In response to a skirmish, and under Hirohito's orders, Beijing was occupied. Attacks on Japanese civilians led to bombing and invasion of Shanghai where the KMT retreated, and the capital Nanjing where massacres occurred. Chiang was driven upriver to Chongqing as the navy blockaded the coast. In two weeks Hirohito had deployed six divisions "to bring peace to the region". Palace meetings were followed by conferences to convey a pretense his cabinet had made the decisions.

Axis
Japan was unable to conquer the vast interior of China. The US and UK stabilized Chinese currency and Japan blockaded concessions in Shanghai. Roosevelt began to back Chiang's KMT and the US lifeline of raw materials to Japan slowed. To continue the fight Japan needed resources from elsewhere. As Hitler prevailed, Roosevelt sent a fleet to Hawaii to deter seizure of colonies. Hirohito, failing to avoid a conflict with the west, allied with Germans ascendant in Europe. Fatefully he chose to advance on SE Asia hoping Britain would fall. He later blamed his PM and cabinet for the disasterous results.

Downfall
The US imposed an oil embargo when French Indochina was seized. Japan could retreat or try to defeat the US before its reserves were depleted. To reach sources of oil in the Dutch East Indies, Hirohito and his staff decided to attack while the US mobilized for the European war. As battles raged in the Pacific soldiers were exhorted to die rather than be captured. After the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki six more atomic bombs were planned and in production. Hirohito agreed to surrender on the sole condition his sovereignty would be preserved; if not the devastation would continue.

Ex Culpa
In 1946 foreign and domestic pressure built for Hirohito to face war crime charges for declaring war on the US and UK, for Pearl Harbor and POW treatment. The imperial family urged abdication to preserve the monarchy as public opinion shifted against him. US occupiers drafted a constitution to strip the monarchy's power and wanted Hirohito to accede. Asked "if able to surrender why he was unable to prevent the war" he gave a confidential exculpatory account blaming his inner circle. Except for the 1936 rebellion and ending the war as constitutional monarch "he was not involved in politics".

Coda
Renouncing divinity Hirohito reigned to 1989 as emasculated emperor. Bix concludes this book with Hirohito's later life and impact in those years. Perhaps not as morally bankrupt as Hitler, he is responsible directly and indirectly for over 30 million deaths. Execution might not have been expedient yet some punishment was warranted. It may be that exoneration fulfilled the goals of the time. Born and bred to believe in the primacy of the emperor he was misadvised by military and ministers. He had opportunities to support a constitutional monarchy but instead became the last emperor of an age.

While partly a biography this is primarily a political history. Hirohito left few papers, and documents from his reign are not available to the public. Bix relies on recently published diaries and memoirs of advisors to reconstruct the emperor's personality and thinking. American and Japanese scholars assisted Bix to develop early drafts, including a colleague at Harvard and fellow Pulitzer winner John Dower. The writing is dense at times, and at nearly 700 pages of text thorough. Dower's 'Embracing Defeat' is a good companion volume to this one, covering the history of Japan's post war recovery.

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 4 out of 5]

Herbert Bix's Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan offers a robust revisionist take on the Japanese Emperor who led his country into World War II. Pushing back against accounts that treat Hirohito as a passive spectator held captive by militarists, Bix shows that the Showa Emperor was intimately involved in the country's drift towards militarism in the '20s and '30s. After the liberal Taisho Period led to increased democracy and freedoms (but also political instability and a weak, vacillating Emperor) Hirohito aligned with court conservatives to restore the Emperor's prestige and create a more authoritarian nation-state. He was educated from birth to be an absolute ruler, and while his behind-the-scenes role prevented him from directly dictating policies, his authority allowed him to direct, veto and countermand his ministers. Thus he spent the '30s, not as a puppet manipulated by fascists and military hardliners, but bring the mutinous Army to heel after a series of revolts and streamlining Japan's expansionism in a less chaotic fashion. As World War II breaks out, Hirohito becomes complicit in his country's war crimes (Bix shows that he personally authorized the use of chemical weapons in China and the attack on Pearl Harbor) and delays its surrender by rebuffing peace feelers and firing moderate ministers. After the war, to avoid prosecution by the Allies, he presents himself as a constitutional monarch with only symbolic power; General MacArthur and President Truman, fearing the Soviets more than the Japanese, abides the fiction and assists him in covering up his complicity in wartime imperialism. Thus, for the rest of his life, Hirohito escaped serious scrutiny for his wartime role as Japan evolved into a modern, prosperous democracy. Hirohito indeed becomes symbolic not only of his country's traditions but its reluctance to face its troubled past. A devastating work of biographical investigation; a must-read for serious students of Japanese history and the Second World War.

[Dan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hirohito is an important and exhaustive history of Japan’s most famous emperor that won the Pulitzer for General Non Fiction in 2001. This is an objective biography that holds Hirohito at least partially responsible for the the WWI and WWII Japanese atrocities in Korea, Shanghai, Nanking and the Philippines.

The early portion of the book covers Hirohito’s childhood up to his assumption of the throne in his early 20’s. These chapters were a fascinating read. We see the extreme privileges that were given to him at a very early age. We learn of his middling intelligence and capabilities and also of his dedication.

The next section of the book covers his assumption of the throne, marriage and the drama around his ascendancy and his interaction with the Japanese government leading up to Pearl Harbor. I did not find this section of the biography to be particularly interesting.

The third section of the book comprises the WWII years. While this section was interesting, there are several other books that did a better job of explaining Japan’s actions during WWII including one of the best history books ever written, The Rising Sun by John Toland.

The last portion of this biography was extraordinarily well researched. These pages covered the post WWII years until Hirohito’s death in 1989. In particular, hundreds of pages were dedicated to the rehabilitation of the Emperor’s image. This image makeover was facilitated by MacArthur who believed that executing the emperor for war crimes would devastate post WWII Japanese society. It turns out that MacArthur was correct but his decision was a very difficult pill to swallow for millions of Koreans and Chinese who experienced massacres and atrocities at the hands of Japan’s occupying forces. It is covered in fascinating depth in the book. While Hirohito did not directly order these atrocities he did nothing to stop them and was at the same time a strong proponent of Japanese racial superiority as justification for invasions of the Asian mainland. The energy with which Hirohito and Japan threw themselves into modernizing their society into an economic power was also quite remarkable.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the book was not well received in Japan as Bix, in this book and in subsequent articles, continues to hold the Japanese government to task for its reluctance in owning up to war crimes. Honoring ancestors is still a very powerful nationalistic force in Japan today and contributes to some reluctance to admit guilt.

Like most Americans, I remember exactly where I was when the planes hit the twin towers on 9/11. I was visiting Tokyo on business and there was a tropical storm hitting at the same time. Beyond grieving and watching news, there was little to do for days while waiting for flights to resume their service to the United States. So each day as a distraction, I ran laps around the Imperial Palace in the monsoon. The Palace is one of the few building complexes of any importance that survived the bombing of Tokyo from during WWII and it is a special landmark in the midst of Tokyo. Hirohito spent a great deal of time here. I remember thinking, while circling the palace, how incongruent the idea was of an emperor, now Akihito, occupying this building in a modern world with terrorism. It took me 16 years to get around to reading this biography. Oddly enough, I experienced nostalgia reading about Hirohito occupying the palace, someone who died more than a decade before I even visited.

[Louise · Rating 4 out of 5]

As the title suggests, this is a political and not a personal biography of Hirohito. Herbert Bix shows that by selecting the information you want to consume, you can see him as a pacifist or leader of the war effort; nevertheless, Bix builds a solid case for Hirohito’s ultimate responsibility in leading Japan to war.

The closest the book gets to personal is the description of Hirohito growing up in the shadow of his over-esteemed grandfather and his (perhaps mentally deficient) father. His over-structured childhood is described. He was trained to be apart. He was separated from his classmates to eat a western lunch alone, while they sat together for a Japanese lunch. His education was narrow and leaned heavily on military affairs. You learn how his wife was selected and (merely) that they had children.

He comes to the throne as a young man in 1926. His advisors and cabinet members see how they can benefit from deifying the Emperor position and created the myth of Hirohito's divinity. Interestingly, Bix shows that not everyone bought into it, including Hirohito. You watch him grow into his role and how he gradually came to support the military and help it cover up its atrocities in China. You see how the need for raw materials meant more military conquest and how, when Roosevelt sanctioned Japan for its aggression no options but war were considered.

Once at war Bix documents how Hirohito operated like an 18th century general issuing orders with little knowledge of the events on the ground. After Hiroshima, Hirohito would still not surrender. With no realization that the world powers were (obviously) now with the Allies (or wanted to be), Hirohito choose to negotiate with Stalin (i.e. let Russia have some of China & the Japanese POWs as slave labor) to re-join the war with them. (Stalin, of course, ignored the emissaries who took the message to Moscow.)

As foolish as Hirohito was for Japan’s interests during the war, he was wise for his own interests during the occupation. Bix shows how Hirohito escaped scrutiny as did many of his top military staff. War trials were limited (only 7 war leaders/criminals were executed). While many people had a lingering sense that their leaders betrayed them, much about the war was censored allowing Hirohito to promote himself as the man who ended the war. Once the Occupation was over, hundreds of war criminals were pardoned; many of whom went right back into politics which accounts for the continued censorship and official distortion of the war’s history in Japan.

This book is worthy of the awards it has received. The author has assembled a lot of research. For the general reader, it can be tough. I had to read and re-read a lot of the text regarding the lesser known (to me) events. An annotated list of the people and a glossary of Japanese terms (almost one on every page in some chapters) are very much needed. I would have liked more development of the person and character of Hirohito and more on his family. The concluding chapters, particularly ones on what became of the perpetrators of this tragedy and “The Legacy of Showa” are excellent.

[Brian Griffith · Rating 3 out of 5]

Bix takes his task seriously, to dismantle the myth that Emperor Hirohito was a benevolent, symbolic monarch, who never pushed for war or endorsed war crimes. The author takes 689 pages to build on the work of Japanese historians, and examine almost every detail of the emperor’s career. And this evidence completely demolishes the myth of imperial innocence. Hirohito is exposed as a man devoted to advancing his own prestige almost regardless of any other consideration.

The book documents a strange dance toward absolutism, where leaders of the armed forces demand that all branches of government must unconditionally obey the emperor. But then they repeatedly take the initiative to invade foreign territories. The emperor fails to censor these initiatives, because that would suggest he was failing to control his followers. Besides, each of these aggressions boosted the emperor’s prestige. As Bix explains, “following the dictates of one’s conscience posed … a threat to belief in the idealized collective self.”

Then we reach the full-blown cult of imperial glory and self-sacrifice for the emperor, which Hirohito proudly endorsed. But regardless of the cost to other nations, or however much his people sacrificed themselves, the emperor “lacked all consciousness of personal responsibility for what Japan had done abroad and never once admitted guilt for the war of aggression that … cost so many lives.”

Although all hope of victory was gone by 1943, Hirohito refused to consider unconditional surrender, because that might threaten his standing as emperor. Then, after his cities were fire-bombed or nearly obliterated by atomic blasts, he took credit for the peace. As his loyal prime minister Higashikuni put it on Sept. 4, 1945, the war’s end came thanks to “the gracious benevolence of his Majesty, who paved the way to an eternal peace in order to save the people from suffering. Never before had we been so profoundly moved by the deep sympathy of His Majesty. We deeply regret having caused him so much concern.”

After the war, Hirohito was stripped of administrative powers and reduced to a purely symbolic function. But within a few years, he began venturing out to tour the country, hoping to experience his people’s homage once again. In 1947 he came to Hiroshima. The people lined the streets, many with faces disfigured by the atomic bomb. The crowds grew excited, recovering their old sense of pride, crowding around him to shout their devotion. And at this, Hirohito was hopelessly awkward, with virtually nothing to say. He received their salutations, regardless of all the suffering he had inflicted upon them, but he offered them nothing in return. I don’t normally cry reading history books. But this scene was so horrific that I just wept.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

I spent a little over three years in Japan in the US Air Force 1969-1972. While I was there I read many books about Japanese history as well as some of their popular fiction (translated into English) and found them to be quite fascinating. This book by Herbert P. Bix has been on my list for a while because of the topic as well as the author's credentials and I finally read it. All I can say is it was very thoroughly researched, well written, and I learned a lot about the Emperor's part in the events of WWII as well as why Japanese society is the way it is today. Once I got into the book a bit, momentum took over and it was hard to put down, not because it was like a thriller but because I just kept wanting to learn more. I can highly recommend this book to anyone interested in WWII, Japanese history, or Emperor Hirohito. A lot of the mystery is dispelled and based on letters, notes, diaries, etc of those around him. It was a great read!

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

A Man who Defied the Odds.

This is a fantastic book about a man in the middle of a fascinating period of history. The release of Japan into the modern era with the Meiji period and then the successes in the subsequent wars against China and Russia and then in the First World War put Japan on the map. But it also paved its own path. Frustrated by the prejudices of the victorious nations in the aftermath of 1919 and holding its own views of Japanese superiority in the east, a new dawn was coming. In the middle of this a young Crown Prince was being educated and raised as a living god to lead a newly obedient and militaristic nation. His name was Hirohito and it was only a matter of time before his world clashed with the west.

The question raised is, was he central to the cause of the Pacific War? Herbert P. Bix deploys to the investigation like Hercule Poirot to a murder mystery. And is there a case to answer? Bix believes so and concludes that the emperor was central to the decision making process and due to his interest in state affairs and politics would have known the circumstances and decisions being made. The war was devastating for Japan and the empire collapsed, ending with the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and subsequent military occupation by the USA. What is fascinating is that Hirohito survived this. He remained emperor and reigned for another 44 years in a post war world. This is an incredible combination of luck, circumstance and loyalty of the people.

Bix is clearly not a fan of Hirohito and the analysis is not a glowing one. A small man with a rounded back, of average intelligence, but possessing a fantastic memory. He was interested in science and Shinto (the cult of the emperor) rather than history or politics. Bix shows that he was was at the centre of everything as Japan walked the path to war and sanctioned the decisions. Bix does state that the horrors, such as the Rape of Nanking or the treatment of prisoners of war were not his doing, but the culture of the Japanese at the time was to blame. So why then did he survive the aftermath, after so much bloodshed and devastation and unconditional surrender? The reason is General Douglas MacArthur needed him. The Japanese people still followed him and were behind him. In order to peacefully occupy the country Hirohito was the spiritual head who had ‘gifted’ his people surrender. Both men needed each other and they recognised this. As such, Hirohito was able to be exonerated and removed from any blame or war guilt.

All of this makes for a fascinating read, in a well written and coherent book. Absolutely great history. My one criticism is that Bix as an American does difficulty understanding the concepts of constitutional monarchy. When talking about it and it’s advantages, he doesn’t seem the grasp why nations such as Japan or the UK work under these systems. It is a small gripe and doesn’t detract from the greatness of this book. I knew next to nothing about this man before reading this, I have walked away having learnt a lot.

[S. Miles Lotman · Rating 5 out of 5]

The American novelist, William Faulkner, famously said, “The past is never dead. It's not even past.” His subject matter was black-white race relations and the legacy of slavery in the American South, but his words serve the Japanese experiment in twentieth century imperialism, the scars of its militarism yet unhealed, and the descendants of the rulers and the oppressed nursing respective grievances. World War II ended nearly seventy years ago, the blood spilled long since washed away, but a new nationalism in East Asia is drawing up a stale and divisive rhetoric, taking arrogant postures, and pretending history is malleable and can be recast according to one's manufactured political persuasions.

The American historian, Herbert Bix's biography of Japan's most notorious emperor, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (Harper Collins, 2000), is an 800-page tome indicting Hirohito in no uncertain terms for the war crimes for which he was never prosecuted. Like an attorney who will leave no doubt in the reader's mind, Bix carefully assembles a narrative, beginning with Hirohito's grandfather, Meiji, and how his constitution allocated tremendous authority to the Chrysanthemum Throne. Nearly a hundred pages of the book are citations of evidence reflecting Japanese militarism and a racist philosophy propagated by Japanese intellectuals and historians that led to the colonization of Manchuria, sexual bondage in the Korean peninsula, and an irrational war of conquest that nearly caused Japan's total obliteration. Every step of the way, Hirohito authorized or failed to punish the inhumane crimes of his military establishment. Moreover, Bix argues it was Hirohito's self-centered maneuvers to preserve his throne and avoid just punishment that prolonged the war unnecessarily long after Japan's cause was lost, and that the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians is the emperor's burden, as much as it is that of the Americans who authorized the atomic apocalypses.

Modern Japanese militarism has its origins when policy leaders began debating the kokutai, an archaic rarely-used concept nowadays. Kokutai are the best possible principles of Japanese state and society. Alas, it was inevitable that conservative ideologues would win the interpretation to ensure a status quo of the nearly feudal hierarchy that defined the structure of Japanese society for most of its history. Kokutai was then coupled with kodo, the “imperial way,” a political theology that declared the divine right of the emperor, who embodied moral goodness. The court, the military, and conservative political operatives could then utilize their reactionary agenda via imperial decree, as the emperor could make palatable even the most ruthless policies.

Hirohito was an amateur marine biologist. Small in stature, shy, and awkward, he was not a strongman. His personality was easily overshadowed by his arrogant generals and court advisers. Nevertheless, he was intelligent, detail-oriented and had been inculcated by court tutors to take divine right seriously, and that it was his responsibility to take part in political affairs, legitimizing Japanese militarism to the poor farmer sons who would have to leave their homeland and their families for dubious acts of violence in China, Korea, and Taiwan in service of the Emperor.

Because of WWII's total destruction, it's easy to overlook the trauma of the first world war. After Versailles, the US and Britain, via the League of Nations, put together a number of international treaties outlawing wars of aggression, most famously the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928. Japanese leaders interpreted that as an Anglo-American initiative to consolidate their vast colonial holdings (a fair argument-- they also called Europe on its hypocrisy, declaring peace overtures while resorting to violence to keep its multitudes in Africa and Asia in line). The Japanese imperialist philosophy, Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, wanted to rid Asia of European colonialists (as well as their pernicious cultural influence). The war in Asia-- beginning in China, and spreading to Britain's and France's holdings in Southeast Asia, as well as the United States' colony in the Philippines-- was justified as Asia for Asians, though the new hierarchy would indubitably place Japan at the top.

Every step of the way, Hirohito rubber-stamped his generals' advances. As emperor he could have cautioned or refuted militarism, and initially he sometimes did feel outrage at aggression, but overwhelmed by other, stronger personalities, he admitted “it can't be helped,” whether it was the political assassinations, repression of radicals, the Nanking Massacre, Pearl Harbor, or allied bombing of Japanese civilians, Hirohito decided to continue an unwinnable war waged with morally dubious values.

There is no question that Hirohito had absolute power. There is also no doubt that by summer of 1944, Japan would lose the war. Their ally, Nazi Germany, had been invaded at Normandy, and it was certain that the Soviets would turn their attention to Japan once Berlin fell. Moreover, after a spectacular blitzkrieg in late 1941, early 1942, Japan lost every single battle against the United States beginning with Midway, sustaining heavy casualties (to surrender to the enemy was seen as an act of ultimate shame-- better to die for the emperor). The US had closed Japanese sea lanes, in the process removing access to vital natural resources, as they slowly moved the Pacific war towards the home islands. In fact, the army and navy were in such dire shape, the only major losses the Americans were incurring by 1945 were kamikaze attacks and suicide charges. Thus, thousands of young men were being asked to die needlessly in the emperor's name. Why did Hirohito permit this? Why didn't he stop the war after Tokyo was firebombed on the night of March 9th, 1945 (in which 100,000 civilians were killed)? Instead they passed out bamboo spears to women, children, and old men in the event of an amphibious American invasion. They sent thousands of balloons charged with explosive across the Pacific (almost none of them reaching the U.S. and none detonating over population centers) Meanwhile, dozens of Japanese urban industrialized areas would be bombed in the five months between Tokyo's firestorming and Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why did Hirohito persist, causing so much unnecessary death?

Self-preservation, of course. The Americans wanted unconditional surrender, like they'd had with Germany. The atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration of war (happening the same week, a very bad one for Japan) spelled the futility in no uncertain terms. On August 15th, 1945, Hirohito gave his famous radio address announcing Japan's surrender. But the emperor needn't have worried. Though he had to give up his divinity status, US leadership (under the guidance of General Douglas MacArthur) was more concerned with total destabilization brought on by his abdication (they were quite concerned about communism and radicalism). During the Tokyo Trials, Hirohito was not brought up as a war criminal and the infamous, Hideki Tojo, became the fall guy, the villain, taking the rap for the emperor (supposedly the emperor wept the morning Tojo was executed). Hirohito received all the credit for surrendering and none of the blame for the catastrophe. He kept his throne, collaborated with the Americans for the reconstruction of Japan, and approved of the famous peace constitution written by the Americans “forever” renouncing war. Hirohito would reign for another 44 years, in what would be one of the greatest economic booms of any society on earth, creating a middle class, a strong safety net, and progressive values, where once there had been almost none.

Bix has presented irrefutable evidence from various court sources and testimony regarding Hirohito's war guilt. American leadership made a calculated choice not to prosecute him for these crimes. Bix's immense and laboriously composed book is not necessarily a judgment on either the emperor nor Truman and MacArthur. It is not saying that Hirohito was a "bad" man. History is too complex for such trite conclusions. But it is conclusive that the emperor was complicit in giving his imperial seal on some of the worst excesses of Japanese war crimes. And moreover, his failure to act decisively in the certainty of defeat inexorably led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians. This is not up for debate or revision. This is what happened. But how to imagine a Japan had Hirohito been tried and punished like his beloved general and prime minister, Tojo, is one of those pathways history turned away from.

So we return to Faulkner and the presence of the past, our contemporary time and a new nationalism ascendant in Japan's far right government. The prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is playing a risky game of brinksmanship with South Korea and especially China, quarreling territorially over a few rocks near Taiwan and revising history, absolving Japan of its criminal past. It is terrifying to consider how clumsy Abe is diplomatically, moreover, how poorly he is mistaking his agenda as that of a populist's. Japan's far-right is a vocal community, but they are a distinct minority, and the vast population of Japan does not seem very politically inclined, and would certainly be outraged by any sacrifice induced by (yet another unwinnable) war with China. Perhaps he is thinking his security treaty with the United States means U.S. armed forces would do his dirty work? I don't think any US president would commit American boys to China for a few uninhabitable rocks and Japan's reactionary misguided historical viewpoint. And certainly, almost no Japanese today will be willing to die for their emperor. That ideological cult is in the dustbin of history. He is no longer a god, he is just a man, a flawed one, like all of us.

[Joseph Sciuto · Rating 5 out of 5]

“It’s extraordinary how we go through life with eyes half shut, with dull ears, with dormant thoughts. Perhaps it’s just as well; and it may be that it is this very dullness that makes life to the incalculable majority so supportable and so welcome.”
— Joseph Conrad

"Hirohito," by Herbert P. Bix is a very detailed, and for good measure let me repeat, very detailed, highly informative, at times quite difficult to read, and throughout hints of America's complicity in everything that has gone wrong since the beginning of civilization.

The biography on Japan's Emperor Hirohito, who at five feet, two-inches tall and sickly looking, was cultivated like former emperors as a living deity from early in his childhood. Strange, that if you look at quite a few of the war criminals during the 20th century, Stalin, Hitler, and Emperor Hirohito, they were all fairly small in statue...not that that means anything.

Hirohito was fortunate enough to have members of his loyal court, military leaders in the army and navy, politicians and the press behind him in ways, that Donald Trump, would be envious of, and if he was able to read one might think he tried to follow his play book.

The Japanese atrocities, all approved and sanctioned by the emperor, in China during the 1930's in which the total civilian deaths were as high as five million, the millions of indiscriminate deaths during the war in the the Pacific, especially in the Philippines, and the murder of his own subjects by inciting and training his pilots in the art of the kamikaze attack, and his lack of remorse when the atom bombs were dropped and his only worry being that if he surrendered he might be put on trail as a war criminal. Amazingly, it was emperor's subjects (citizens) who were the blame for the war and the lost of millions of lives, and strangely enough a vast majority of the Japanese population believed they were the blame. Yes, as the quote by Conrad above states, “It’s extraordinary how we go through life with eyes half shut, with dull ears, with dormant thoughts. Perhaps it’s just as well; and it may be that it is this very dullness that makes life to the incalculable majority so supportable and so welcome.”

With the help from his loyal subjects, prime ministers, military, and that ever disloyal, disobedient, egoistical General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito was never put on trail. Yes, he was stripped of all his power, but remained in the ceremonial position of Emperor until his death in 1990... never admitting to his hand in all the military atrocities and his sanctioning of the wars against China and the Allied powers.

[AC · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this book several years ago, when it first came out in paperback -- I knew very little at that time (not that I know much now) about Japan, and so cannot say how good it is. I have read some of the criticisms of it. It certainly made a persuasive case, so far as I could tell, against what was still the common view that Hirohito was merely an uninvolved cipher, who was used by the militarists and ultranationalists. According to Bix, Hirohito firmly controlled events by allowing his ministers to act - and that whenever they acted contrary to his desires, he would simply step in and divert them (or remove them). Hence, he fully bears the war guilt.

Dower speaks as if this question of Hirohito's pacificism and involvement is settled (and cites Bix). According to Dower, this image of the Emperor was a sham and a construction -- begun already pre-surrender by the likes of Shigemitsu with the aim of saving the throne (Shigemitsu believed that the reforms of the Occupation would eventually be undone, when the zaibatsu would be restored); and then adopted by MacArthur's "wedge policy" (derived from Bonner F. Fellers), which sought to drive a wedge between the militarists and the people by associating the Emperor with the latter: in other words, the Emperor and the people were good, and the "militarist gangsters" had betrayed them both.

This book is enormous -- but it read very quickly, for some reason. Maybe I didn't know enough to read it slowly.

[J.M. Hushour · Rating 2 out of 5]

Reviewing works of history can be tough when you're approaching it from the perspective of a non-expert. I am no Asian Studies scholar and especially not a student of Japanese history. I have, however, some experience with reading and critiquing historical writing, so I feel fairly confident in asserting that for the lay reader, this book might be a bit much.
Bix's main thesis is that Hirohito was no pawn, no figurehead, and figured prominently in many of the bad decisions that lead to lots of of nasty things in China during the 30s and World War II, writ large. Fine. He also takes on the postwar manipulation by the US occupying forces of Hirohito's image to make the postwar situation more palatable and acceptable to the Japanese people. Fine.
But do you want to slog through a 600+ page book (with 70 pages of footnotes) to get to these nice, salient points? Not unless you're a specialist. And this was the real problem for me. As others have complained, the sheer amount of minutiae and detail are mind-blowing and there are so many names, events, political machinations and what-have-you tossed in the reader's face that the main points became lost in the mix. With a certain amount of assumed knowledge of the politics of the period, a specialist might have no problem with this work, but as a general biography or look at the time, it doesn't succeed.
Structure and density aside, there are other issues that make the ears prick up. Bix admits early on that there's quite a bit of material out there unavailable to scholars and he seems to lean heavily on a lot of secondary source materials that Japanese scholars have picked apart over the years, so some of his conclusions seem somewhat dubious or at least malleable as new information comes to light. The postwar use of the Emperor by the US seems fairly uncontroversial but the ongoing debate over Hirohito's culpability and real role seems to still be uncertain.
I think a slimmed-down version of this work might make his argument more succinct but it gets bogged down in so much detail that it's almost hard to assess where everything fits and how.

[Alex Hope · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well, I can’t say much.
It’s a basic biography with typical “this and then this happened” with basic analysis which does not go beyond the official narrative. I would go as far as saying that author has no thesis… well, that is what a solid biography should look like i guess: only facts, barely any opinion.

[Tyler Anderson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Whenever I construct a course of reading for myself, I always try to include an important biography of an major figure. This was my biographical selection for a short course (4 books?) on Japanese history I read in 2007. While overall I came away from this reading series feeling like I understood hardly any more about Japanese history and society than I had before I started, my gleanings from Hirohito were the notable exception. This wan an informative and engrossing narrative, digging pretty deeply into this man and the Japan that formed him, and was subsequently re-formed by him.

Particularly of interest was how thoroughly Bix placed Hirohito, from youth, within a coterie of advisors, mentors and teachers, and how efficiently he outlined their own backgrounds, philosophies and objects. As with most Royals the world over, Hirohito was raised in a completely and purposely fabricated bubble, disconnected from the broader human experience which would be basic for any "normal" person. The result of this, of course, is a certain sociopathy. The author effectively observes and places this man within the context of world fascism and absolutism, revealing Hirohito as the greatest of the escaped war criminals, not the fictional, hapless, retiring gentleman who emerged shrugging his shoulders at the tail end of the war.

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

Pulitzer winning, massive, detailed and well-researched biography of Hirohito, the Showa emperor of Japan who ruled from 1926 to 1989. It probably deserves five stars, but is pretty dense and dry. It convincingly makes the case that Hirohito was immensely influential and powerful before and during the war and should have been charged with crimes of aggression in the Tokyo trials. MacArthur and Truman allowed him to stay in office ostensibly to help unify and control Japan and counter Communist and Socialist influence. Was it the right decision? It's impossible to say, and leaves me wondering what the post-war would have been like in Japan without him.

[Clif · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's difficult for an American, living under the philosophy that we are all equally human and have a right to elect those who govern, to understand a system where one person is considered divine and entitled to rule absolutely. Japan no longer has such a system but it did from 1868 (the Meiji Restoration) until the end of World War II.

This 700 page book covering the life of Emperor Hirohito gives the reader a detailed account of how the Japanese system worked, in the process providing a view of the run-up, prosecution and aftermath of WWII from the other side.

Until I read this book I had been under the impression that Hirohito was a figurehead who was pressured into war by militarist subordinates. Nothing could be further from the truth, yet my lifelong view is not surprising as it was the intent of both the emperor and the American occupation force under Douglas MacArthur after the war ended that the deception be pulled off. The emperor's interest was in maintaining the relationship of the Japanese people to him. For MacArthur, the deception made it easier to exercise control over the Japanese through the compliant emperor. I wonder how many Americans are still under the false impression.

Hirohito underwent an intensive education to prepare him for his role and he took to it with relish. At the same time, his subjects did not question in the least his right to rule. The military was in charge and Hirohito was in charge of the military. Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria in China were all brought under Japanese control years before the attack on Pearl Harbor. From time to time, ambitious generals in China would on their own initiative launch advances to capture more territory. Hirohito never failed to approve after the fact, feeling that success was justification.

He was careful in his thinking, liked to stay on top of details and had his own independent means of gathering information outside of the military bureaucracy. Far from being a dupe, he was always at least as informed as those who reported to him and demanded a rationale for any action that was suggested to him, peppering his subordinates with questions. In addition to commanding the military, he appointed prime ministers and met with them constantly, charting the course of the government even though it was made to appear that decisions were coming from the parliament (the Diet).

The emperor could not be wrong. In the cases were he made a bad decision, others would take the blame, quite willingly as their responsibility as subjects. This was evident after WWII was over when the former prime minister, Tojo, was convicted as a war criminal and executed, though it was Hirohito all along who had made the decisions.

I was impressed by the isolation of the emperor from the results of his decisions. He never visited a battlefield and issued his orders from an always serene and civil environment. He could order armies of tens of thousands to fight and die without any thought that there were individuals dying. Like Hitler refusing to end the war even when all hope was lost, Hirohito was perfectly willing to see the war fought to the last Japanese. With the Japanese Navy destroyed and no army left to defend the Japanese home islands, he ordered citizens to fight with bamboo stakes. Suicidal attack was honored.

Most remarkable is that Hirohito and his subordinates knew before the attack on Pearl Harbor that there was no way Japan could defeat the United States. Their hope was that they could win a decisive battle at sea that would so demoralize the United States it would agree to terms. The only thing to be decided was the date for opening the attack, the sooner the better because America could only grow stronger with time. A mixture of mysticism and racism played a large part, the Japanese being convinced they were superior to "the white races". Again, as with Hitler, Hirohito often thought that the only thing required to win was the will to do so regardless of the disparity in numbers or armament. Thus are men slaughtered in service to their leaders. To this extent Japan was living in a militarist dream to be awakened only with the shock of Hiroshima and the announcement that the USSR would be invading in addition to the US. The greatest fear? That the three sacred regalia of the emperor might be captured.

There was never an attempt from within to end the war by killing Hirohito. Even after the atomic bombs were dropped, subordinates were fully willing to continue if Hirohito willed it. This makes it all the more astounding that he came out of it all portrayed as a man who wanted peace but was forced into war. Near the end of his life, this war criminal was walking around Disneyland with Mickey Mouse on a visit to the U.S. in the 1970's.

Through it all, Hirohito was a shy, nervous, small man with a squeaky voice, at a loss for words and suffering nervous tics when finally he was required to speak in public. His is an astounding story.

[Aditya Kulkarni · Rating 2 out of 5]

When Clint Eastwood made a film on the Battle of Iwo Jima, he made it from both the Japanese and American perspectives. He ensured that the balance was maintained and handled a sensitive topic with excellent maturity and I really loved that! Actually, it was the movie Letters from Iwo Jima which prompted me to try and read more about Japan in WWII and how the nation emerged from the ashes of the war to become the world's third-largest economy.

That's why I picked this book but I found it to be a disappointment. The author lacked the balance that made Clint Eastwood stand out from the crowd. Overall book is pretty much biased to the American POV and there's very little about "The Making of Modern Japan" in the book. I'm not surprised that this book won a Pulitzer. It is written by an American and caters to the American view point. Not worth reading if you are trying to learn about Japan.

[Aaron Million · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bix writes about as good of a biography as possible about Hirohito - Japan's disappointing and selfish Emperor from 1926-1989. All but the last forty pages focuses on Hirohito's life up to the late 1940s when he was obsessed with making sure that he was absolved of any culpability in starting WWII and then delaying Japan's surrender. The bulk of the book is on the "China incident", in reality Japan's invasion and occupation of China in 1931, through the 1930s, the long build-up to attacking the U.S. in 1941, the Hirohito's abysmal stewardship of his country throughout the War and immediately afterward.

While no fault of Bix's, the book lacks the intimacy of many biographies of famous figures as Hirohito took great strides to prevent anyone from ever knowing just how involved he was in Japaese politics and the country's militaristic attitude. Hirohito rarely wrote or said anything - that would be evidence that could be used against him. So, much of what Bix writes about is the story that he is able to piece together through diary entries of some people who had proximity to Hirohito, and general Japanese views of the monarchy.

Bix is a good writer, and the story flows smoothly. With limited sources, he does an admirable job of reconstructing Hirohito's life. The Emperor really should have been tried as a war criminal; he as much as anyone, if not more than everyone, was responsible for the loss of so many lives in the Pacific (that is not to minimize the atrocities committed by Japanese troops in China in the 1930s). The book does end rather abruptly though, with Bix rapidly sifting through the last almost forty years of Hirohito's life. In the end, Hirohito comes across as a bland, uninteresting, out of touch, power-hungry despot who was indifferent to the suffering of the Japanese people.

[prcardi · Rating 2 out of 5]

Composition: 3/5
Evidence: 3/5
Writing Style: 2/5
Balance: 2/5

Titles matter, particularly when setting expectations. One can be forgiven for assuming this to be a biography - the first word is Hirohito after all, and the work did win the National Book Critics Circle Award for Biography/Autobiography. One coming to this, as I did, expecting an in-depth look at the life of WWII Japanese Emperor Hirohito is set for disappointment. The title, more observant readers might have noted, includes not simply "Hirohito" but also "the Making of Modern Japan." Thus this purports to be a contemporary state history as much as a biography. The biographical element of this was, additionally, relatively weak. Bix mentions early on that although the Emperor was an avid diarist, those diaries are rigorously safeguarded by the Imperial Household Agency and inaccessible to nonpartisan historians. The author writes,

Hirohito was not a gregarious, outgoing person with a wide assortment of friends fond of writing candidly about him. He was a reticent person who spoke most eloquently sometimes by not speaking at all. Socialized to public opacity, he was trained also to private wariness. He left behind no abundance of texts with his signature on them, revealing his thoughts and enabling us to capture his responses to the major events that he lived through. On ceremonial occasions...he wrote waka poems...[b]ut he published no reminiscences and usually expressed his ideas or intentions only through others, who found it disrespectful and inappropriate for a Japanese subject to write critically about him.

Bix would go on to further detail the off-limits sources: personal correspondence with family members, the "Record of the Emperor's Conversations," the diaries of people who served him, and the entirety of the Hirohito folder in the U.S. National Archives. This leaves the historian without access to the usual concentrations of data, and Bix scoured wide ranging sources for hints, scraps, tidbits, and other clues to build a narrative. What results is something less like a biography of Hirohito and more of an account of the institution of the monarchy relative to other state powers - political parties, parliament, the cabinet, and the military. A more descriptive title would have been "The Rise and Fall of Imperial Japan."

In writing a popular history, the author has a double burden: to fulfill the demands of the history buffs, veterans, academics, and politicians who expect detailed facts and supporting evidence while also making the information accessible and interesting to broader audiences. The manner in which Bix attempts to satisfy the fact-seeking is to present a comprehensive cast of characters in their interactions with the Emperor. I'd estimate the number of different names in the text at something around a thousand. Perhaps I exaggerate and it is only several hundred. Whatever the precise number, the reader is inundated with the names of generals and field commanders, secretaries and statesmen, tutors and relatives. Bix's method of streamlining and simplifying for the broader audiences is to craft a simple narrative: Hirohito was not the "pacifist, antimilitarist, and completely passive onlooker" he was portrayed to be at the war's end. As someone in between the two typical audiences - alert for evidence but desiring an engaging narrative - I would have much rather had a work that managed the double expectation in exactly the opposite manner. Streamline and simplify the cast of characters, giving those of us without an interest in or familiarity with early 20th century Japanese domestic actors a limited number of key figures by which to orient ourselves and to follow. Then the nuance and detail would come with understanding Hirohito and the complexities of motivations and circumscriptions. By doing just opposite, I found much of the early chapters dry, as they were devoted to characters and interactions that had limited, if any, obvious ramifications for later in the book. I also found the overarching thesis too simple and repetitive, unconvincing in its presumption as biography.

With a history one of the additional challenges for the author is to win over the reader's trust. We're simply not going to research, study, and verify what is written; we want the author to be a trustworthy authority. That means making reasonable arguments backed by examples and convincing evidence. That means citing other works that also look and feel authoritative. I'm not going to check footnotes very often, but when I do, what I find there should erase any qualms or misgivings about the author's objectivity and expertise. Bix continually failed to win over my trust. It is in his attempt to present a clear and simple argument that I developed most of my objections and concerns. The text is relentless in defending its narrow thesis: Hirohito was not "merely a figurehead within a framework of autocratic imperial rule, and a puppet of the military." Thus as the chronicle proceeds through four parts, "The Prince's Education, 1901-1921," "The Politics of Good Intentions, 1922-1930," "His Majesty's Wars, 1931-1945," and "The Unexamined Life, 1945-1989," the narrative progresses by identifying militaristic postures, violations of international treaties, crimes against humanity, and command decisions in battle and notes how Hirohito did not adopt a pacifist stance, urge respect of treaties, chastise the military for war crimes, or permit orders to be issued without imperial review. The phrase, "Hirohito failed to..."- followed by "stop," "purge," "reprimand," or some other active and effective antiwar action - occurs scores of times. Additional variants such as "He never," "missed opportunity," or the simple, "did not" make for a tally of hundreds of instances where Bix's defense is a lack of action on the part of the Emperor. This is valid tool on the part of the historian and can complement other evidence, but the repetition and centrality of this argument became tiresome and did not instill in me a respect for the author's concern for gradations or grey areas. At times, attempts to make the text more flowery and easy to follow made for confusion or conjecture. In discussing the young Hirohito's first international tour, Bix writes that

The high points of his visit to Britain included a three-night stay in Buckingham Palace, speeches at London’s Guildhall and Mansion House, visits to numerous British military facilities (where he sometimes wore the uniform of a British army general), visits to both houses of Parliament, the British Museum, the prime minister’s mansion at Chequers, the towns of Windsor and Oxford, the universities of Oxford, Cambridge and Edinburgh, a three-day stay at the castle of the duke of Atholl in Scotland, and a tour of Manchester and the Midlands industrial region.

What intrigued me (as I was still reading this as a biography) was that these were the "high points" of Prince Hirohito's visit - thus this is what made an impression upon him early in formative years as an international figure. There is no further discussion, however, of why or how this was a significant part of his tour or what it meant for his life. In fact, the total lack of follow-up suggests that Bix wasn't referring to the "high point" from Hirohito's point of view at all but was rather attempting to liven up the narrative and make it more descriptive - something like a tourist brochure. This would not be the only time this or something like it happened. In several instances Bix would include some provocative statement but without including the supporting details or examples that would make the point illustrative or persuasive. Thus when he notes that during the Allied occupation, Japanese political leaders were able to "downplay, without ever explicitly repudiating, the Shinto foundation myths that, in any event, few Japanese still believed," I latched onto the part about few Japanese believing the Shinto foundation myths. That is meaningful in understanding the roots, stability, and appeal of the monarchy, and it would be surprising to me that the foundation myths did not have a devoted following. If one follows the footnote to the citation, one finds, "Akazawa, 'Shocho tennosei no keisei to senso sekininron,' p. 46. Only I don't speak Japanese, and I don't know who Akazawa is. I can't even tell what information is being attributed. Is this citation pointing to the evidence about the decline in belief of Shinto foundation myths or is this simply what someone in leadership believed at that time? It comes from a 1976 source, thus is it one of the apologetic post-rationalization documents we are supposed to treat suspiciously or one of the candid accounts we are supposed to give more weight? Bix would do this regularly - make bold statements (that usually supported his thesis) and provide a footnote (without explanation or discussion) to a work that would be inaccessible - un-indentifyable even - to non Japanese-speaking audiences. At times this would be less central to the book's main argument and was simple laziness. For instance, when discussing Hirohito's funeral, Bix writes, "Like that of the Showa emperor before him, the pageantry was all government-financed, but less elaborate this time and less hyped. The public looked on with pleasure, but few seemed moved by it." This would be a great place for detail. Give us a paragraph on the emperor's funeral before Hirohito. Give us a paragraph about the arrangements and organization of Hirohito's funeral. Provide some examples, anecdotes, or newspaper headlines that show how it was "less hyped." This kind of sentence is a good topic sentence; you would then follow it up with the detail and evidence that makes this a history. Instead, Bix often used these as summary sentences framing the narrative that he wanted without making the effort to persuade the reader that he had good reasons for doing so.

Even the quasi-biographical, quasi-state history orientation of the book loses focus later in the text. Bix abruptly turns to some subsidiary historical controversies, shifting from the Japanese viewpoint to the American or Allied one in order to make a statement on such debates as the necessity of use of the atomic bomb, the prudence of Allied insistence on unconditional surrender, the charge of victor's justice with the Tokyo Trials, and MacArthur's role in exonerating the Japanese Emperor. Not only did the book lose the concentration and Japanese perspective, but even when it was from derived from Japanese sources, Bix moved further and further from centering on the aims, ambitions, and abilities of the monarchy to understanding the broader post-war Japanese political environment. In the Post-Occupation years, largely chapter 17, the last chapter of both Part IV and the book, Hirohito becomes a much smaller and less central figure. In part, this is simply the reality of the situation - the outcome of the Allied Occupation of Japan. This is where the second half of the title, "the Making of Modern Japan," is actually apt. This wasn't a theme or direction set up with the earlier chapters, however, and I couldn't help but conclude that the book left biography of Hirohito and the institutional history of the monarchy because of a lack of sources.

To Bix's argument that Hirohito was intimately involved with the planning and directing of wars in China, Indochina and the Pacific, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan pounds in ample evidence. This revisionist history must be why this book won a Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction. I do not come away from the book, however, knowing Hirohito very well. Also, though I found the sheer volume of evidence persuasive, I was regularly suspicious of Bix's reading of events, use of data, and sources. This was not a book written to convince a skeptical audience but a history with a clear objective to defend. Bix's method was to take the traditional view of Hirohito as a powerless, centrist, pacifist and look to see what one would have expected to see if that were true. A more ambitious history would have also asked other questions such as, was Hirohito circumscribed by military actors? What were the limits on him and how plausible was it that he could be assassinated and replaced? This would not absolve the Emperor of the culpability that Bix wants billed to Hirohito's legacy, but it would help to understand the person of Hirohito. How much outside information was Hirohito able to access, and how much of his own and the state mythology did he believe? None of these are questions that Bix seriously considers, and he rarely presents or entertains any evidence that challenges his reading of history. So even though I find myself persuaded by the central thesis, I never found Bix to be an author that imbued trust. If one wants to read more about the Making of Modern Japan, I would heartily recommend John Dower's "Embracing Defeat." There are bound to be better military histories available on the Pacific front. And if you are looking for a biography on Hirohito, I would wait until some of those top secret sources from the Imperial Household Agency or U.S. National Archives are released. In short, I would not recommend this book.

[Adam Balshan · Rating 3 out of 5]

3 stars [Biography]
Exact rating: 3.08
#21 in genre, out of 35

Herbert Bix’s biography of Hirohito won the Pulitzer Prize in 2001, making this the second Pulitzer Prize-winning book I have read within 5 weeks that rated far below amazing.

A New Introduction comes first at the front of my Harper Perennial softcover published in 2016. It sets a jaundiced tone which—though it was thankfully minimal in the main body from 2001—clarifies some of his political assessments, especially in post-war Japan. The New Introduction included a deeply ignorant harangue of U.S. involvement in world affairs. Ludicrous overgeneralization concerning the Middle East, a region in which Bix has no expertise, skewed the picture of 21st century jihad movements. When Bix defended North Korea (p.xxx), it became evident that his biases must be stilted indeed! Bix’s viewpoint seemed to be a flavor of Chomskyism; it was so warped and delusional that Bix had me mentally defending Barack Obama! Especially after 4 years of Chinese actions since Bix wrote the New Introduction, he resembles a wide-eyed maniac, or a new Neville Henderson waving a paper around and proclaiming, “Peace in our time!”

Writing: 2.75
The first 93 pages were the worst of the writing. As Bix covered Hirohito’s early life and education, the names of people, offices, terms, and events flew by with little to no explanation. A few interesting assertions popped up—but then there were no details! As coverage of the 1920s began, Bix stabilized into a narrative between mediocre [2.5] and above average [3] for the rest of the book (to page 688).

Truth: 3.23
I concede that certain of Bix’s assertions cannot be assessed by the non-specialist in East Asian Studies; they are too tied up with documentary analysis (including omissions) of the Japanese record. Thus, this Truth score mainly assesses how well Bix presented the evidence. His assessments were rather thorough throughout the book, but nevertheless relied heavily on speculation. Bix admitted that source material was still scant due to private, imperial foundations withholding primary documents to this day, but perhaps a shorter book would have better represented this fact. Minutiae, conjecture, and holes were the result.

With the Chomskyan Introduction, I expected wide-ranging abuse of historical facts, but most of the book seemed rather staid. In particular, Bix did not revise the suicidism of late-war Japan, or give an overly facile presentation of the last year of the war. He barely touched the complex reasoning for dropping the atomic bombs, but on the other hand, he didn’t viciously color it with anachronistic moralizing from contemporary, pseudo-intellectual, Critical theory. He woefully mischaracterized the American response to Southwest Asian invasions in July 1941 [p.400], and all but lied about Truman’s response to the Korean conflict [p.640]. Minorly, but egregiously, he implied that Hirohito should have recognized the character of German weakness in 1941, when the entire rest of the world didn’t realize it until 1942 or 1943 [p.409-410]!

On the other hand, his main premise seemed to be a rare truth and well-founded. Bix contended that Hirohito was not a pacifist immobilized by the organs of constitutional monarchy, had full knowledge and approval of Pearl Harbor, and that there was an American conspiracy to whitewash Hirohito's war guilt for the gains of 1940s occupation stability and 1950s Anticommunism.

Use: 3.27
There was enough historical narrative to interest the general reader, although its length will dissuade many. Content ranged between things one could find on a Wikipedia page [2.5] and the underlinable [3], with about 93 pages of [2.38] and 74 pages of [3.5]. Its length, sourcing, useful transliteration of important Japanese phrases, and the ability to be used as an ad hoc textbook bumped its utility above its mere historical content.

Takeaway
Recommended only to those highly interested in East Asia, WWII, or lengthy biographies. Bix, impeded by sequestered archives, simply couldn’t dive deep enough to warrant a 700-page biography. This should have been a 400-page book either in Biography or Politics/Foreign Affairs.

[Colin McEvoy · Rating 4 out of 5]

I had been interested in reading Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan ever since I had seen an exhibit of American anti-Japanese propaganda advertisements from during World War II, which used extremely exaggerated Asian stereotypes in its portrayals of the emperor. In addition to being highly offended by the overt racism, it occurred to me that I really didn't know much about Hirohito himself, and my only real impression of him was that he was largely a figurehead who was forced into the war by the Japanese military. As it turns out, this impression was not only false, but probably itself also resulted from American propaganda, which dates back to when American leaders protected Hirohito from prosecution as a war criminal in order to establish democracy in post-WW2 Japan. In this book, Herbert P. Bix presents a strong and compelling argument that the decades-long perception of the emperor as a passive figurehead is a false one, and that Hirohito was in fact a very active player in the country's militarism during the 1930s and 1940s; an emperor who both reigned and ruled.

Although I had long been interested in Japan, particularly 20th century Japanese history, I had not read much about the subject heading in to Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, and I did struggle with the reading at first. Bix does a fairly decent job of providing enough context that the material is approachable even to someone without much past knowledge of Japanese history, but even so it was initially difficult to keep certain names and events straight. But while the initial chapters with Hirohito's childhood and education were a bit slow, the book picks up in a big way once we reach 1931, starting with the Manchurian Incident that led to the Japanese invasion of China. After this point, the book was quite gripping, and Bix's account is especially impressive given how very first-hand accounts and texts were left behind by Hirohito, and how much information is still not rendered publicly available by the Japanese government.

As the book unfolded, it was really interesting to watch how the role of the emperor changed and evolved over the course of the 20th century, from one of the embodiment of a living deity to one of a more symbolic constitutional monarch. The idea of Hirohito, after World War II, being forced to tell his subjects that, despite what they have believed all their lives, he is NOT in fact a god was fascinating to me as an outsider to this culture looking in. I also found intriguing, and somewhat infuriating, how much more quickly the war could have been brought to an end if Hirohito and other Japanese leaders had been more concerned about ending the suffering of their people and less concerned about finding a way to protect their power structure and, as Bix puts it, "lose without losing." As someone several generations removed from this period of history, I've long had issues with the fact that the U.S. government took so many noncombatant lives with the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the air raids on Tokyo and other Japanese cities, and I still do. But it's mind-boggling to think how many hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives could have been saved if Hirohito had not delayed his country's surrender for so long.

This is an excellent, comprehensive biography of an intriguing historical figure, impressive in its depth of research and nuance, and it's well worth reading for anyone interested in this area, regardless of how much prior knowledge you have of modern Japanese history.

[Jonathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very thorough and readable political biography. Bix's thesis is that Hirohito ruled as well as reigned, and that he was one of those directly responsible for Japan's aggression and war crimes in the Second World War. A combination of Japanese duplicity and the American occupiers' policy under MacArthur saved the emperor from prosecution as well as the throne itself, which the Americans found convenient for keeping order in Japan as it demobilized and reconstructed after the war. My problems with the book is that Bix is a Marxist and that, as such, he can't resist making gratuitous swipes at the US (and never at the Soviet Union) or nattering on about "ruling elites." Like most leftists, he doesn't understand military affairs, so his descriptions of the war in the Pacific are riddled with errors. Nonetheless, as a portrait of the Showa Emperor and his life and times, this book is the best available.

[George · Rating 5 out of 5]

Embracing Defeat -- meet your match! As with Dower's book, Bix makes heavy use of Japanese language primary source materials. Bix is coy in the beginning when he warns the reader that access to historical imperial records remains limited, but the breadth and depth of his research can't be faulted in the slightest. A highly enjoyable and insightful read!

[Susan O · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well-written and documented book. I enjoyed Bix's writing style and learned a lot about a subject I knew little about.

[Gilbert · Rating 2 out of 5]

832 pages, and the promised synopsis of the title has not been explained, at all. How modern Japan was made could be substituted to ’’Hirohito was an awful militarist I Mr. Bix will give evidence and analysis in about 50pages and spend the rest on my own opinion, fucking up with facts and ignoring all other viewpoints, leaving out anything that does not serve my agenda’’

The priorities struck me as odd, indeed very odd. And sometimes, I can not help to think the author did claim some things in the knowledge that most of the readers would not know
Factual flaws include the claim that Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary were fascist states in 1940. It’s a detail, but this kind of totally wrong facts makes me question the credibility of the book. And perhaps, the authors motifs, either he plays dum or actually is dumb. Cause I can not believe that a historian with (claimed) knowledge of WW2 political affairs would put forward such absolutely ignorant factual claim.

His claim that Japan was fascist is also equally ludicrous, no serious scholar believes this. At most (and this is probably not wrong) Japan was an authoritarian regime with some fascistic traits, including cult of personality.
But in order to claim that cult of personality makes a state fascist one has to be extremely historically ignorant.
Napoleonic (monarchy) had it, Rome definitely had it (with the same belief and dogma about the Emperor being a divine ruler and god among the other gods), Stalinism (and most communist countries had it), in modern times the theocracy of Iran has it. So, well that does not make a society fascist.
Was Japan economically fascist? No. Was it culturally fascist? Quite the opposite, fascist states (Italy and Germany) tried its best to destroy tradition, replacing it with the project of the ’’new human’’ - Futurism, Racial Mysticism etc. Had a repulsion to established religion. And viewed monarchy as an annoying hindrance for their goal, that should either be destroyed (Germany) or tolerated but only as a figurehead, and deposed when time will allow it (Italy).

Does he use the term ’’fascist’’ as marxists do? Claiming that everything that is in some way traditionalistic or ’’evil’’ fascist? I suspect so, and I believe he is a marxist (won’t go into it cause this review is already long enough and I think I have debunked more important factual flaws, his possible personal-beliefs are not the most important. But, it once again makes me question the credibility of the author.

The most important thing tough, by far, is his priorities. This book is 800(!) pages. He spends much time on Hirohitos upbringing, fine that’s relevant but not when contrasted with how little he writes about other objectively more important things. He spends more time on how he raised his children than on for example Hideki Tojos career, Tojo literally pops up like mushrooms after rain, no context, no background, nothing. And he does not figure very much, at all, however the author has to put strong emphasis on the fact that Hirohito liked Tojo. Why? No, that is totally irrelevant according to Mr. Bix.

The by far most absurd claim is that Hirohito used February 20th incident (1936) to gain more political power. It is beyond belief how idiotic this claim is. The Kodoha (Imperial Way Faction) that Hirohito cracked down on, wanted to make him a supreme leader, a total dictator, reform the Kokutai wherein Hirohito would not only be viewed as a god, but also (which is the difference between the Imperial Way and Control Faction) treat him as a god within the political system.
Well, Hirohito suppressed this; ’’In order to take more control’’. Does he put forward any analysis? Any proof, or rather counter proof? No, he spends less than a chapter on what is perhaps most important event (having a snowball effect and setting the map for future road) leading up to Japan in WW2.

The Soviet-Japanese border clashes, Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign which were also very important (their failure played a huge part in which way Japan would take.

I can understand why this book won prizes, all revisionism that paints what is considered by the intellectual as ’’bad guys’’ usually do. But no prizes in the world will save this book from the fact it is absolute joke in many ways, and in no way tries to answer the claimed goal (How Hirohito formed Japan). It is partial to the maximum, and sets out to prove a point which in itself is pretty bad for a serious history-book (facts-proof-conclusion), but fine, it can still be interesting if it at least attempts to do it right even tough it is partial, but it makes it so bad that nothing can save it.

At times interesting, some new information on Hirohitos life, but all in all a partisan waste of time.

2.5* (1.5* for ’’analysis’’, 1+ for the times it gave some facts unknown to me)

Recommended for marxist schoolers and petty moralistic pseudo intellectuals that which to get their worldview affirmed, not recommended for anyone else.

[lex · Rating 4 out of 5]

definitely well researched, and i feel like i learned a lot so i don't feel right rating it badly, but would i read it again? probably not

one book closer to a master's degree 🙈

[George · Rating 3 out of 5]

A Leader Like Any Other
This is not a traditional biography. It is more half-historical biography and half-commentary on Japanese politics.
I recommend skipping the forward and prologue save yourself time. It is mainly just hot takes on Japanese politics from a Chomsky frame of mind, and doomsaying about the future of a capitalistic and imperialistic Japan. Example hot take: he says that the American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were “genocidal.” Bix likes his hyperbole. However, when it gets to the emperor’s life, the quality improves greatly. Especially concerning the emperor’s early life.
Bix’s main thrust of the book, as I saw it, is to prove that Hirohito was a driving force in the war and should be held responsible. I’m not completely convinced that he is any more or less responsible for Japanese actions in WW2 than anyone else. But that’s a big deal because the traditional narrative of him being peaceful and being a puppet has been challenged well by this book.
He tries to give proper context for everything, for the most part succeeds, but this definitely shouldn’t be your first Japanese WW2 book.
You can tell the author doesn’t like him and will take shots at his personality and will try and show that the Japanese people didn’t really like him. For example, he tells about how when Hirohito was dying people signed get well cards and prayed for him only because company leaders did it. This could be true for some, but I doubt the Japanese people hated him so, especially since I have asked some about it.
The strangest part of the book is the rather abrupt ending that it has. I was expecting Bix to really nail me with a hot neo-liberal take on the future of the position of emperor, but it just sort of ends.
This book is important because it challenges the traditional narrative and does it well, however it comes with its own set of biases. If the book had been a more properly balanced biography that painted a complex picture of the emperor I would have enjoyed it more. Would recommend reading if it is following or followed by a more traditional biography or summary of the emperor and the Pacific War.

[Stephen Rowland · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have read volumes about Japan, its history, the Pacific War, the American Occupation, and so on, therefore I was in no hurry to read this book as I didn't think I had much to gain from it. It has been on my radar for years, though, and once I picked it up I really couldn't stop reading. And the knowledge I gained is invaluable, with Bix's immaculate research destroying and rebuilding much of what I already knew. It's not a book I would recommend to those with little knowledge of the Showa era (or the Meiji), but for amateur "scholars" of Japanese history like myself, this book is essential.

[Infosifter · Rating 4 out of 5]

When I was in my teens, I read a biography of Hirohito that made it seem as though he was largely innocent of war crimes committed by Japan. This much more thorough political biography shows that this is a myth propagated by the emperor and those around him to protect him from the potential consequences should his actions become better understood by Western leaders. This was a fairly dense read, but interesting and definitely informative. There is a new book about the war crimes trials, and I read this in order to have a deeper understanding of the background.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a fantastic read. This book really delves into the aspects of the Japanese and its emperor that never are addressed in modern popular literature. Dr. Bix did an excellent job in describing Hirohito and the political movements that influenced the twentieth century from the perspective of the Japanese themselves.

I would highly recommend this book if you are looking to broadening your worldviews.